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The increasing reliance of the American military on weaponized drones in counter terrorism efforts 
has produced a contentious debate regarding the use of drones. This debate is characterized by two 
competing social discourses. First, a dominant discourse, articulated by the political elite in the 
United States, that advocates the use of drones as an issue of national security, while maintaining 
the clandestine nature of the drone program.  Second, a subversive discourse, primarily articulated 
by legal scholars and human rights organizations, that criticize the civilian casualties resulting 
from the United States’ use of drones and attempts to expose the human experience of drone strikes 
by exposing the clandestine. This project utilizes interpretative content analysis to establish the 
major themes present in the dominant discourse by evaluating seminal policy speeches given by 
members of the Obama Administration regarding drone warfare. To establish the primary themes 
of the subversive discourse, this project uses a multi-methodological approach, employing 
interpretative content analysis of two Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) reports and visual 
analysis of the post-drone strike photography of Pakistani journalist, Noor Behram. These 
discourses are organized by three frames (Security, Insecurity, and Story) that attempt to garner or 
maintain public support and generate or suppress collective action. Examination of these frames 
reveals that the subversive discourse has been unable to prompt a sustained policy-changing 
movement within the United States but has prompted the release of documents by the Obama 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
  
The eye in the sky waits for the putty people to get closer together. 
Just a little closer…closer…closer…there. 
I press the button. I watch the screen. 
A moment. A moment. 
And, boom. A silent grey boom. 
George Brant1 
 
Instead of first experiencing America through a school or a hospital, most people in Wessab 
[Yemen] first experienced America through the terror of a drone strike. 
Farea Al-Muslimi2 
  
On April 23, 2013, the United States Senate held a hearing to discuss the security, legal, 
and ethical implications of drone-focused counterterrorism policies. The hearing, Drone Wars: 
The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, brought together 
retired military officers, legal scholars, security experts, and a Yemeni reporter, each giving 
testimony on the advantages and disadvantages of drone warfare. The speakers’ testimonies 
represented three frames, or ways that information is presented in order to prompt action, regarding 
drone warfare: Security, Insecurity, and Story. 
 Articulating the Security frame, retired General James E. Cartwright explained that the use 
of drones is necessary because members and affiliates of the al Qaeda terrorist network “find 
sanctuary in sympathetic populations, ungoverned spaces, and have the potential to move quietly, 
often undetected across the globe.”3 Drone expert Peter Bergen argued that “the drone attacks in 
Pakistan have undoubtedly hindered some of the Taliban’s operations and have killed hundreds of 
their lower-lever fighters and a number of their top commanders.”4 The reliance on the tactical use 
                                                 
1 George Brant, Grounded (New York: Samuel French, 2014), 32.  
2 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 
Drone Wars: The Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing, 113th Congress, First 
Session, 23 April 2013, 14. 
3 Ibid., 3.  
4 Ibid., 27.  
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of drones, however, has been wrought with criticism and concerns about the targets of strikes and 
the potential for civilian casualties.   
 These concerns have been articulated by the second represented frame at the hearing: 
Insecurity. It is logical that the delivery of strikes from an unmanned plane, generally undetectable, 
would spark fear and anxiety—insecurity—on the part of civilians who reside within the areas 
generally targeted by drone strikes. Legal scholar, Rosa Brooks, suggested to the Senate 
Subcommittee that feelings of insecurity are rooted in a seeming indiscrimination of drone strikes. 
“The trouble is,” Brooks explained, “no one outside a very small group within the US executive 
branch has any ability to evaluate who is and isn’t a combatant.”5  Ilya Somin, also a legal scholar, 
explained that clear discrimination of combatants from noncombatants in drone warfare is vital for 
American drone tactics to be viewed as legal within the auspices of international law. She said, 
“Serious constitutional and other problems arise if the US government fails to take proper care to 
ensure that the use of drones is strictly limited to legitimate terrorist targets.”6  
This legal jargon, however, may cause noncombatants to seem uni-dimensional, lacking a 
sense of humanity; making them real. Yemeni citizen Farea Al-Muslimi attempted to humanize 
the noncombatants who live in areas targeted by drone warfare through the frame of Story. By 
recounting his experiences with drone strikes in his home town of Wessab, he paints of picture of 
anger, fear, and hatred harbored by the residents of Wessab and Yemeni villages like it, directed 
not towards the targeted terrorists, but at the United States. Al-Muslimi recounted his 
conversations with Yemenis, “I have met with dozens of civilians who were injured during drone 
strikes and other air attacks. I have met with relatives of people who were killed by drone strikes 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 56.  
6 Ibid., 74.  
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as well as numerous eye witnesses. They have told me how these air strikes have changed their 
lives for the worse.”7 
Evident in this hearing are two competing social discourses. First, a dominant discourse, 
articulated by the political elite in the United States, that advocates the use of drones as an issue 
of national security, while maintaining the clandestine nature of the drone program.  Second, a 
subversive discourse, primarily articulated by legal scholars and human rights organizations, that 
criticize the civilian casualties resulting from the United States’ use of drones and attempts to 
expose the human experience of drone strikes by exposing the clandestine. This project utilizes 
interpretative content analysis to establish the major themes present in the dominant discourse by 
evaluating seminal policy speeches given by members of the Obama Administration regarding 
drone warfare. To establish the primary themes of the subversive discourse, this project uses a 
multi-methodological approach, employing interpretative content analysis of two Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) reports8 and visual analysis of the post-drone strike 
photography of Pakistani journalist, Noor Behram. These discourses are organized by three frames 
(Security, Insecurity, and Story) that attempt to garner or maintain public support and generate or 
suppress collective action. Examination of these frames reveals that the subversive discourse has 
been unable to prompt a sustained policy-changing movement within the United States but has 
prompted the release of documents by the Obama Administration that incompletely account for 
drone strike and their guiding policies.     
                                                 
7 Ibid., 14.  
8 Amnesty International, “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan (London: Amnesty International 
Publications, 2013) and Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic and the Global Justice 
Clinic at NYU School of Law, Living Under Drones, Internet; http:///www.livingunderdrones.org; Accessed 20 
October 2015.  
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This chapter provides some guidance for reading this project. First, it will briefly explain 
the relevancy of discourses within society and the impact of framing that discourse for social 
mobilization. Second, it will explain the context of borderless counterterrorism that underpins 
drone warfare, identifying what is being framed. Third, it will briefly sketch out the three frames 
that organize the analysis in this project. Finally, it will outline the chapters that flesh out this 
project. 
Why Discourse? Why Framing? 
 
This project seeks to identify and critically analyze the normalized discourse created by 
elite narratives and the oppositional discourse created through NGO reports and photography 
surrounding the use of weaponized drones in counterterrorism combat missions. While identifying 
and clarifying a discourse is interesting, it doesn’t do anything. The utilization of framing theory 
assists by providing an analytical mechanism that can account for how the discourses interact with 
society and is useful in assessing their success and/or failure.   
A discourse, simply defined, is a “sense making story.”9 These stories are socially 
constructed narrative structures that give deeper meaning to mere words.10 Primarily underpinned 
by the discursive philosophies of Foucault and Derrida, the analysis of discourses seeks to “reveal 
connections between language, power and ideology that are hidden from people.”11 These power 
structures are established “particularly through the ideological workings of language.”12 The 
process of identifying and critically evaluating linguistically-produced power structures is 
important for the constructivist IR scholar because it establishes relationships between states and 
                                                 
9 Terry Locke, Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Continuum, 2004), 5.  
10 Ibid., 7.  
11 David Machin and Andrea Mayr, How To Do Critical Discourse Analysis (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, 2012), 5.   
12 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power, 2nd edition (Harlow, England: Longman, 2001), 2.   
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individuals and understands the binary nature (in the tradition of Derrida) of defining one’s identity 
in opposition to another’s (self vs. other).13 Thus, discourses serve as a way of communicating 
ideas by determining who we are, who they are, and explaining the relationship between the two. 
The analysis of discourses are characterized by the goals of “demystifying ideologies and 
power through the systematic investigation of semiotic data (written, spoken or visual).”14 
Discourses are socially constructed. They “are structures that are actualized in their regular use by 
people.”15 Thus, they are unstable in the sense that they are continuously being created and 
recreated. Consequently, discourses are reliant upon the researcher’s interpretation and 
explanation in order for their impact to be elucidated. Chapter Four explains the methodology by 
which the dominant and subversive discourses surrounding drone warfare are created. 
One of the ways that a discourse’s efficacy can be judged is through the application of 
sociology’s framing theory to understand how discourses are expressed and how that expression 
is received by society. Frames “assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in 
ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherent and constituents, to garner bystander support, 
and to demobilize antagonists.”16 Snow and Benford explain that frames have three primary tasks. 
First, they define a problem that requires a solution. Second, they propose a solution. Third, they 
call society to action to fix the problem.17 Ultimately, the use of discourses and framing in this 
dissertation is utilized in order to isolate the major ideas and themes present in the public 
                                                 
13 See: Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and 
Methods,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5(2), 229 and Hansen, 19.  
14 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, “Critical Discourse Analysis : History, Agenda, Theory, and 
Methodology,” Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis, 2nd ed. Eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2009), 3.  
15 Milliken, 231.   
16 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford, “ Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization,” 
International Social Movement Research Vol. 1, 198.   
17 Ibid., 199.  
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conversations that surround drone warfare. Identified frames help us to more clearly understand 
how the ideas and themes impact society and the security policies that surround drone warfare. 
What is Being Framed: The Borderless Drone War 
On April 23, 2015 a sober President Obama delivered a statement from the Whitehouse. 
During his remarks, the President publically offered his condolences to the family of American 
citizen and Al Qaeda hostage, Warren Weinstein. Weinstein, a humanitarian worker affiliated with 
the US Agency for International Development, was killed in a “signature” drone strike conducted 
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) against a known al Qaeda compound in Pakistan where 
he had been held captive.18 Notably omitting explicit confirmation of the role of drones in the 
strike, President Obama explained the circumstances surrounding Weinstein’s death:  
Since 9/11, our counterterrorism efforts have prevented terrorist 
attacks and saved innocent lives both here in America, and around 
the world…Our initial assessment indicates that this operation was 
fully consistent with the guidelines under which we conduct 
counterterrorism efforts in the region…And based on the 
intelligence that we had obtained at the time, including hundreds of 
hours of surveillance, we believed that this was an al Qaeda 
compound; that no civilians were present; and that capturing these 
terrorists was not possible. And we do believe that the operation did 
take out dangerous members of al Qaeda.19  
 
This drone strike, as well as the strikes detailed by the NGO reports analyzed by this 
project, occurred in Pakistan, a country that is not part of the formally delineated theatres in the 
Global War on Terror: Afghanistan and Iraq. The strike that killed Warren Weinstein is evidence 
of a clandestine drone war that is waged against terrorists throughout the world, notably in 
                                                 
18 Michael D. Shear, “Warren Weinstein’s Devotion to Pakistan Was Part of a Lifetime of Service,” 23 
April 2015, Internet; http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/24/world/asia/warren-weinsteins-devotion-to-pakistan-was-
part-of-a-lifetime-of-service.html?_r=0; Accessed 6 October 2015.  
19 Barack Obama, “Statement by the President on the Deaths of Warren Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto,” 
23 April 2015, Internet; https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/23/statement-president-deaths-
warren-weinstein-and-giovanni-lo-porto; Accessed 6 October 2015.   
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Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.20 General Cartwright’s above quotation indicates the tactical 
difficulty of waging a war against al Qaeda and affiliates. Because drones can infiltrate areas that 
are almost inaccessible to ground troops and because terrorists operate in, especially, states with 
weak security forces throughout the world.21  
The rhetorical change in the scope of this conflict from the Bush Administration’s “Global 
War on Terror” to the Obama Administration’s “War Against al-Qaeda” is significant because it 
allows combat to follow individual terrorists conceivably wherever they might go. Pugliese notes 
that drones emerge as the perfect weapons system for such a war, perhaps better described as a 
manhunt,22 because they are able to “transgress the very things that the US government is so 
preoccupied in protecting on its own homeland: national sovereignty and security.”23 Additionally, 
the change in the conflict’s focus causes its end game to be unclear. Wilcox warns that “the use of 
drones continues the extension of the space of the battlefield, as well as the time of war, 
indefinitely.”24   
The use of drones as a counterterrorism tactic is carried out by two separate agencies within 
the United States’ extensive security and defense institutions. Strikes are divided between the 
military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the civilian Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). Because they are conducted by a military body, JSOC strikes “can be acknowledged” by 
the Obama Administration, though “little detail on specific operations is generally provided to the 
                                                 
20 Avery Plaw, Matthew S. Fricker, and Carlos R. Colon, The Drone Debate (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2016), 42 
21 Christopher Swift, “The Boundaries of War? Assessing the Impact of Drone Strikes in Yemen,” Drone 
Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, Eds. Peter L. Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), 72.  
22 Gregoire Chamayou, A Theory of the Drone, transl. Janet Lloyd (New York: The New Press, 2015), 30-
35.  
23 Joseph Pugliese, State Violence and the Execution of Law: Biopolitical Caesurae of Torture, Black Sites, 
Drones (New York: Routledge, 2013), 16.  
24 Lauren Wilcox, Bodies of Violence: Theorizing Embodied Subjects in International Relations (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 154.  
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public.”25 Under the clandestine shield produced by the CIA’s orchestration of part of the United 
States’ drone war, strikes and their casualty counts are generally hidden from public scrutiny. Thus, 
strikes are conducted outside of the purview of public debate, with little transparency from the 
Obama Administration on the subject. A report published by the Columbia Law School’s Human 
Rights Clinic and the Center for Civilians in Conflict suggest, however, that it is difficult to know 
which agency is acting in any given strike and “there are some reports of JSOC and CIA operations 
being conducted under CIA authority because it provides foreign governments a ‘fig leaf of 
deniability.’”26 
The ability to deny knowledge of a drone strike is important in the interaction between the 
dominant and subversive discourses explored in this project. It is through deniability of classified 
documents and strikes that the clandestine is elevated above the visible. A political commitment 
to opaqueness (despite claims of transparency) pits the Obama Administration against the 
narratives and photographs published in NGO reports. This discursive competition provides 
motivation for the subversive narrative to expose the actions of the political elite. The converse is 
also true as the political elite attempt to disprove and discredit the assertions of the subversive 
discourse through the wizard’s curtain of the intelligence community.   
Frames: Security, Insecurity, and Story 
 The first frame identified through this study, security, is utilized by the dominant 
discourse. The attacks leveled against the United States by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001 caused 
American national security to be devoted to actively combatting terrorists who are perceived to 
pose a threat to the United States. This overturned the “illusion of invulnerability” that seemed 
                                                 
25 Swift, 41.  
26 Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and Center for Civilians in Conflict, The Civilian Impact 
of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered Questions (New York: Center for Civilians in Conflict, 2012), 14.  
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foundational to American security culture.27 The result of this perceptual rupture has been a keen 
desire to elevate national security as the priority of American politics. Paul Viotti defines national 
security as “providing safety from threats to the nation by taking steps toward this end both at 
home and abroad.”28  
At root, the goal of security is self-preservation. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde explain that 
in cases of armed conflict, the state evaluates an existential threat and concludes that it must 
survive, and thus, makes the decision to engage in actions that will preserve itself.29 This suggests 
that security should be understood as a relational enterprise, as the state’s security is defined within 
the context of a threat.30 In the United States’ current security environment, security is, thus, 
understood within as in relationship to the other—in this case, the terrorist and his/her affiliate 
organizations. Pitted against each other, the United States is committed to maintaining its security 
through the defeat of terrorism.31    
 This view of security understands relationality to be discursively constructed. As, 
primarily, elite political actors “speak security” into existence, the discourse becomes a construct 
                                                 
27 Jack Holland, “From September 11th, 2001 to 9-11: From Void to Crisis,” International Political 
Sociology Vol. 3, 281.  
28 Paul R. Viotti, “Toward a Comprehensive Strategy for Terrorism and Homeland Security,” Terrorism 
and Homeland Security: Thinking Strategically About Policy, Eds. Paul R. Viotti, Michael A. Opheim, and Nicholas 
Bowen (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008), 5.  
29 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 2008), 36. 
30 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, Revised 
Edition (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 9-11.  
31 Ole Waever contends that security as it is understood in the Western context, and as is referenced in this 
project has been “highly militarized in the West, while in the East it was broadened to incorporate economic security 
and various types of interference in domestic affairs” (“Securitization and desecuritization,” On Security, ed. Ronnie 
D. Lipschutz, ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 59.)   
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of power.32 Thus, in the context relevant for this project, “security is articulated only from a 
specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”33 
 The second frame identified through this study, insecurity, is utilized by the subversive 
discourse to indicate how individuals are ontologically destabilized as they are unable to feel 
secure in their immediate surroundings.34 While the physical aspects of insecurity as they pertain 
to noncombatants’ experiences of drone warfare are obvious—they are afraid of dying. A less 
obvious part of this insecurity is produced by the systematic dehumanization of warfare, 
threatening the person’s being and self-understanding.35 The subversive discourse uses this frame 
in order to show how noncombatants’ lives are negatively affected by drone warfare in an attempt 
to secure recognition that drone warfare kills people. 
German philosopher Axel Honneth, suggests that “the presupposition of all communicative 
action,” or discourse, “is to be seen in the acquisition of social recognition.”36 Thus, Honneth’s 
theory of recognition and justice seeks to confront previous trends in political philosophy to either 
concede the pursuit of global justice as unattainable, thus forcing the theorist to “muddle through” 
tough examples of injustice, often tacitly excusing them, or to link justice to citizenship (local 
and/or global), which alienates those disenfranchised by the global community.37 
                                                 
32 Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 85. See also: Michael C. Williams, “Words Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 47: 511-531. 
33 Waever, 57.  
34 The insecurity frame differs from the security frame in its level of application. In this project, the security 
frame is applied at the national level, whereas the insecurity frame is applied at the individual level. This shows a 
difference in strategy on the part of the two drone discourses. The security frame desires for the individual American 
to view themselves as part of national security. The insecurity frame seeks to differentiate individuals who have 
been lumped into the dehumanized wartime distinctions of “combatant” and “noncombatant.”  
35 Paul Roe defines this sort of ontological security as being concerned with threats to identity (“The 
‘Value’ of Positive Security,” Review of International Studies Vol. 34, 784).  
36 Axel Honneth, Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (Malden, MA: Polity, 2007), 
71.  
37 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice,” Acta Sociological (47), 
352.   
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 Honneth, heavily influenced by the phenomenological work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, understands recognition to be a mutually-constitutive process through which individuals 
share existential validation. Honneth characterizes Hegel’s view of recognition as being 
fundamental to the actualization of the self. “A subject can only arrive at a ‘consciousness’ of its 
own ‘self’ if it enters into a relationship of ‘recognition’ with another subject.”38 Once recognition 
is achieved, it is protected through intentional praxis of social order and law.39  
It is through participation in community that an individual is able to realize the full extent 
of his/her humanity “by being gradually assured of the specific abilities and needs constituting his 
or her personality through the approving patterns of reaction by generalized interaction partners.” 
This experience is global in the reality that “every human being is dependent in an elementary 
way, on a context of social forms of interaction that are regulated by normative principles of mutual 
recognition.” Lack of mutual recognition generates patterns of “disrespect or humiliation that 
cannot be without damaging consequences for the single individual’s identity formation.”40 Thus, 
injustice occurs when “human subjects are denied the recognition they feel they deserve,” 
experiencing “feelings of social disrespect.”41  
Honneth’s theory develops three principles of recognition (love, equality, and merit)42 
which correspond with practical “spheres” that can measure personal security: “responsiveness to 
need, legal equality or justice to achievements.”43 Experiences of the noncombatant in warfare 
restricts access to these modes of security, and can significantly and permanently disrupt lives.  
                                                 
38 Axel Honneth, The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition ( Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012), 2-3.  
39 Ibid., 21.  
40 Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 34(3), 354.   
41 Honneth, Disrespect, 71.  
42 Nancy Fraser, “Abnormal Justice,” 355.  
43 Ibid., 361.   
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 Similarly, American critical theorist, Judith Butler suggests that it is through human 
interaction that one’s humanity is socially understood. This causes one’s life to be precarious, 
which suggests the vulnerability of one’s life in relation to others. “One’s life is always in some 
sense in the hands of the other…Grievability is a presupposition for the life that matters.”44 
Humans, especially within the context of war are situated within physical and psychological spaces 
of insecurity, causing them to experience fundamental levels of vulnerability. “Loss and 
vulnerability seem to follow from our being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk 
of losing those attachments, exposed to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure.”45 
Thus, for Butler, the fully realized life is the life that we mourn individually and corporately.  
 In the face of warfare, this is difficult, however, as public narratives are constructed to 
dehumanize and delegitimize the lives of combatants and noncombatants alike. According to 
Butler “such populations are ‘lose-able,’ or can be forfeited, precisely because they are framed as 
being already lost or forfeited; they are cast as threats to human life as we know it rather than as 
living populations in need of protection from illegitimate state violence.”46 Butler also seems to 
understand this within the language of risk transfer warfare, concluding that through the 
incorporation of otherizing frames that present the stories of those within war-contexts to be 
fundamentally different than one’s own,47 “the loss of such populations is deemed necessary to 
protect the lives of ‘the living.’”48 
 The third frame isolated is also utilized by the subversive discourse. It uses story to 
humanize and give voice to the noncombatants affected by drone warfare. It also is vital in 
                                                 
44 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (New York: Verso, 2010), 14.   
45 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004), 20.   
46 Butler, Frames of War, 31.  
47 Butler, Precarious Life, 38.  
48 Butler, Frames of War, 31.  
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exposing the clandestine details of drone warfare that are obscured through government secrecy. 
The photography analyzed in this project is also included under this frame as it provides visual 
confirmation to the stories told. 
The story frame seeks to identify and analyze the voices of the “Other” through the stories 
and testimonies of drone attack survivors in order to reveal the impact of drone warfare on real, 
grievable people. Poignantly, Butler notes, “There are no obituaries for the war casualties that the 
United States inflicts, and there cannot be. If there were to be an obituary, there would have had 
to have been a life, a life worth noting, a life worth valuing and preserving, a life that qualifies for 
recognition.”49 Butler further explains: “Such a death vanishes, not into explicit discourse, but in 
the ellipses by which public discourse proceeds.”50 The elucidation and analysis of drone victims’ 
stories is an opportunity to extend recognition to those lives lost and damaged that have been 
dismissed within the fog of war as collateral damage.    
Stories are a unique form of discourse because they facilitate the human experience in such 
a fundamental sense. Telling stories “provide hopes, enhance or mitigate disappointments, 
challenge or support moral order, and test out theories of the world at both personal and communal 
levels.”51 Stories can serve as a vehicle for establishing and entrenching cultural norms.52 They 
also have the potential “to make meaning out of raw experiences; to transcend suffering; to offer 
                                                 
49 Butler, Precarious Life, 34.  
50 Ibid., 35.  
51 Deborah Schiffrin and Anna De Fina, “Introduction,” Telling Stories: Language, Narrative, and Social 
Life, eds. Deborah Schiffrin, Anna De Fina, and Anastasia Nylund (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press, 2010), 1.   
52 Jerome Bruner, “Narrative, Culture, and Mind,” Telling Stories: Language, Narrative, and Social Life, 
eds. Deborah Schiffrin, Anna De Fina, and Anastasia Nylund (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
2010), 45.  
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warnings, advice, and other guidance; to provide a means for traveling beyond the personal; and 
to provide inspiration, entertainment, and new frames of reference to both tellers and listeners.”53  
In addition to conveying information from the teller to the listener, stories also open up 
relational space between the teller and listener. It provides an opportunity for the listener to move 
beyond “tolerance” of teller to offering an atmosphere of hospitality. In the face of violence, 
Derrida notes that hospitality “opens or is in advance open to someone who is neither expected nor 
invited, to whomever arrives…in short, wholly other.”54 An authentic atmosphere of hospitality 
also makes it possible to access the process of grieving for human lives lost in war that Butler calls 
for: “To grieve, and to make grief itself into a resource for politics, is not to be resigned to inaction, 
but it may be understood as the slow process by which we develop a point of identification with 
suffering itself.”55 This is highlighted by the responding to the question: “‘What is it in the Other 
that I have lost?’”56     
Handling others’ stories is a difficult task characterized by a held tension between the 
promise of being “a crucial and important means for creating empathy and inducing action” and 
the peril of “misinterpretation and misappropriation.”57 Additionally, Fiona Robinson argues that 
an ethic of care is necessary when encountering vulnerable populations. She suggests that this 
includes “questioning why and understanding how it is that different forms of ‘power’ come to 
exist, and how they are distributed in society. It also involves understanding which relations of 
                                                 
53 Amy Shuman, Other People’s Stories: Entitlement Claims and the Critique of Empathy (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005), 1.  
54 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 128-
129.  
55 Butler, Precarious Life, 30.  
56 Ibid., 30.   
57 Shuman, 120.  
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dependence are built on mutual trust and support, and which are built on manipulation and 
paternalism and why.”58 
The second part of the story frame is represented in this project by the analysis of 
photography as provider of information and visualization of an area of the world that most 
Americans have never seen. Photography is a ubiquitous form of visual communication and artistic 
expression. In a culture that is permeated by the visual, there is an expectation that the verbal will 
be accompanied by an illustrative or entertaining visual in almost all contexts. In Regarding the 
Pain of Others Susan Sontag explains the poignancy of the photograph: “Narratives can make us 
understand. Photographs do something else: they haunt us.”59   
Since the capability was invented in 1839, the role of wartime photography has been one 
of documentation and, as a result, photography has “kept company with death.”60 The goal of this 
accompaniment has been the keeping of “visual records or evidence”61 of the human atrocities 
associated with warfare. This is an important conceptual practice within the context of war because 
photographs capture the realities of warfare (as they are produced, edited, and distributed, at least) 
and demands recognition. “To not look at pictures of atrocity,” Prosser argues “is to deny its 
existence, not only when atrocity happens at a distance but also when it’s there on our doorsteps, 
in front of us.”62 Additionally, photography, as conceived by Sontag, possesses the potential to be 
socially transformative. “Photographs of an atrocity may give rise to opposing forces. A call for 
                                                 
58 Fiona Robinson, “Stop Talking and Listen: Discourse Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics in International 
Political Theory,” Millennium Vol. 39(3), 853.  
59 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 89.  
60 Ibid., 24.  
61 David Phillips, “Actuality and Affect in Documentary Photography,” Using Visual Evidence, eds. 
Richard Howells and Robert W. Matson (New York: Open University Press, 2009), 55. 
62 Jay Prosser, “Introduction,” Picturing Atrocity: Photography in Crisis, eds. Geoffrey Batchen, Mick 
Gidley, Nancy K. Miller, and Jay Prosser (London: Reaktion Books, 2012), 7.  
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peace. A cry for revenge. Or simply bemused awareness, continuously restocked by photographic 
information, that terrible things happen.”63   
Thus, within the context of warfare, photographs present a certain truth claim of a reality 
that is encompassed through the composition of the picture and is ultimately informed by both its 
original context and the context of the interpreter. Nickel is clear in his assertion that photographs 
require interaction with an external interpreter in order for meaning and significance to be imparted 
upon them. “The photograph cannot claim authority; as an inanimate object, it literally cannot 
claim anything at all. But we can confer authority upon it.”64 How we confer authority upon the 
visual matters. The method of visual analysis, or how I am “conferring authority” on the selected 
photographs is described in Chapter Four. 
Exposing the Clandestine: Chapter Summaries 
 This project is tasked with judging the formation and efficacy of drone warfare discourses 
as they are socially presented through frames. While attempting to provide voice to the subversive 
discourse, I ultimately conclude that that dominant discourse is successful in silencing its 
adversary. This project proceeds from this introduction (Chapter One) in four chapters. 
 In Chapter Two I examine the drone, discourse, and framing literatures, explaining how 
they intersect with the constructivist international relations literature. Chapter Three provides a 
historic overview of the military and cultural climates that underpin the United States’ reliance on 
drones as a preferred counterterrorism tactic, ultimately producing the dominant discourse. It also 
explains the origins of the subversive discourse and its attempts to unsettle the dominant discourse.  
                                                 
63 Sontag, 13.  
64 Douglas R. Nickel, “’Impressed by Nature’s Hand’: Photography and Authorship,” Using Visual 
Evidence, eds. Richard Howells and Robert W. Matson (New York: Open University Press, 2009), 47. 
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In Chapter Four I evaluate the dominant discourse, composed of speeches from Eric 
Holder, John Brennan, and President Obama, using interpretative content analysis. I find that the 
dominant discourse supports three primary themes: national security, legality, and hiddenness in 
order to protect and advance its advocacy of drone counterterrorism efforts. The subversive 
discourse is evaluated using a multi-methodology approach. First, it utilizes interpretive content 
analysis of drone reports from Amnesty International and Stanford/NYU, finding that the 
subversive discourse is composed of three themes: human security, illegality, and exposure. 
Second, this chapter analyzes Noor Behram’s photographs of post-drone strike areas using visual 
analysis. I find that my interpretation of the photographs favors aesthetic themes.  
In order to judge the efficacy of these discourses first, in conveying their ideas to their 
audiences and, second in prompting mobilization, Chapter Five uses the frames developed in this 
chapter (Security, Insecurity, and Story) and explains why the subversive discourse has failed to 
promote mobilization and policy changes. Finally, Chapter Six, concludes this project by looking 
at the “triumph” of the dominant discourse over the subversive discourse, but suggests that some 
transparency on the part of the Obama Administration has resulted from its awareness of the 















Chapter Two: Drones, Discourse, and Framing: A Review of the Literature 
 
 This project is reliant upon literature from a number of disciplines. Thus, the literature 
reviewed is rather expansive. While a daunting endeavor, the integration of these literatures is a 
great opportunity for framing theory to formally engage the discourses surrounding drone warfare. 
This review is divided into two major sections. First, it details the drone literature and second, it 
explores the connection between constructivist International Relations theory, approaches to 
discourse, and framing theory.   
The Drone Literature 
As public and academic interest in drone warfare increases, so too does the drone literature. 
This literature is voluminous, interdisciplinary, and constantly growing. While the literature 
addresses diverse aspects of drone warfare, it consistently elucidates the complexity of the tactical 
use of drones in contemporary conflict. The drone literature can be divided into four major areas: 
journalistic, military/tactical, legal, and ethical.  
The Drone Literature: Journalistic Sources 
 The first area of drone literature emerges from journalistic sources. Readily accessible to 
the public, these magazine and newspaper articles and books provide the public with a glimpse 
into the Obama Administration’s use of drones as a counter terrorism tactic and offers explanation 
and analysis of the Obama Administration’s policies informing drone strikes. While, in general, 
informative, these journalistic sources are clear to express the potential ethical and legal challenges 
surrounding the use of drones in warfare. 
 From the onset, the journalistic literature has been concerned both with the impact that 
drone-based tactics have on the nature of warfare and upon the legal and ethical expectations for 
warfare. P.W. Singer’s 2009 book, Wired for War, was one of the first public forays into the use 
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of drones and robotics in warfare. Like many drone scholars Singer notes that he published the 
book “because robots are frakin’ cool.”65 He explains, however, that the introduction of drones 
into contemporary warfare is not merely about the “coolness” of technological military 
advancement, but that “it transforms the very agent of war”66 and marks the emergence of “a new 
warrior class” that is dependent upon war waged at a distance.67 While a distance-based “push-
button” war may seem attractive and might be efficacious, also writing in 2009, Jane Mayer 
cautions that it is not without consequences. In her New Yorker Article “The Predator War,” Mayer 
raises questions regarding the ethical nature of drone warfare and its legal viability, drawing 
attention to the potential for noncombatant casualties resulting from operator error and bad human 
intelligence.68 
 A pair of exposes, by journalists David Sanger and Daniel Klaidman, published in 2012 
seek to provide an explanation for the transition from Barack Obama the idealistic presidential 
candidate to Barack Obama, President of the United States and avid utilizer of drone strikes. Both 
authors pay significant attention to the use of weaponized drones both in combat (Afghanistan and 
Iraq) and extra-combat areas such as Pakistan and Yemen. Both accounts also discuss the tension 
between transparency and secrecy that was created by the Obama Administration’s reliance on 
drone warfare. David Sanger defines President Obama’s drone use as “a strategy of confrontation 
and concealment, a precise, directed economy of force.”69 This is a strategy informed by a desire 
for a “light footprint,” and “it was relatively cheap and low-casualty—at least, low in American 
casualties.”70 And, as Daniel Klaidman notes, fundamentally, the use of drones seemed to work 
                                                 
65 P.W. Singer, Wired For War (New York: Penguin, 2009), 1.  
66 Ibid., 194. 
67 Ibid., 280. 
68Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker, 26 October 2009: 36-45.  
69 David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal (New York: Random House, 2012), xvii.  
70 Ibid., 420.  
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for the Obama Administration. “There was little doubt that the program was effective as a tactic; 
drone strikes routinely killed high-value targets on the CIA hit parade…Drones may not have been 
a panacea, but they were an awfully seductive tool.”71 
 While Sanger and Klaidman’s books attempt to produce a sort of comfort level with the 
use of drones, more recent journalistic sources seek to problematize drone strikes in three main 
ways. These sources express concern about first, the impact that drone strikes have on both the 
victims of drone strikes, second on the intelligence-gap that emerges from combatant death, rather 
than capture, and third, on the tenuous relationship between Pakistan and the United States.  
A key consideration later in this project, recent journalistic publications on drone warfare 
have focused on the experiences of noncombatants living in areas targeted by drone strikes. It is 
not surprising that the conditions of people living in these areas are difficult. Conor Friedersdorf, 
a writer for The Atlantic, has focused on the psychological impact that drone strikes have on 
civilians targeted by drones, noting that “they are trapped. Terrified. Powerless.”72 Steve Coll 
describes a meeting with Pakistani photo-journalist, Noor Behram, in which he was shown 
hundreds of post-drone-strike photographs. These included dozens of pictures of dead and injured 
children.73  Additionally, drone strikes have reportedly become such an entrenched part of life in 
these areas that NPR reporter, Kelly McEvers relates that mothers in Yemen “used to tell their 
kids, ‘Go to sleep or I will call your father.’ Now they say, ‘Go to sleep or I will call the plane.’”74 
While these pieces suggest that drone strikes may not be as precise and combatant-focused as the 
                                                 
71 Daniel Klaidman, Kill or Capture (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), 118.  
72 Conor Friedersdorf, “‘Every Person Is Afraid of the Drones’: The Strikes’ Effect on Life in Pakistan,” 
The Atlantic, 25 Sept. 2012, Internet http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/every-person-is-
afraid-of-the-drones-the-strikes-effect-on-life-in-pakistan/262814/ Accessed 28 September 2015.   
73 Steve Coll, “The Unblinking Stare,” The New Yorker, 24 November 2014, Internet 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/11/24/unblinking-stare Accessed 28 September 2015.  
74 Kelly McEvers,“The Hidden Cost of the Drone Program,” National Public Radio. 5 May, 2013  
Internet; http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=181403067; Accessed 23 May 2013. 
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dominant American narrative has suggested, Coll clearly notes that civilian casualties have been 
reduced as a result of improved strike procedures by the CIA. Instead of targeting homes, the CIA 
has shifted to strikes on vehicles where the presence of women and children is less likely.75 
Second, recent journalistic analyses have problematized American drone warfare by 
identifying the lack of intelligence gathered as a result of a “‘kill ‘em and sort it out later’” 
approach to counterterrorism.76 Bergen and Tiedemann consider this to be a challenge for 
continued efforts in the region because “dead militants, of course, can offer no insights into 
planned operations.”77 McEvers also notes that this policy is able to avoid the continued legal and 
logistic concerns associated with capturing combatants and housing them at Guantanamo Bay.78 
But, as is discussed below, from this policy emerges different potential legal challenges.  
Third, recent journalistic sources reveal the difficulties in American relations with the 
Pakistani government resulting from drone strikes.  McEvers’ NPR report states that cooperation 
with Pakistani officials is difficult because leaks in the Pakistani government often cause “the 
information [to get] out to the target.”79 In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 
often targeted by American drone strikes, citizens must choose between two evils: American drone 
strikes and the Taliban insurgency. The choice that the citizens make is up to interpretation by 
analysts. An oft-cited opinion piece by Kilcullen and Exum argues that “violent extremists may be 
unpopular” in the FATA region, but “for a frightened population they seem less ominous than a 
                                                 
75 Coll, “The Unblinking Stare.”  
76 Klaidman, 43.  
77 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone 
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faceless enemy that wages war from afar.”80 On the other hand, Coll concludes that many 
“welcome—or, at least, accept—the CIA’s drone strikes as a necessary, temporary compromise.”81  
While a tacit acceptance of drone strikes in Pakistan may be the status quo, Bergen and 
Tiedemann suggest that the relationship between Pakistan and the United States could be stronger 
on this issue. They propose greater cooperation with the Pakistani government on drones and 
believe that this would result in more transparency from both governments. “A more transparent 
drone-strike program, with greater overt cooperation from Pakistan, would increase accountability, 
in particular regarding civilian casualties.”82  
The Drone Literature: Military/Tactical 
The second subject area discussed by the drone literature is interested in the military, 
historical development, and tactical understandings of drone warfare. This literature can be divided 
into three groups: the history and future of drone use, military tactics, and the impact of drones on 
the soldier. 
While the bulk of the drone literature is interested in the sticky ethical and legal issues 
imbedded within the use of emergent military technology, some of the literature, however, 
considers their historical development and the promise for and consequences of future use.  
Aside from cursory statements asserting that “drones are not a new technology,” few 
sources are interested in exploring the historical development of military and civilian uses of 
drones. John Blom provides us with the most extensive study of drones’ historical development 
and military implementation with his book Unmanned Aerial Systems: A Historical Perspective.83 
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Other book chapters by Konstantin Kakaes’ and Plaw, Fricker, and Colon provide sufficient, but 
brief historical overviews.84  
Both Blom and Kakaes contend that the rich history of drone use in warfare for surveillance 
purposes (dating back to Orville Wright and Charles Kettering’s development of “The Bug” for 
use in World War I)85 and the success of weaponized drones in contemporary warfare suggest a 
continued future for drones in warfare. While carefully describing the impressive development of 
UAVs from weather balloons to aerial robots equipped with precision-weaponry, Blom is guarded 
about the military’s continued support of drones in future conflicts. He suggests that budgetary 
considerations and increased logical strain (due to different operating systems) may cause drones’ 
development to slow down.86 Similarly, Kakaes suggests that drones’ limitations, vulnerability 
and the onslaught of information that they provide, may cause strategists to employ alternative 
technologies in future conflicts.87 Plaw, Ficker, and Colon suggest that the workforce required to 
maintain drone flights may decrease their use in conflicts88 and that the ethical and legal challenges 
associated with targeted killings (discussed below) must be sorted out before they believe that 
drones will be a permanent fixture in American military operations.89     
For the foreseeable future, it seems that the tactical use of drones, especially in 
counterterrorism efforts, will persist. Micah Zenko suggests that this is the result of a political 
preference for Discrete Military Operations. Zenko defines DMOs as “a single or serial physical 
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use of kinetic military force to achieve a defined military and political goal by inflicting casualties 
or causing destruction, without seeking to conquer an opposing army or control territory.”90 Zenko 
explains that DMOs have specific “political objectives [that] can be summarized as any one or a 
combination of the following goals: punishment…deterrence…coercion…”91 What differentiates 
DMOs from other exhibitions of force “is that [they are] usually undertaken without a theory of 
victory.”92 CNN.com’s May 12, 2016 report seems to confirm the persistence of DMOs in 
American military strategy as “President Barack Obama is increasingly calling upon Special 
Operations forces to carry out so-called ‘small wars’ across the Middle East and Africa to 
challenge both ISIS and al Qaeda.”93  
The use of drones in DMOs not only maintains a small combat footprint in these “small 
wars,” but provides necessary surveillance and air power for the troops on the ground and allows 
for “the United States to project force when it and the national government have few other 
options.”94 The added value, according to the Department of Defense, is the reduction of the 
number of dull, dirty, and dangerous missions undertaken by soldiers and flown by pilots. 
The attributes that make the use of unmanned preferable to manned 
aircraft in the above three roles are, in the case of the dull, the better 
sustained alertness of machines over that of humans and, for the 
dirty and the dangerous, the lower political and human cost if the 
mission is lost and greater probability that the mission will be 
successful.95        
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 Importantly, in contrast to Jenna Jordan’s 2014 article,96 Johnston and Sarbahi’s 2016 study 
indicates that done strikes work. They conclude that drone strikes are effective in reducing terrorist 
attacks in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen as they have been proven “capable of disrupting and 
degrading militant organizations” and “such technologies limit both the frequency and the lethality 
of militant attacks.”97 The efficacy of drone strikes and surveillance has resulted in further research 
and development of new, more advanced drone technologies “that can go places too dangerous for 
soldiers or spies” and will continue to increase their tactical value.98 
 The final military/tactical drone literature addresses the impact that distance-based warfare 
has on the pilots who are waging war in absentia. Successful militaries have always worked to 
develop technologies that reduce risk to soldiers by removing them from harm’s way. Singer 
observes that “each new technology has pushed soldiers farther and farther away from their foes.”99 
This means that Western militaries must utilize more airpower and more soldier-less technologies 
to present war as “clean” to the public on the home front.100 Ignatieff adds that the object of war 
is to “destroy [the enemy combatant] at long range, accelerating a long-standing trend: the 
battlefield has been emptying for centuries.”101 
For many soldiers in contemporary wars, the battleground is no longer a holistic sensory 
experience. The traditional soldier can relate to his/her surroundings by what he/she can hear, see, 
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taste, touch and/or smell. For the UAV pilot stationed in the United States, the battleground is what 
he/she can see and hear by extension of technology.102 “Inside the trailers, crews don’t get even 
the sensation of flying that one gets in a flight simulator.”103 The pilots of Predator drones are 
limited to what their cameras see and the sounds that are transmitted by them. Even with 
intelligence reports from the ground, the pilot cannot act unless the visual footage confirms the 
intelligence.104 “The best technology cannot bridge the divide of being in two different locales. 
Being there virtually only allows so much communication.”105  
Royakkers and van Est argue that the “digitization of warfare exhibits the danger of 
emotionally detaching moral action from moral awareness and reasoning…”106 However, a twice-
deployed pilot, now flying Predators, states, “‘For us, it’s combat…Physically, we may be in 
Vegas, but mentally, we’re flying over Iraq. It feels real’”107 The pilot’s assertion that his UAV 
missions “feel real” provides some insight into the alienation that results from drone warfare.108 
This is the true plight of the drone pilots. He/she is mentally engaging the enemy through the 
processing of surveillance footage and pushing the button to deploy hellfire missiles when 
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commanded. He/she is mentally responsible for the death of combatants and civilians and for the 
destruction of buildings, vehicles, and other elements of infrastructure. But, he/she is not 
physically present on the battlefield.  
Additionally, the UAV pilot does not experience the threat of war that produces sensations 
of fear. The distance between the cubicle warrior and the danger is so great that the consequences 
of mistakes for traditional soldiers are essentially irrelevant. “This means that they are safe in a 
physical sense; they cannot be wounded. As a consequence, cubicle warriors do not feel any 
fear.”109 Singer further explains the implications of fearlessness for the soldier. “Your experience 
of war is not merely distanced from risk…but now fully disconnected from it. And thus these new 
warriors are disconnected from the old meanings of courage as well.”110     
The UAV pilot feels the disconnection from the holistic sensory experience, including 
feelings of fear, of being in the action and is compelled to justify his position as an active soldier 
by arguing that his actions “feel real.” In his memoir, former drone pilot, Matt Martin, suggests 
that one of the challenges of drone warfare is the lack of battlefield horror experienced during 
combat.111 For those whose boots are on the ground, there is no “feeling” about their task, they 
know it’s real and they experience war’s horror. Christopher Coker explains that one of the 
limitations of contemporary warfare is that soldiers have “become displaced into their own 
weapons system and transformed into technicians.”112 
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The Drone Literature: Legal 
The third major area of drone literature is concerned with the legality and compatibility of 
drone strikes with international law. When casualty averse tactics and strategies of warfare are 
executed on the battlefield, they become a part of the global discourse regarding justice and 
warfare. Characterized by the canonization of international law, the expectations for legal warfare 
become what philosopher Jürgen Habermas refers to as the “constitutionalization of international 
law,”113 which allows for the “taming of brute political power.”114 This cosmopolitan view of the 
international system underpins the legal drone literature and assumes the obligation of global 
powers to submit to a “continually expanding [international] federation that prevents war [and] 
can curb the inclination to hostility and defiance of the law.”115 Adherence to the precepts of 
international law also suggests an acknowledgment and acceptance of international underpinning 
norms that “tie [the international community] together because we share them as humans.”116  
The proximity of noncombatants to the battlefield has become a key consideration when 
looking at the legality of UAV-centric warfare. While my intent is not to determine the legality of 
American use of UAVs in warfare (especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen), the 
perspectives that have been articulated by international lawyers can be helpful in establishing a 
benchmark for understanding the administration of global justice to noncombatants within the 
international community. As Habermas contends, problems that are as complex as eradicating 
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terrorism (especially al Qaeda and its affiliates) “can be solved only through joint political 
action”117 with international law as its basis for action.  
The importance of international law to wartime conduct is vital to the protection of all 
parties within the legal practice of war. International law produces the expectations that exist for 
justice within warfare. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has detailed six 
principles that make up the Law of Armed Conflict and set international expectations for the 
execution of warfare: Distinction, Proportionality, Military Necessity, Limitation, Good Faith, and 
Humane Treatment and Non-Discrimination.118   
The two areas of the Law of Armed Combat that scholars are most interested in when 
determining the legality of weaponized drone use in military engagement are the jus in bello (or 
justice in war) principles: proportionality and distinction.  
First, proportionality seeks to determine the balance between the military advantage 
achieved by attacking a target and the amount of potential and/or realized collateral damage 
associated with it. The ICRC states: “When military objectives are attacked, civilians and civilian 
objects must be spared from incidental or collateral damage to the maximum extent possible.”119 
This principle, however, should not be viewed as an empirical calculus of weighing numbers of 
civilian to combatant casualties.120 Judge Advocate General for the Army, Chris Jenks, suggests 
that determining proportionality can be difficult because it is a “subjective determination the 
military commander makes…As a general rule, proportionality does not limit the amount or type 
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of force used; it considers the expected results.”121 Sarah Kreps and John Kaag further 
problematize this, arguing that in the case of the current conflict, proportionality is nearly limitless 
when the adversary is “terror.”122 Under this line of reasoning, any strike on a potential terrorist, 
anywhere, could be argued as legal making the battlefield “almost boundless.”123  
The difficulty with proportionality in the case of drone strikes articulated by Vogel, is the 
case-by-case nature of each strike. “Thus, the number of civilians killed, or of terrorists killed, is 
only the first part of the analysis—whether the target was of sufficient value and whether the strike 
offered a real military advantage and was conducted with all due caution and concern for civilians 
establishes the operation’s proportionality.”124 Supporting the Obama Administration’s line of 
reasoning, Brunstetter and Braun suggest that the use of UAVs may actually increase adherence 
to the principle of proportionality because of a UAVs precision-guided missiles. “The localized 
application of drone strikes limits the destruction because it targets the actual individual threat, 
thus minimizing the force necessary to remove it.”125   
This, however, leads to the second principle of Jus in Bello in international law, distinction. 
The Law of Armed Conflict requires that militaries “distinguish between combatants and civilians 
or the civilian population as such.”126 This principle applies to both people and property. 
Understanding the legality of drone strikes is difficult within the principle of distinction because 
the definition of those who are defined as combatants and noncombatants can be fluid. Under the 
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Jus in Bello expectation of distinction, international law is clear that noncombatants cannot be 
deliberately targeted in warfare. International law divides the people involved in armed conflict 
into two distinct categories: combatants and civilians.127 Committed to protecting civilians present 
in conflict, international law permits “only members of a state’s armed forces during armed 
conflict or persons taking a direct part in hostilities”128 to be targeted. Because drone warfare is 
waged from a great distance and through a video camera, a person’s role in the conflict may not 
be immediately clear to a UAV pilot who is surveying the scene from above. Making matters of 
distinction even more difficult is the fact that “suspected militant leaders wear civilian clothes. 
Even the sophisticated cameras of a drone cannot be certain that a suspect being targeted is not a 
civilian.”129 Though Vogel adds that this is not a problem unique to drone warfare, and that the 
ability to conduct careful, lengthy surveillance increases the potential for discrimination between 
combatants and noncombatants.130 
While the Obama Administration reportedly uses a “kill list” of known, targeted affiliates 
with the Taliban and al-Qaeda to guide attacks,131 an added complication affecting matters of 
distinction addressed in the literature is the Obama Administration’s utilization of a target-
selection procedure known as signature strikes. Such attacks are leveled against targeted 
individuals whose identities are unknown, but whose monitored activities “match a pre-identified 
‘signature’ of behavior that the US links to militant activity, rather than targeting a specific 
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person.”132 Klaidman reports that President Obama was initially uncomfortable with the practice 
of signature strikes because he worried that mistakes could be more easily be made, but conceded 
when the CIA convinced him that “you could take out a lot more bad guys when you targeted 
groups instead of individuals.”133 Unfortunately, distinction remains difficult when the intentions 
behind individuals’ signature behaviors are unknown.134  Becker and Shane sardonically report a 
joke within the State Department: “When the CIA see ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency 
thinks it is a terrorist training camp.”135 
In his 2013 article, Kevin Heller tackles the question of the legality of signature strikes. 
While he does not contend that all signature strikes result in a violation of in international law, 
through his analysis he levels tough criticism on the Obama Administration’s reliance on signature 
strikes: “The United States considers any military-age male in the area of known terrorist activity 
and any individual who ‘consorts’ with ‘known militants’ to be a lawful target—a standard that 
bears little resemblance to long-standing principles of IHL.”136 Heller does, however, provide a 
list of “adequate signatures” that he believes are necessary for signature strikes to align more 
closely with international law. He suggests that individuals that can be proven to be “planning 
attacks,” “transporting vehicles,” and/or “handling explosives” would be displaying adequate 
signatures of combat.137 Additionally, known “Al-Qaeda compounds” and “Al-Qaeda training 
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camps” that are consistently used for combative purposes are also well-within the bounds of 
international humanitarian law.138 However, Heller concludes that the task of determining the 
legality of signature strikes is difficult due to the Obama Administration’s lack of transparency on 
the issue. “Because the United States refuses to publicly identify the signatures on which drone 
strikes rely, it is extremely difficult to assess the legality of its signature strike program.”139   
The turn toward casualty averse and technologically-driven modes of Western warfare 
characterized by the utilization of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles suggests that contemporary wartime 
strategy is primarily concerned with precision140 and speed,141 coupled with an aversion to 
casualties that causes concern with International Law. Instead, the practice of risk transfer warfare 
becomes attractive because it protects the lives of American soldiers, through their spatial 
separation from the battlefield, at the expense of the ontological and physical security of 
noncombatants in the midst of the war.142 
The Drone Literature: Ethics 
The fourth area of drone literature discusses the ethical issues surrounding drone warfare. 
These sources utilize normative and philosophical approaches to analyze and explain the ethical 
ramifications that drone warfare might have for humanity. International relations ethicist, Mervyn 
Frost reminds us that ethical considerations and judgments are an innate product of interaction 
with the world. “In day-to-day world politics, a domain in which we all participate to some degree, 
we all hold and are guided by certain beliefs about what, from an ethical point of view, we think 
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ought to be done.”143 Drone ethicists seek not only to discuss what ought to be done during war, 
but also challenge the discipline to consider the overall impact of war, seeking to re-humanize 
noncombatants who are dehumanized by drone warfare. This literature can be divided into two 
groups: literature that addresses drone ethics from the perspective of Just War Theory and literature 
that addresses drone ethics from the perspective of biopolitics. 
The first ethical considerations regarding drone warfare are made from the philosophic 
posture of Just War Theory.144 Emerging from Augustine’s writings in the fifth century CE, the 
premises of Just War Theory have guided ethical understanding regarding the justice of war 
waging.145 Its viability in technologically changing war environments persists as “a moral 
framework with evolving normative categories that helps us talk about the ethics of war.”146 
Theoretically, this permits Just War Theory an elastic quality that allows for its reinterpretation as 
it is applied to new scenarios and historical contexts. “So while it displays a potential for 
renovation and change, the theory also reflects a strong element of continuity…We can be 
relatively confident that when we tap into the language of just war, we are participating in a trans-
historical dialogue with the great and the good of previous generations.”147 So, Just War theorists 
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who study drone warfare are attempting to root new, technologically advanced, tactics of warfare 
into pre-modern ethical categories. While some theorists find this line of ethical reasoning fruitful, 
others recognize the shortcomings of this theoretical posture.   
For those who support the continued engagement with and application of Just War Theory, 
the principles associated with Just War Theory present a framework by which we might better 
understand and thus talk about war’s ethical conduct.148 These principles also translate from the 
philosophical to the pragmatic, suggesting a standard of justice that is expected before, during and 
after war and providing a vocabulary necessary to explain how occurrences of civilian casualties 
might be expected even in the course of a justly fought war.   
For the purposes of drone warfare, theorists are concerned primarily with issues germane 
to jus in bello, or justice during war. As is discussed above, jus in bello has traditionally been 
divided into two major areas of consideration that are mirrored in international law: Proportionality 
and Discrimination. “Proportionality attempts to balance the harm inflicted with the anticipated 
military advantage of an action, while discrimination entails making all efforts to distinguish 
between combatants and noncombatants, and avoid harm to the latter while still fulfilling the 
military mission.”149 Walzer is clear about the importance of considering the plight of 
noncombatants who are caught up in the crossfire of war. He notes that noncombatants “do not 
forfeit their rights when their states wrongly go to war.” Instead, they are to be considered “men 
and women with rights [who] cannot be used for some military purpose.”150  
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Walzer argues that within the Just War paradigm “noncombatants cannot be attacked at 
any time.”151 Schulzke is clear to note, however, that occasionally civilian deaths do occur that are 
not intended by the soldier, but result from the structural concerns of uncertainty and the 
subjectivity of self-defense.152 This is known as the principle of double effect,153 which “gets its 
start from the realization that actions often have more than one consequence.”154 Under the 
principle of double effect, both the positive and negative consequences of a particular act of war, 
such as a drone strike, should be considered before that act is undertaken. For example, “Actions 
performed by a soldier can lead not only to the death of enemy soldiers but also to the death of by-
standers, trauma to other enemy soldiers and by-standers, the destruction of buildings, damage to 
the environment, and so on.”155  
It is clear that civilians have been casualties of drone warfare and this creates a key point 
of emphasis among drone scholars who utilize Just War Theory. Himes notes that civilian 
casualties result from one of two human errors that have been attributed to drone warfare above: 
“The unobserved nearness of civilians to the locale of an airstrike, or ground troops calling for a 
strike when mistakenly thinking civilians were enemy combatants.”156 Bellamy, however, argues 
that more could be done to prevent double-effect casualties associated with drone warfare. He 
believes that the “reliance on air power [is] designed to lower risks to coalition forces by removing 
them from harm’s way. The result is that we must accept higher noncombatant casualties.”157 
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While these explanations may not be entirely palatable, they do provide a framework whereby we 
might understand the tragedy of war’s casualties.  
 Scholars who critique application of Just War Theory to the Global War on Terror do so 
because they have difficulty reconciling a counter-insurgency, fought with asymmetric weaponry 
with the Just War tradition. Of significant concern is the nature of the adversary. Can a just war be 
fought against terrorists? 
Generally, noncombatants are the focus of ethical debates regarding drone warfare. 
However, Just War Theory is designed to protect the adversary from injustice as well. Walzer 
explains: “Even the pawns of war have rights and obligations.”158 Thus, as a result of its inherent 
asymmetry, drone warfare strains the premises and application of just war theory. Suzy Killmister 
argues that this forces targeted adversaries into a situation “in which the targeted state has all moral 
options for retaliation closed off, forcing it to either surrender or transgress civilian immunity.”159 
This would make a just war difficult to wage from the perspective of both the perpetrator and the 
adversary. 
Are combatants who are defined as terrorists the sort of “pawns of war” discussed by 
Walzer? Kenneth Himes pointedly argues that terrorists are not legal combatants and that 
principles of Just War Theory may not be applicable to terrorist targets at all because they do not 
“observe the crucial distinction between civilian and combatant targets. For the terrorist, the death 
of noncombatants is not unwanted ‘collateral damage,’ for civilian deaths are the intended aim of 
a terrorist attack. Thus, terrorists may be combatants, but they are illegal combatants.”160 Bellamy, 
however, suggests that it is unfair to lump all Western-defined terrorist organizations into a single 
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category, much less a category that defines them as unjust. This is primarily because “the term is 
most often used as a political label to de-legitimize one’s opponents.”161 Thus, Bellamy suggests 
that terrorist organizations must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether 
or not they fit under the broader umbrella of enemy combatant.162 Neta Crawford argues that in 
order for terrorists to be considered combatants in a war, conceptions of war must be changed in 
order for terrorism to be considered “war.” This makes it difficult for counterterrorism efforts to 
fit within the rubric of Just War Theory.163 
Little in this debate has been satisfyingly settled. Killmister suggests that perhaps just war 
theory has become a “relic of another age, ill-suited to the 21st century.”164 But Bellamy counters 
this with an apology for Just War Theory: “The Just War tradition provides a useful way of 
assessing the morality of the war against terror.”165 In the end, difficulty in employing Just War 
Theory should be expected, according to Crawford, because “ethical traditions are not checklists 
or simple codes of conduct—they are tools for evaluating options and assessing behavior. As such, 
the questions that an ethical tradition raises may not have clear and simple answers.”166 
 The second approach to drone warfare taken by international relations ethicists is a reliance 
on postmodern, biopolitical philosophies to bring attention to the humanization of the targets of 
drone warfare who have been dehumanized by war and seek to evoke “equal concern for bodies 
of flesh and bodies of steel.”167 Thus, this literature is interested in attributing value to individuals 
believed to have had value stripped from them as a result of warfare. This is uniquely the case with 
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drone warfare as it is perceived to digitize people, demoting them to a two-dimensional figure on 
a screen.  
Much of this literature is dependent on the philosophies of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, 
and Georgio Agamben. These theorists seek to understand the value of humanity as an exchange 
between those with, and those without, power. Butler notes that life is a mutually constitutive 
relationship between at least two people. Because one has the freedom to accept or reject one’s 
life-status, this relationality is precarious. “Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact 
that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other…Reciprocally, it implies being 
impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others.”168 In this way, the life of one person 
is solely dependent upon recognition by the other. When life is acknowledged, it is recognized as 
something valuable and, thus, grievable, and not merely biologically functioning. “Without 
grievability, there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life.”169 
This precarious nature of acknowledged life is also spoken about by philosopher Giorgio 
Agamben in his treatise Homo Sacer.170 In order to understand the classical roots of biopolitics, 
Agamben reaches back to the Greek, Aristotelian tradition, discussing life as divided in bios or 
political life, and zoe or bare life.171 He notes that the relationship between political and bare life 
is fundamental to understanding political, thus power-based, relationships: “In the ‘politicization’ 
of bare life—the metaphysical task par excellence—the humanity of living man is decided.”172       
While we can see that the mutually constitutive relationship of one to another functions in 
social relationships, and that there is classical conflict between political and bare life. How, then, 
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can we interpret this within the political realm? Michel Foucault, in his lecture series The Birth of 
Biopolitics, suggests that in liberal political systems the definition of life becomes the mandate of 
the state.173 This is an argument built upon previous assertions in Society Must Be Defended, “In 
terms of his relationship with the sovereign,” Foucault says, “the subject is, by rights, neither dead 
nor alive…It is thanks to the sovereign that the subject has the right to be alive or, possibly, the 
right to be dead.”174 This is an especially helpful definition when considering the role of the state 
as the war-wager. It is the state that orchestrates, funds, develops, and necessitates war. And, in so 
doing, the state serves a role in redefining which lives will be acknowledged as valuable and those 
that won’t. 
This literature deals with two major issues in biopolitics as it relates to drone warfare: 
governmentality, or the power that states wield over people, and the humanization of those targeted 
by drone warfare. 
First, the biopolitical drone literature is interested in the power that the state or, to use 
Foucault’s terminology, the sovereign, uses when governing in times of war. Foucault explains: 
“The sovereign has a right of life and death.” This “means that he can, basically, either have people 
put to death or let them live.”175 As has been detailed, the utilization of drone warfare is a tactic 
that utilizes stealthy surveillance and unannounced strikes to target adversaries. Thus, the drone 
represents the ever present political opportunity to preserve or take life. Lauren Wilcox 
acknowledges that this positions the drone’s watchful eye as a panopticon with a “global reach.”176 
This also changes the nature of warfare from conventional battle lines to that of a surveillance-
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based manhunt.177 This represents an immense amount of governmental power as the 
“technologies of precision warfare produce potentially every human in the world as watchable, 
and killable.”178 
These scholars argue that the presence of drones extends that battlefield beyond its 
traditional boundaries. Joseph Pugliese observes that drones, as a “prosthetics of US empire,” 
extends “the imperial power of the state through prosthetic weaponry predicated on violent 
asymmetries of power.”179 This view depicts drones as mechanized appendages of the state’s 
surveillance, projecting state power through a robotic visage. 
Second, the biopolitical drone literature undertakes a project to humanize the targets of 
drone warfare. Caroline Holmqvist argues that “an ontological assumption about what it means to 
be human” is essential for any “ethics” to take place.180 Interestingly, the literature is interested in 
general humanization, taking into consideration the combatant as well as the noncombatant. 
Individuals captured by the drones’ cameras and interpreted on screens continents away are 
referred to in a number of dehumanized ways: squirters,181 bug splats,182 lumps.183 Pugliese focuses 
his attention on the term “lump,” stating that it is “at once human, animal, vegetable and mineral. 
In its collapsing and obliteration of difference it situates the resultant (human) object-things under 
the sign of death: lumps are what remain after a living field has been incinerated by Hellfire 
missiles.”184 This literature is dedicated to stepping beyond these simplistic, dehumanizing terms. 
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Unexpectedly, the biopolitical drone literature is deliberately interested in the 
humanization of combatants targeted by drone warfare. The moment that the combatant becomes 
identified as a surveillable target by a drone is the moment that the value of the target’s life shifts, 
using Agamben’s terminology, from bios life to zoe life.185 For the UAV pilot, the target emerges 
from anonymity to known, but only as a potential terrorist. Zulaika criticizes this process, stating 
that the targeting of humans by drones, especially when the target is informed by “pattern of life” 
or “signature” behaviors, is often characterized by a “lack of basic knowledge regarding the 
languages or cultures of the peoples they are engaged with, let alone disinterest in their political 
goals or subjective motivation.”186 Despite the intent of the subject, this is the moment of 
dehumanization through digitalization. The target’s life is precarious, because it can be taken at 
any moment by the unseen UAV operator. It is valuable to the pilot as long as it serves the pilot’s 
purposes of data collection. Thus, the target’s life is no longer grievable and “without grievability, 
there is no life, or, rather, there is something living that is other than life.”187         
Through its surveillance, the target’s life becomes bare through digitalization. By watching 
the target’s most intimate and vulnerable moments, the operator may connect emotionally with 
their target in the same way an audience connects to a character in a film. When this happens, the 
target, itself, is still not grievable, since the pilot continues to see them as something living, but 
not alive; a target awaiting execution. Wilcox explains that this process includes “the production 
of certain bodies as killable yet ungrievable, whose guilt or innocence is irrelevant.”188 The 
maintenance of the subject’s life is relegated to the interpretation of the target as it is observed on 
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a digital feed.  Chamayou states that targets of drone warfare “are presumed guilty until they are 
proven innocent—which, can only be done posthumously.”189  
More expectedly, the biopolitical drone literature is interested in elucidating the humanity 
of the noncombatants targeted by drone warfare. The noncombatant victims of drone warfare are 
rhetorically brushed away as “collateral damage.” Those who happened to be in the wrong place 
at the wrong time, or were a part of a calculus that determined that the civilian’s life was worth 
forfeit when considering the value of the combatant target. The goal of the biopolitical ethicist, 
according to Thomas Gregory, is to highlight “the lived experiences of those affected by drones 
have been pushed to the margins of the debate or excluded altogether, limiting the discursive space 
that is available to talk about the pain and suffering that is caused.”190 Thus, it is through discourse 
that humanization occurs and through which a “target” of a drone strike can become a survivor, a 
student, a parent. Holmqvist explains that the impact of war occurs on a number of levels for the 
noncombatant. “For instance, the bombardment of a town or village is never simply the physical 
destruction inflicted: the impact on human lives, on individual psyches, thoughts, and emotions, 
on hopes for the future on the part of those whose homes or livelihoods have been destroyed.”191 
While “doing ethics” does little to alleviate the pain of suffering humans, it does create an 
intellectual and discursive space whereby we might trouble the status quo and work toward making 
the unseen viewed and considered.    
International Relations, Discourse, and Framing 
 While the drone literature focuses on a number of intriguing and compelling areas of 
research, missing from this conversation is a discussion about the role that public discourses play 
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in impacting public opinion about drone warfare and maintaining or changing those held beliefs. 
This project is an effort to fill that gap in the existing literature. The impact of discourses, both 
dominant and subversive, upon public beliefs is significant and this project serves as an inaugural 
examination of the failure of the subversive discourse to transform the public’s views of drone 
warfare.  
 A concentration on the discourses that shape public debate in the United States aligns with 
International Relations’ constructivist theoretical approach and provides an opportunity to identify 
the primary themes that compose the discourse. This project not only contributes to the drone 
literature, but also continues an interest in the power of discourses to construct public 
understanding of reality through speech, rhetoric, and art in IR’s constructivist literature.     
International Relations Theory and Discourse 
Spoken, written, and visualized ideas are the ways by which meaning is conveyed from the 
idea’s sender to the recipient. Epstein defines a discourse as a “cohesive ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorizations about a specific object.”192 Hodges provides additional insight into 
what a discourse does. He notes that the practice of “discourse infuses events with meaning, 
establishes widespread social understandings, and constitutes social reality.”193  Discourses 
become powerful when they make a difference.194 The more persuasive they are, the more 
entrenched they become in society, become a power structure that isn’t noticed. Fairclough refers 
to this as “a hidden effect of power.”195  
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One of the core goals of the constructivist approach to International Relations seeks to 
understand how societal norms are established and sustained, while simultaneously establishing 
and sustaining the identities of individuals and collectives. Wendt explains that “particular 
identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social definition of the actor grounded in the 
theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and one another and that constitute the 
structure of the social world.”196 Thus, when identity formation and sustenance is a key theoretical 
consideration, understanding the creation of relational meaning becomes important. Klotz 
characterizes shared meanings and norms as intersubjective. “Particular meanings become stable 
over time, creating social orders that constructivists call structures or institutions. Rules and norms 
set expectations about how the world works, what types of behavior are legitimate, and which 
interests or identities are possible.”197  
The formation of the social and political identities of individuals and states is important 
because it explains the purpose behind the social processes that humans continuously engage in in 
a constructed world. Identities are not to be regarded as static realities, rather, they are 
“continuously restated, negotiated, and reshaped”198 in relationship to and with society. Aristotle 
famously categorized humans as political animals and linked their human identity to their 
engagement with and in the Greek polis. “Anyone who cannot form a community with others, or 
who does not need to because he is self-sufficient, is no part of a city-state—he is either a beast or 
a god.”199 Thus, even from the beginnings of political philosophy, the importance of evaluating 
and understanding the relationship of an individual’s identification within society (polis 
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participant, beast, or god) and society’s constitutive reliance on the individual is apparent. 
Understanding of identity is especially important for this project because our ethical responses to 
the casualties of drone strikes are shaped by their identification as terrorist, combatant, target, 
noncombatant, grandmother, child. 
 International relationships, thus, are fundamentally driven by meaning-laden 
communication or speech acts. Utterances, like presidential speeches, are performative actions, 
wrought with meaning, that evoke response, after interpretation, from the receiver of the speech.200 
Risse notes the “triviality” of this assertion, noting that “communicative behavior is all-pervasive 
in international relations as in any other social setting.”201 But, he continues, there is a difference 
between instrumental “cheap talk” and deliberative argumentation or “rhetorical action.”202 The 
difference is rooted in the purposes underpinning the communication. Epstein suggests that one of 
the purposes of communication, in alignment with constructivism, is to establish and re-produce 
identity. “This ‘talking’ is central both to what [states] do and who they are—to the dynamics of 
identity. States, like individuals, position themselves in relation to other states by adopting certain 
discourses and not others.”203 This contributes to the state’s self-understanding of what actions and 
beliefs are acceptable and consistent with values and policies held and those that aren’t.204 
Because the constructivist agenda is interested in the ways that human interactions produce 
ideas and contribute to the constitution of ideas, power structures, and norms, it should not be 
surprising that most of the discursive analysis in the International Relations literature has emerged 
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from the constructivist camp. In fact, Charlotte Epstein contends that a focus on discourse and 
language within constructivist IR is “necessary to deepening the understanding of the constructed-
ness of IR’s world” that goes beyond empirical studies.205 
Going back to the Aristotelian concept of homo politicus, Neta Crawford looks at discourse 
as an instrumental tool within international politics that is important because it is the process 
through which citizens and leaders are persuaded to act in particular ways. She notes that “the 
method of persuasion, political argumentation to promote belief and behavior change” is common 
in international politics.206    
Words are powerful, and through their skillful utilization, the practice of discourse is a 
process through which norms and identities can be established, challenged, and altered. This 
occurs on the international level both through formal discourse such as diplomatic negotiation and 
through less formal public discourse such as elite speeches. Elite-level discourses in the 
international sphere “influence the interests, and thus policies, of targeted nation-states through 
‘reflexive discourse,’” which requires states to consider how public statements and actions affect 
their international appearances and reputations.207  
Additionally, elite-level discourses allow for the creation and situation of security crises 
within certain classifications, changing global perception of the crisis. Both Lene Hansen and Eric 
Heinze show how the discursive classification of a security event as “genocide” evoked a change 
in how the international community regarded the crisis. Evaluating the Bosnian War, Hansen’s 
discourse analysis concludes that “the Western debate on Bosnia showed that adopting a 
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representation of ‘genocide was a powerful discursive move which radically changed the 
construction of ethical, spatial, and temporal identities within the Balkan discourse.”208 Heinze’s 
study looks at how the Bush Administration was able to delineate the mid-2000s conflict in Darfur 
as “genocide,” even if the United States had no intention of intervening in the conflict. The 
utilization of this term sought to generate action from the international community. “The word 
‘genocide’…is more inflammatory, more reproachful, and entails at a least a moral (if not legal) 
obligation to stop such acts.”209 Thus, we see how discourse can impact the established norms, 
identities, and political actions within the international community.  
Discourse at the international level also provides an intentional check upon the actions of 
political agents and allows for deliberation regarding actions and policies and carves out room for 
critical evaluation of those actions and policies. As Risse explains, “the existence of a public sphere 
ensures that actors have to regularly and routinely explain and justify their behavior.”210 For 
International Relations scholars who utilize a Habermasian approach to discourse (known as 
discourse ethics), it is understood that discourse is the primary mode of social transformation. 
Andrew Linklater produces a compelling case for the use of Habermasian discourse ethics within 
International Relations. Acknowledging the potential for an international dialogical community, 
he concedes that powerful states engaging in dialogue with less powerful states must be cognizant 
and tolerant of cultural and moral differences. He asserts, however, that “only through dialogue 
with other cultures can progress be made in separating merely local truth from those with wider 
acclaim.”211 He goes on to argue that Habermas’ project is ultimately one that provides 
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emancipation for those engaged in discourse.212 Linklater goes on to defend the use of Habermas 
in International Relations literature stating that, “it opposes totalizing projects that ride roughshod 
over cultural differences and expose individuals and groups to forms subjection and 
humiliation.”213 
The most dominant voices in international politics, as is illustrated in the above examples, 
are the political elite on behalf of their respective states. This, however, provides an incomplete 
picture of the discourse, leaving out the subaltern voices. Attempts to bring these voices to the 
forefront are the International Relations feminist theorists. Critiquing the Habermasian approaches 
to ethical discourse, Fiona Robison argues that the equity proposed by Habermas strips away the 
agency of the less powerful, forcing them into a position of waiting for the powerful to include 
them at the table. Robinson explains that in order for the subaltern to be fully engaged in dialogical 
processes, “dialogue must be supplemented by prior or concurrent attention to the structuring and 
composition of institutions, and the ways in which gender essentialisms and the public-private 
dichotomy are constitutive elements of the liberal social and political order.”214  Kimberly 
Hutchings contends that a key problem with structural approaches to discourse, like Habermas,’ is 
that one must presuppose the superiority of a liberal world order, which Hutchings rejects as being 
neocolonial and inherently exclusionary.215 A general rejection by the constructivist International 
Relations literature of the Habermas’ discourse ethics has led the discipline towards post-modern 
discursive approaches informed by Derrida and Foucault.216   
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The relevance of a discursive approach to International Relations theory seems apparent. 
Even the (essentialized) realist International Relations theorist who argues that it is exclusively the 
acquisition and execution of material power that establishes activity within the international 
system,217 might find some promise in discursive theoretical traditions as the actions and words 
that states undertake are symbolic of power-laden discourse. Considering, for example, the 
quintessentially realist Melian dialogue transcribed by Thucydides,218 it is apparent that Athenian 
power ultimately triumphed over Melian desire for neutrality.219 The anecdote itself is encased in 
discourse, action, and reaction.220 
Discourse and the Global War on Terror 
 Underpinning the discourse surrounding drone warfare is a discourse that articulates the 
political and security goals of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). This discourse was born out the 
crisis of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and its principles, despite the Obama 
Administration’s choice not to use the term “Global War on Terror,” have transcend the Bush and 
Obama Administrations. Fairclough and Fairclough suggest that the creation of a dominant 
discourse, or meta-narrative, in a time of crisis provides the public with “a reason for favoring or 
accepting certain lines of action and policies rather than others.”221 Holland argues that President 
Bush was able to effectively frame the terrorist attacks as a crisis that required a holistic, national 
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response. This infused “the events with meaning and [articulated] the solution to the underlying 
morbid condition they represented.”222  
Shortly after September 11, philosopher Jacques Derrida explained his impression of the 
“morbid condition” (as articulated by Holland) produced through the terrorist attack: “A weapon 
wounds and leaves forever open an unconscious scar.”223 It is the scar of 9/11 and the continued 
public insecurity prompted by the threat of terrorism that propels the GWOT discourse. “Out of 
the tragedy of 9/11 arose the rhetoric of ‘the war on terror’…The ‘war on terror’ discourse 
constrains and shapes public discussion and debate within the US and around the world…[as] its 
language” is used to “explain, react to, justify or understand a broad range of political, economic 
and social phenomena.”224 The American public was especially receptive to this sort of organizing 
discourse after 9/11 because it required a schema through which to process the insecurity prompted 
by the terrorist attack.225 As Holland explains, “US security culture was dominated by an illusion 
of invulnerability that has flourished during the ‘interwar years’ following the Cold War.”226 On 
9-11 this illusion was shattered and the GWOT discourse naturally took its place.   
 The texts and speeches composing the GWOT discourse are voluminous and discussing 
them in detail is beyond the scope of this project,227 but studies by Richard Jackson, Lee Jarvis, 
and Adam Hodges utilize critical discourse analysis to isolate the major trends and components 
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present in the GWOT discourse. Jackson finds that the meta-GWOT-discourse and its sub-
discourses utilize common discursive practices, which include: 
The creation of a sense of exceptional grievance and victim-hood; 
the demonization and dehumanization of an enemy ‘other’; the 
manufacture of a catastrophic threat and danger which demands 
immediate and forceful action; and the justification and 
legitimization of pre-emptive (or preventative) counter-violence.228 
         
These ideas become “normalized” as an American cultural narrative as they are repeated and 
reproduced by politicians and the media.229 Importantly, this discourse “serves as the truth in the 
sense that it produces real effects in the world.”230 While not addressed in these studies, one of the 
“real effects” experienced as a result of this discourse and the continuance of boundary-less 
targeting of terrorists is a tactical reliance on drone warfare.  
Framing, Social Mobilization, and Discourse 
 Discourses produce a vocabulary through which societies can make sense of cultural 
narratives. These discourses only have power to transform society, affecting public opinion and 
thought if they are organized in a persuasive fashion that will prompt mobilization.231 Within the 
sociological literature, these organizational mechanisms are called frames. Sociologist Erving 
Goffman explains that “social frameworks…provide background understanding for events that 
incorporate the will, aim, and controlled effort of…the human being.”232 Building off of 
Goffman’s Frame Analysis (also referred to as “frame theory”), Snow, et. al. refine this definition, 
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explaining that frames “function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or 
collective.”233  
The process of frame creation is referred to by Snow, et, al. as “frame alignment.” The 
authors note that the process of frame alignment is “the linkage of individual and [Social 
Movement Organizations] interpretive orientations, such that some set of individual interests, 
values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary.”234  
Benford and Snow note that the process of frame creation is discursive and occurs in two steps: 
frame articulation and frame amplification. They explain that frame articulation “involves the 
connection and alignment of events and experiences that they hang together in a relatively unified 
and compelling fashion.”235 The creation of the dominant and subversive discourses surrounding 
drone warfare, and germane to this project, is discussed in Chapter Two.  
The emergence of collective action frames are a social construction. Melucci describes this 
process stating that frames “are produced by internal negotiations and conflicts: individuals and 
groups within a movement construct them.”236 Finnemore and Sikkink, writing from the 
constructivist theoretical lens, argue that this is similar to the process of norm creation within the 
international system.237 Aligning with Melucci’s explanation of the creation of frames, in the IR 
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literature, “norms…constitute a community’s shared understandings and intentions.”238 This is 
accomplished through the ideational efforts of “norm entrepreneurs” who “are critical for norm 
emergence because they call attention to issues or even ‘create’ issues by using language that 
names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”239 It is through the process of framing that discontent 
groups can articulate grievances in a systematic way and can use the created frames to convey 
those grievances to others, attempting to mobilize a response to their concerns.240 Though, 
McCarthy notes, that the selection of frames and their strategic presentation is extremely important 
for the success of the mobilizing structure: “Activists must successfully frame them as usable and 
appropriate to the social change tasks to which they will be put.”241 This is an important 
consideration when analyzing the success or failure of a discursive movement. 
The term “framing” is used with little formal interaction with the sociological literature in 
the International Relations literature. There is, however, continuity between the two disciplines’ 
use of the term and precedence for utilizing “framing” in constructivist, discursive IR analysis 
beyond Finnemore and Sikkink’s 1998 article. In the previous IR discourse literature cited, we see 
a number of examples in which framing is utilizes in order to explain the political goals of the 
discourse’s formation. For example, Holland and Abulot explain elite discourse as taking on a 
frame of “crisis” or “security” (respectively) in order for the rhetorical and policy goals to be 
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realized. Gregory’s 2015 article discusses the role that power plays in frames’ success, especially 
in cases of frame competition.242  
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Chapter Three: Creating Drone Discourses: Background and Context 
Discourses, both dominant and subversive, do not emerge ex nihilo. They are the product 
of a historical context and are socially constructed. Ruggie refers to the creation of social narratives 
as being part of a holistic “human project”243 that consists of “civilizational constructs, cultural 
factors, state identities” and come together to “shape states’ interests.”244 It is through the 
conglomeration of concepts, ideas, social expectations, and events that state’s interests are 
articulated to create discourse. Consideration of the origins and social constructs that compose the 
discourse allows for investigation of the processes impacting the creation of particular 
discourses.245  
 This chapter seeks to trace the suppositions that underpin the discourses surrounding the 
use of weaponized drones by the United States, especially in its counterterrorism missions. First, 
it investigates the creation of the dominant or US government-perpetuated discourse, which I 
suggest is propelled by a post-Vietnam Revolution in Military Affairs and is informed by an 
emphasis placed on casualty aversion in conflict. Second, this chapter investigates the origins of 
the subversive narrative, which attempts to expose the dominant narrative’s shortcomings. I 
suggest that the subversive narrative emerges from the streets of Pakistan’s cities in the form of 
protest and given notoriety in the United States through online activism and NGO reports. 
Exploring the historic and contextual underpinnings of these discourses will assist in 
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understanding the interactions of these discourses and the impact that they have in the public 
sphere.           
 
Precision and Casualty Averse Warfare: Establishing the Dominant Discourse 
 
[We must] challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture 
for the defense of America…On land, our heavy forces will be 
lighter, our light forces will be more lethal. All will be easier to 
deploy and to sustain. In the air, we will be able to strike across the 
world with pinpoint accuracy, using both aircraft and unmanned 
systems. On the oceans we will connect information and weapons in 
new ways, maximizing our ability to project power over land. In 
space, we’ll protect our network of satellites essential to the flow of 
our commerce and the defense of our comment interests. 
President George W. Bush 
February 13, 2001246 
 
American military engagement in the Post-Cold War world has taken on a markedly 
different tone. Lacking a monolithic adversary,247 American forces engage in smaller-scale, 
shorter-term missions dominated by the use of strategic air-based strikes.248 This transition from 
modern, total warfare (evidenced in World Wars I and II) to a limited-engagement, precision and 
speed-focused model of warfare, has been widely regarded as a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).249 Latham acknowledges that this RMA “has been ‘triggered’ by technological changes” 
and is characterized by “a transformation of most (if not all) dimensions of the mode of warfare.”250 
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Prior to 9/11 and the Global War on Terror, Latham sagely suggested that threat had been redefined 
in the Western world. Instead of “the Soviet Other” providing the primary security threat, it is now 
characterized “by a range of actually or potentially hostile Third World states.”251 The change in 
security threat not only signals a change in the type of war to be prepared for and waged, but also 
indicates a change in adversary from a country’s military to individual terrorists, terrorist cells, 
and nongovernmental actors. 
 Revolutions in Military Affairs are certainly not a new or unique development to the 
contemporary military world. Volumes by Parker,252 Keegan,253 and Boot254 chronicle the 
emergence of technological innovations that so significantly altered the battlefield that they 
required radical changes in military strategy and training. Focused on the mechanization of the 
battlefield, Martin van Creveld suggests that the trajectory of the most recent RMA finds its roots 
in the ashes of World War II. “The most significant post-1945 technological developments took 
place in the field of electronics and space.”255 The consequent arms races of the Cold War produced 
expensive, virtually unusable stockpiles of nuclear weapons.256 As new challenges and conflicts 
developed, “big bomb” strategies were no longer viable. New technologies, applications of 
technological developments, and warfare strategies integrating precision were desirable.  
                                                 
251 Ibid., 222.  
252 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
253 John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).  
254 Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World (Ne w York: 
Gotham Books, 2007). 
255 Martin van Creveld, “Strategic View: World War II’s Stifling Paradigm,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Military History, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Spring 2001), 51.  
256 Whether or not the proliferation of nuclear weapons create a more or less stable world is the subject of 
Sagan and Waltz’s book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, but both scholar agree that the use of nuclear weaponry 
in warfare would be so horrible that containment and monitoring regimes to control these weapons are more likely 
than the utilization of these weapons (Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A 
Debate Renewed, (New York: Norton, 2003).  
 59 
 
In his study, War Made New, Max Boot is clear that changes on the battlefield are reflective 
of factors inclusive of and beyond the military (social, economic, political, etc.). He notes that at 
a fundamental level the focus of RMA analysis should rest on “the soldier struggling to kill or 
avoid being killed, and [on] his commander struggling to master the remorseless logic of 
carnage.”257 The deliberate inclusion of the human into the RMA equation is also endorsed by 
military historian, Adrian Lewis. Critiquing the wholesale acceptance of a defense development 
and deployment strategy characterized as technology-first, Lewis states: “Technology, operational 
doctrine, and new adaptive organization were to come together in ways that created synergies that 
made possible the RMA. The problem with this thinking was that it left out the human beings.”258  
At the heart of this RMA has been the development of casualty-averse technology such as 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. According to P.W. Singer, the present RMA is unique as “the 
introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn’t change simply how we fight, but for 
the first time changes who fights…It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its 
capabilities.”259 This change in agent has additional implications for the role of the soldier and the 
Western understanding of war because, as Singer quips, “Drones don’t die.”260 Weapons like 
UAVs are designed to feed a casualty averse American public, “destroy[ing] [the enemy 
combatant] at long range, [and] accelerating a long-standing trend: the battlefield has been 
emptying for centuries.”261 
Half a year before the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks and the United States’ incursion into 
Afghanistan, the nascent Bush Administration committed itself to the development of a 
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technologically-driven military that would reduce risk to soldiers through technological 
advancements. In an address given to troops and personnel at Norfolk Naval Air Station on 
February 13, 2001, President George W. Bush noted: “We’re witnessing a revolution in the 
technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness…Safety 
is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons. The best 
way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.”262 It is this sentiment that cements the 
continuation of the RMA and the American-preferred “Casualty Averse” philosophy of military 
engagement. 
In order to properly understand what is meant by “casualty averse warfare,” it must be 
defined. Conceptually, casualty aversion is not complex. Robert Mandel describes casualty averse 
warfare as: “During warfare one has a low tolerance for losing many lives or suffering many 
injuries.”263 The very definition of casualty aversion is, however, laden with ambiguity as the 
nature of “many lives lost” is perceptual.264 Mandel notes that “the quest for bloodless war 
represents as aspiration embodying a set of sometimes unspoken or confusingly stated motivations, 
intentions, and values, rather than a pattern of unambiguous empirically observable behavior.”265 
This defines the ideal of precise death in warfare of precise combatant targets without risk to 
soldiers or noncombatants not identified as targets, thus establishing a righteous justification for 
conflict. If assailants can attack enemy combatants with pinpoint accuracy, then the risk of 
collateral damage is decreased significantly.    
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Casualty averse military strategies are attractive in a world of twenty-four hour news cycles 
and competition between cable news stations to break the latest news.  The relationship 
between media and public support can clearly be observed through the media’s “ability to 
dramatize the costs of war.”266 What would become known as “the CNN Effect,” accounts for the 
ability of CNN (and all news media outlets) “to focus an audience’s attention,” thus “increas[ing] 
public pressure on political leaders.”267 The classic case for the CNN effect is the Vietnam War. It 
is largely believed that “the reason Vietnam casualties are still remembered today is because of 
their unprecedented visibility during the conflict.”268 The visualization of loss causes a conflict 
and the strategy by which it is being fought to face delegitimization in eyes of the public.       
In today’s conflicts, American public support of military actions is often directly tied to 
what is shown on their television screens.269 This is why Michael Ignatieff describes the highly-
televised Kosovo Conflict as “a spectacle” and notes that “it aroused emotions in the intense but 
shallow way that sports do.”270 American citizens become “armchair soldiers,” watching exploding 
bombs as spectators.271 Consequently, Americans require images of victory to develop and 
perpetuate support for military conflict. Fewer American casualties translate to greater support by 
the American public for the military and its overseas deployments. This feeds an American public 
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with expectations for images of easy victories and few flag-draped coffins.272 Mandel explains, 
“So casualty aversion seems to be a virtually inevitable consequence because people would be 
upset if many of their fellow citizens were being slaughtered in battle.”273              
Directly influencing change in American military strategy, the media’s portrayal of the 
United States’ Battle of Mogadishu in October of 1993 caused not only the swift abandonment of 
a ten month United Nations mission in Somalia, but also impacted the strategies utilized by NATO 
forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. After two Black Hawk transport helicopters were shot down 
by Somali militants, with initial reports of five dead American soldiers274 and bringing the combat 
death toll in Somalia to sixteen.275 While the soldiers’ deaths were tragic in their own right, the 
reports and images of the Somali’s grisly treatment of the soldiers’ corpses and soldiers taken 
hostage caused the loss to be intolerable by the American people.  
News reports from Mogadishu…said the bodies of dead American 
soldiers littered the scene of the fighting, with the bloodied corpse 
of one U.S. serviceman being dragged through the streets by ropes 
tied to his feet, and another dead serviceman stripped naked and 
surrounded by a gleeful Somali mob chanting “Victory!”…In 
another case, the corpse of an American soldier was said to have 
been tied up and trundled through the streets on a wheelbarrow by 
about 200 cheering Somalis.276       
 
The unwillingness of the American people to accept the deaths and desecrations of 
American service personnel abroad was reflected by the United States Congress, who were quick 
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to link the operation in Somalia to controversial loss of soldiers in Vietnam.277 The sentiments of 
the American people were further evidenced in a public opinion poll, which revealed that “43% 
[of those polled] say that they’re less willing to commit U.S. troops after the escalating violence 
in Somalia” and the same percentage believed that the United States should remove troops 
immediately. 59% of those polled had seen “news photos of the corpse of a U.S. solider being 
dragged through the streets by Aidid followers.”278 This incident marked the beginning of the end 
of the American military’s mission in Somalia, with formal withdrawal completed on March 25, 
1994.279  
 The October 1993 battle in Mogadishu served as a backdrop for the spring 1999  
United States-led, NATO air war against Yugoslavia. The impetus for the strikes was “an effort to 
halt and reverse the human rights abuses that were being committed against the citizens of its 
Kosovo province by Yugoslavia’s president, Slobodan Milosevic.”280 Using the recent history of 
ethnic cleansing and genocide in the Balkans and measurable success with targeted air strikes 
during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War,281 President Clinton stressed the aerial (casualty averse) nature 
of the campaign in Kosovo, while affirming its potential risks. 
Like any other military action—there are risks in it…There are risks 
every time our young people get up and fly jet airplanes at very high 
speeds…But the dangers of acting must be weighed against the 
dangers of inaction. If we don’t do anything after all the to-and-fro 
that’s been said here, it will be interpreted by Mr. Milosevic as a 
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license to continue to kill. There will be more massacres, more 
refugees, more victims, more people crying out for revenge.282        
 
Commentators speculate that a contributing factor for Milosevic’s eventual surrender was 
the threat of ground troop deployment,283 but the images of the Somalia tragedy, stamped on the 
minds of the American public, would only permit a perceptually low-risk engagement for 
American troops in defense of Kosovo. Like other conflicts of the 1990s, the Kosovo Conflict was 
widely televised,284 but the lack of US troops on the ground prevented “battlefield reports” from 
reporters. Thus, the US government was able to control the interpretation of the bombings, 
primarily through the portrayal of Milosevic’s war crimes as the problem.285 
A public resistant to the idea of combat deaths of their troops has aided in propelling the 
evolution of Western military strategy. Thus, this strategy is reliant upon air power in order to 
prevent heavy casualty conflict.286 In the end, Kosovo “did indeed represent the first time in which 
air power coerced an enemy leader to yield with no friendly land combat action whatsoever.”287 
The NATO victory in Kosovo set a precedent for technology and air-power-focused twenty-first 
century warfare.   
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 A progressively casualty-averse strategy of warfare is propelled by technological 
developments that allow for soldiers to step back from the danger of battlefield, with the goal of 
increasing the strength and precision of weaponry.288 The ultimate intention is to “give the United 
States a battlefield edge against region powers, [and] will also bolster efforts to deal with such 
dangers as international crime, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and 
environmental damage.”289 In part, the edge that technology provides a military is speed of 
response.290 A vital technological advancement in today’s battlefield has been the development 
and use of UAVs for the purposes of surveillance and combat. 
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, such as the USAF’s TQ-1A Predator and US Army’s Hunter, 
were first used for intelligence collection during the Kosovo Conflict.291 The tactical advantage of 
UAVs was quickly acknowledged as “UAVs offered commanders and planners the frequent 
advantage of real-time video imagery without any accompanying danger of aircrew losses.”292 
General Wesley Clark confirmed the utility of UAVs in combat in an interview with James der 
Derian, and advocated for continued development of the technology. 
What you needed was integration, of the digitized images from the 
unmanned aerial vehicle flying overhead, your map coordinates, and 
the geolocations of the enemy from the GPS, and to project it all on 
the thermal viewer, to use it as a computer, so the driver and the 
gunner know when they get to the top of the hill, they’ll know that 
the son-of-a-bitch is going to be right there.293        
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While not fool-proof, the USAF was able to use three Predators with 24 hours of flight time, to 
simultaneously to map and identify targets for attack.294 Additionally, General Clark and his staff 
were able to locate two of Milosevic’s Serbian colleagues (Mladic and Karadijic), though both 
eluded capture.295 
Prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the remote, rough terrain of Tora Bora of Afghanistan 
and Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the United States Department of Defense 
articulated an intention to further develop UAV capabilities. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review Report expressed the efficacy of UAVs for “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance” 
(ISR).296 The value of UAVs for surveillance missions is undeniable. Unlike the Cold War 
surveillance standard, the U2 spy plane, the unmanned Global Hawk, slated to replace the U2 in 
2015,297 can monitor targets for about 35 hours at an altitude of 65,000 feet without endangering 
a pilot. To put this in perspective, the “Global Hawk can fly from San Francisco, spend a day 
hunting for any terrorists in the entire state of Maine, and then fly back to the West Coast.” 298  
The surveillance provided by UAVs is remarkably crisp and, provided in real time, it 
eliminates the delay of photo and information transfer previously experienced through intelligence 
gathering methods such as human intelligence (HUMINT). In her seminal New Yorker article, 
journalist Jane Mayer described her experience watching as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
team surveyed and executed a strike on wanted Pakistani terrorist, Baituallah Mesud, through the 
assistance of a Predator Drone. “It was a hot summer night, and he [Mesud] was joined outside by 
his wife and his uncle, a medic; at one point, the remarkably crisp images showed the Mehsud, 
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who suffered from diabetes and a kidney ailment, was receiving an intravenous drip.”299 Minutes 
later she reports the clarity with which she observed the rocket impact that killed Mesud and those 
in his compound.  
While Predator Drones had been utilized to track the movements of al Qaeda terrorist, 
Osama bin Laden in October of 2000, prior to the 9/11 attacks, the drones had not been weaponized 
and the CIA was forced to watch, frustrated, as bin Laden went about his daily tasks unhindered. 
“Here was the clean shot they had been seeking for more than two years: positive identification of 
their target, no questionable human agents, no delay.”300 Funding to develop the weaponization of 
the drones, however, was not immediately forthcoming from Congress. While the capability was 
developed and tested prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this event caused the weaponization of 
drones to become a top military priority.             
 For the purposes of warfare, the ability to equip UAVs with strike capabilities in order to 
access targets in remote or hidden areas has been an integral component of casualty averse 
strategies. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report expresses the necessity of weapons 
capabilities to be developed for UAVs in combat: “Emphasis must be placed on…unmanned long-
range precision strike assets, related initiatives for new small munitions, and the ability to defeat 
hard and deeply buried targets.”301 Shortly after the Global War on Terror had begun, President 
Bush praised the efficacy of armed UAVs and the necessity to further pursue unmanned 
technology.  
This combination -- real-time intelligence, local allied forces, 
special forces, and precision air power -- has really never been used 
before.  The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the 
future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-
tank symposiums. The Predator is a good example. This unmanned 
                                                 
299 Mayer, 36.  
300 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 534.   
301 Department of Defense, 44.    
 68 
 
aerial vehicle is able to circle over enemy forces, gather intelligence, 
transmit information instantly back to commanders, then fire on 
targets with extreme accuracy. Before the war, the Predator had 
skeptics, because it did not fit the old ways.  Now it is clear the 
military does not have enough unmanned vehicles.  We're entering 
an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater 
importance -- in space, on land, in the air, and at sea.302 
     
US military concentration has clearly been upon casualty aversion for American service 
men and women, but how does this military strategy account for the deaths of and injuries to 
civilians? 
Questioning Precision: Roots of the Subversive Discourse 
From the first reports of US drone strikes in counterterrorism efforts outside of the formal 
theatre of war, the ethical veracity of drone utilization has been questioned. In 2009, Micah Zenko 
called for a public debate, but explained that the drone program’s classification as a “covert action” 
(as defined by the National Security Act of 1947), has prevented the effective development of 
critical voices in the United States.303 These voices have suggested that perhaps the Obama 
Administration’s drone war has not been as precision-driven as advertised. 
Because casualty numbers resulting from UAV attacks are classified, reports vary wildly. 
While some sources report that 50 noncombatants are killed for every one militant,304 The New 
America Foundation claims that the rate between noncombatants and militants has never been that 
high305 and currently claim a civilian death toll of single digits in 2013 and zero in 2014. These 
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numbers have come under scrutiny because they are limited by the numbers that are reported in 
the media, not by the real numbers that are collected by the US military and/or the Central 
Intelligence Agency.306 On Friday, July 1, 2016 the White House publically released the number 
of combatants and civilians killed as a result of drone strikes. Marking the first solid numbers 
released by the Obama Administration, the report states that in drone strikes conducted from 2009 
to 2015 (in areas outside of Afghanistan and Iraq) between 64 and 116 civilians and that between 
2,372 and 2,581 combatants have been killed.307 
For example, it has been documented - at the time of writing - that 2,354 U.S. service 
members have died in Operation Enduring Freedom since 2001.308 While the deaths of these US 
service men and women are an indisputably tragic loss to the United States, the loss of life has 
been potentially more substantial for Afghan civilians.309 The United Nations reports that from 
January 01, 2007 to December 31, 2012, 14,728 Afghan civilians have lost their lives. 3,219 of 
these deaths are attributed to pro-government forces as “collateral damage.”310 However, the exact 
number may never be known. 
The numbers of combatant and noncombatant casualties attributed to UAVs are also 
extremely lopsided (conceivably zero for UAV pilots). This is because the pilots of UAVs are not 
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located within the physical geography of the battlefield, and, thus, combatants and noncombatants 
almost entirely absorb the casualties sustained through UAV attacks. Martin Shaw refers to the 
preservation of soldier safety while sacrificing noncombatant safety as “risk-transfer war.” This is 
“because it centers on minimizing life-risks to the military…at the expense not only of ‘enemies’ 
but also of those whom the West agrees are ‘innocent’.”311 The ambiguity of casualty aversion is 
apparent: what is casualty averse for one group may not be casualty averse for another, but may, 
instead, be the transfer of risk from one group onto another. The consequence of risk transfer 
warfare is the prioritization of the soldier protection over the protection of noncombatants. 
The endorsement of casualty aversion and consequent tactical use of drones has been a 
hallmark of President Barack Obama’s counterterrorism efforts throughout the world. The material 
and thematic contributions of President Obama and his staff to the dominant drone discourse will 
be detailed in Chapters Three and Four, but it is clear that the combination of continued drone 
strikes and public statements made by the President and members of his Administration have 
directly influenced and prompted the development of a subversive discourse. 
In response to the contested reports of noncombatant casualties, Pakistani photo journalist, 
Noor Behram, a resident of North Waziristan, Pakistan, sought to provide visual confirmation of 
the impact that drone strikes have upon the villages and citizens targeted. Specifically concerned 
by Pakistani media reports in 2009 and 2010 that the victims of drone strikes were exclusively 
described as “militants,” Behram has sought to photographically document the destruction of drone 
warfare, both material and human, in the Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan in order 
to verify these reports.312 His photography is an attempt to visually problematize the “natural and 
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commonsensical”313 While “the world’s media quickly reports on how many militants were killed 
in each strike,” Behram goes to the sites of drone strikes in order “‘to count how many children, 
women, innocent people, are killed.’”314 
 Hasnain Kazim of the German newspaper, Der Spiegel, reported that Between 2007 and 
2011 Noor Behram visited the sites of about “70 drone attacks” and observed “more than 600 
corpses.”315 Shah and Beaumont report that Noor Behram often arrives at the scene of a strike 
shortly “after the explosion,” so “he first has to put his camera aside and start digging through the 
debris to see if there are any survivors.” 316 He does this at great personal risk because “the drones 
frequently hit the same place again.”317 
 The subversive narrative, as visually presented by Behram has been buttressed by two 
reports, whose data and conclusions are guided by interviews conducted in Pakistan. In September 
of 2012 the report Living Under Drones, a joint venture between scholars at Stanford and New 
York University was released. Its intent to provocatively challenge the dominant discourse of 
casualty aversion is presented in the first sentence of its executive summary. “In the United States, 
the dominant narrative about the use of drones in Pakistan is of a surgically precise and effective 
tool that makes the US safer by enabling ‘targeted killing’ of terrorists, with minimal downsides 
of collateral impacts. This narrative is false.”318 The report goes on to acknowledge the security 
threats apparent to American and Pakistani interests along the largely ungoverned 
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Afghanistan/Pakistan border, but “in light of significant evidence of harmful impacts to Pakistani 
civilians and to US interests, current policies to address terrorism through targeted killings and 
drone strikes must be carefully re-evaluated.”319 
The equally provocative Amnesty International report “Will I Be Next?” was published in 
October of 2013. It, too, seeks to engage the dominant discourse regarding American tactics of 
drone warfare, expressing the discrepancy of experiences by noncombatants and reported precision 
of UAV strikes. 
The USA, which refuses to release detailed information about 
individual strikes, claims that its drone operations are based on 
reliable intelligence, are extremely accurate, and that the vast 
majority of people killed in such strikes are members of armed 
groups such as the Taliban and al-Qa’ida. Critics claim that drone 
strikes are much less discriminating, have resulted in hundreds of 
civilian deaths…and foster animosity the increases recruitment into 
the very groups the USA seeks to eliminate.320  
 
Utilizing more damning language, the Amnesty International report expresses concern that drone-
based attacks “have resulted in unlawful killings that may constitute extrajudicial executions or 
war crimes…[and] may have also violated human rights.”321 
The root of the subversive discourse opposing drone warfare emerged from Pakistan at 
beginning of the Obama Administration when reported drone strikes were becoming 
uncomfortably common in Pakistan’s western frontier, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
This discourse was both formed and disseminated through public protests and demonstrations, 
which were aimed both at the American and Pakistani governments.322 This subversive discourse 
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was concerned both about the violation of Pakistani national sovereignty and about the number of 
casualties resulting from the drone strikes. Scott Shane reported that “Drones are hugely unpopular 
with many Pakistanis, who see them as a violation of their country’s sovereignty.” 323 Additionally, 
“there is a question of public perception particularly over the civilian casualties caused by the 
strikes, which infuriate politicians and the media here.”324  
In December of 2011 Wired.com posted thirteen of Noor Behram’s photographs featuring 
the victims and physical destruction of drone warfare. At the time, no photographs documenting 
drone strikes had been released by an American news outlet.325 Spencer Ackerman took the 
opportunity to show Americans what the aftermath of drone warfare looks like—at least through 
Noor Behram’s camera lens.326 Behram has a clear agenda in presenting his photography to the 
world: “‘I want to show taxpayers in the Western world what their tax money is doing to people 
in another part of the world: killing civilians, innocent victims, children.’”327  
Behram’s photography embodies a central component of the subversive discourse: an 
intentional humanizing of populations targeted by drone warfare. Humanization through creative 
visualization is also what makes the Pakistani art installation, #NotABugSplat an impactful 
contribution to the subversive discourse. Influenced by the building-sized portraits envisioned and 
installed around the world by “semi-anonymous” artist, JR,328 the #NotABugSplat art installation 
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tries “to reach the people pulling the trigger in America’s drone wars—the drone operators 
themselves.”329 While the aim of revealing the innocent, thoughtful face of a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
child to American drone pilots through their cameras, the installation has a wider audience. Meyer 
notes that the poster is “also designed to be captured by satellites in order to make it a permanent 
part of the landscape on online mapping sites” and that “it challenges all those who have access to 
images photographed from the sky to use their power to make a more just world.”330    
 The artwork’s title is a visual, discursive challenge to the military terminology popularized 
by a 2012 Rolling Stone article which uses the term bug splat. “The military slang for a man killed 
by a drone strike…since viewing the body through a grainy-green video image gives the sense of 
an insect being crushed.”331 It’s presence within the digital public sphere has been pervasive as its 
title, which includes a hashtag (#) indicates an intention for aerial photographs of the artwork to 
be widely disseminated through social media like Twitter and Instragram, both of which use 
hashtags as an organizational device for searching and grouping tweets or photos with the same 
hashtags. 
 In addition to its proliferation on social media and presence in mainstream news, the 
#NotABugSplat art installation received additional publicity when artist J.R. was interviewed on 
the August 28, 2014 episode of Comedy Central’s The Colbert Report giving the project and the 
subversive discourse popular culture exposure. Regarding #NotABugSplat, host Stephen Colbert 
sarcastically (and in all seriousness) quipped: “So what you’re saying is that I have to consider 
every person as human. That I can’t just think of people as part of a population or a 
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statistic…Anybody who accidentally dies in a war that’s otherwise justified, I have to grieve 
over?”332  
Amnesty International’s Will I Be Next? and the NYU/Stanford report Living Under 
Drones strive to disseminate the subversive drone discourse internationally and have shown some 
success in contributing to, perhaps even sparking, public debate on the impact of drone warfare on 
noncombatants. Each, as a response to the dominant discourse of casualty averse warfare, 
challenges the public sphere to consider the wider impact of casualty aversion upon 
noncombatants.       
The dissemination of these reports and their updates are dependent upon the internet. For 
example, www.livingunderones.org, where the report NYU/Stanford report has been posted and 
maintained, is designed as a publically accessible multimedia experience. In addition to the 
provision of data about drone strikes and written victim stories, the website has linked video 
interviews (also posted on YouTube) in which interviewees explain their experiences while living 
in an active drone war zone. This provides visitors to the site with the ability to disseminate 
information through their social media presence, thus perpetuating the discourse. The Amnesty 
International “Will I Be Next?” report possesses a similar, though not as flashy, web presence and 
includes an interactive story map and a Tumblr page entitled #GameOfDrones detailing a traveling 
protest movement, elucidating physical in addition to cyber forms of discourse. 
The emergence of the subversive discourse originated from the Pakistanis from the 
locations of the strikes, directly affected by drone surveillance and strikes. This discourse was 
bolstered through the printing of Noor Behram’s photography in Western news sources and by the 
Will I Be Next? and Living Under Drones reports (analyzed in Chapter Three). It has been further 
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developed by social media efforts and the #NotABugSplat art installation in Pakistan’s Waziristan 
providence. These discourses seek to expose the local and personal impacts that drone strikes 
inflict upon the populations they target and is characterized by a concentration on combatting the 























Chapter 4: Examining Drone Warfare’s Dominant and Subversive Discourses: 
Interpretative Content and Visual Analyses  
 
The careful thematic formation of political discourses is important for their ultimate 
efficacy. A consistent, persuasive message that connects with an audience “gives people a reason 
for favoring or accepting certain lines of action and policies rather than others.”333 This is relevant 
in the case of the discourses that surround drone warfare as they seek to either obscure or elucidate 
the humanitarian impact of drone strikes. This chapter establishes the primary themes present in 
the dominant and subversive discourses surrounding drone warfare. This is accomplished through 
the utilization of two complementary, interpretative methods of three qualitative data sets. First, I 
use interpretive content analysis to analyze Obama Administration drone policy speeches 
(dominant discourse) and drone NGO reports (subversive discourse). Second, I use visual analysis 
as outlined by Clarke334 and Banks335 to analyze post-drone strike photographs taken by Pakistani 
photo-journalist Noor Behram (subversive discourse). In addition to clarifying the underpinning 
values of each discourse, this analysis begins to reveal framing techniques employed by the 
creators of each discourse that are aimed at either perpetuating the policy status quo or are 
attempting to unsettle it.   
Jarvis refers to this process as discursive recovery. The goal of this approach is “to offer a 
patient and faithful reconstruction of the purposes and objectives beneath the texts we are 
studying.”336 While simultaneously holding a position of faith and suspicion (or “demystification”) 
when approaching the analyzed texts, “we adopt what may be considered to be a humanistic 
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attitude and construe our task as trying to represent to ourselves and the readers of our work, clearly 
and accurately, the message [the texts] are trying to convey to us.”337 In the case of drone warfare, 
it is clear that interaction between the Obama Administration and the NGO reports exists. The 
photographs provide a visual element to the subversive discourse, permitting story to be embodied 
through “the claims to realism they usually convey and their consequences in particular 
situations.”338 Under this approach to the discourse, it is the job of the research to tease out the 
major themes of the texts, and, in this project, to understand how the message is being framed in 
order to mobilize action. Josselson is clear that because this is an interpretive intellectual posture, 
“there will always be gaps and partial truths as well as power dynamics” at work in the discourse.339 
However, the goal is to portray the discourses in as accurate and fair a light as is possible.  
Methodology: Content Analysis 
In order to identify and evaluate the primary themes present in the dominant and subversive 
discourses regarding the use of weaponized drones as a tactic in counterterrorism efforts, I employ 
the qualitative methodology of interpretive content analysis. Holsti defines content analysis as 
“any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified 
characteristics of messages.”340 While Holsti’s definition of content analysis guides this project’s 
initial approach to the texts, I am also interested in understanding and interpreting the meaning of 
particular themes in relation to each other. The goal is to form an interpretation of the chosen texts, 
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“understanding better the perspective(s) of the producer of these words”341 as well as the impact 
that these texts have on larger political discourses and policy formation.342  
In conducting the content analysis for this project, I used two rounds of coding utilizing 
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis iSoftware, namely ATLAS.ti version 7.5. Prior to 
the first round of coding I isolated seven a priori codes for the dominant discourse texts and nine 
a priori codes for the subversive discourse texts. These a priori codes are informed by the literature 
review, a brief reading of President Obama’s May 23, 2013 speech, the NYU/Stanford study Life 
Under Drones and my research questions. Using these codes as a base, I open coded the texts by 
sentence,343 allowing for emergent codes of the manifest content.344  
Dominant Discourse: Content Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
In speeches given by former Attorney General Eric Holder, current Director of Intelligence 
John Brennan, and President Barack Obama in 2012 and 2013, the political elites of the Obama 
Administration sought to establish a public narrative regarding use of drones as counterterrorism 
tactic. This analysis investigates four addresses that have been denoted as seminal policy-
establishing speeches. These speeches were selected first, through the recommendation of 
secondary sources, and second, after a thorough search of whitehouse.gov/the-press-office for 
drone-related addresses, statements, and press releases. The diversification of speech-giver is 
suggested by Jennifer Milliken: “If the analysis is to be about social signification, a discourse 
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analysis should be based upon a set of texts by different people presumed (according to the research 
focus) to be authorized speakers/writers of a dominant discourse…”345  
The following speeches were analyzed in chronological order: 
 March 5, 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder, Northwestern University School of Law 
 April 30, 2012, John Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s 
Counterterrorism Strategy,” Wilson Center 
 May 23, 2013, President Barack Obama, National Defense University 
 April 23, 2015, President Barack Obama, The White House      
 
Each of the major speeches has a clear objective in shaping the drone discourse and their 
venues reflect the purpose of the speech. Eric Holder’s speech, given at Northwestern University 
School of Law, focuses on the legal aspects of the Obama Administration’s drone and 
counterterrorism policies. John Bennan’s speech focuses on the ethical justifications of drone 
warfare and was given at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. President 
Obama’s speech outlines drone and counterterrorism policy and was delivered at the National 
Defense University at Fort McNair. In each of these cases, the audiences were, presumably, 
interested in (if not experts in) the speeches’ topics, granting the speeches’ content additional 
weight.      
Before conducting the first round of content analysis coding, I constructed five hypotheses 
based in the above-cited literature that I chose to test. Evaluation of these hypotheses after the 
content analysis provides us with the primary themes that construct a dominant discourse 
established by the analyzed speeches given by members of the Obama Administration, regarding 
the tactical use of weaponized drones in counterterrorism efforts.346  
H1: Terminology used in the selected speeches will prioritize national security. 
 
H2: Terminology used in the selected speeches will seek to justify the tactical use of drones 
through legal language. 
                                                 
345 Milliken, 233.  




H3: Terminology used in the selected speeches will seek to justify the tactical use of drones 
by prioritizing soldier safety and/or the avoidance of casualties 
 
H4: Terminology used in the selected speeches will concede civilian casualties as 
collateral damage or as a natural byproduct of conflict. 
 
H5: Terminology used in the selected speeches will not specify dates or locations of drone 
strikes.   
 
 Prior to the first round of coding, I established seven a priori codes. The codes are as 
follows: Civilian Casualties, Civilian Safety, Dates/Locations of Strikes, Dates/Location of 
Strikes—Vague, Legal Language, National Security, and Solider Safety/Casualty 
Avoidance.347 In addition to the seven a priori codes, the first round of coding produced twenty-
eight emergent codes. The second round of coding paid special attention to the presence of 
emergent codes in the texts to ensure that their presence (or lack thereof) in the other texts was 
observed and recorded. At the completion of the first two rounds of coding, three overarching 
themes emerged under which the a priori and emergent codes could be organized: National 
Security, Legality, and Hiddenness. These three themes establish the key components of the 
Obama Administration’s dominant narrative regarding the tactical use of drones in 
counterterrorism efforts. Percentages of thematic codes within the speeches were calculated and 
will be discussed in turn below. The total percentage of the thematic areas are presented in Table 
1.  
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Table 1 
Total Percentage of Theme Areas in Speeches 
Themes Holder Speech Brennan 
Speech 
Obama Speech Obama 
Statement 
Legality 34% 20% 20% 36% 
Hiddenness 2% 19% 21% 28% 
National Security 64% 54% 59% 36% 
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Of interest in the calculated totals for each speech in Table 1 is the overwhelming focus on 
National Security despite the cited purpose of the speech. This seems to support Hypothesis 1: 
Terminology used in the selected speeches will prioritize national security. While this assertion 
might seem rather obvious given the speeches’ concentration on drone warfare and 
counterterrorism, an interesting finding is the prominence of the national security theme in 
Holder’s speech. This content analysis found that 64% of Attorney General, Eric Holder’s speech, 
while billed as covering the legal aspects of counterterrorism policies, is coded with national 
security-inclusive codes. Holder’s speech does, however, include more legal language than the 
other speeches (with the exception of the Obama statement regarding the death of Warren 
Weinstein). Brennan and Obama’s speeches speak more directly (19%, 21%, 28% respectively) 
about the importance of maintaining the clandestine aspects of the drone program.     
 In order to investigate the components of the Obama Administration’s dominant discourse 
on drone warfare, each of the major themes, their inclusive codes, and their associated hypotheses 
will be discussed below.  
Dominant Discourse: National Security 
The most principal theme informing the drone discourse is National Security, composing 
64% of Holder’s speech, 54% of Brennan’s speech, 59% of President Obama’s speech, and 36% 
of President Obama’s Weinstein Speech. This theme is composed of thirteen codes that are 
primarily emergent that include direct references to defense of the United States’ interests and 
citizens through military actions. This theme is primarily shaped by the code “Responses to 
Terrorism” and the code “National Security” in all of the speeches. For the Obama Administration, 




Surprisingly, all of the speeches discuss counterterrorism efforts within the context of the 
“September 11, 2001 Attacks.” I found this surprising because of the almost eleven year gap 
between Eric Holder’s speech and the actual events on September 11, 2001. However, providing 
the conceptual link between the continuing counterterrorism efforts abroad and 9/11 accomplishes 
two tasks. First, it reminds the audience of the continued threat of terrorism on American soil, 
expressing a need for counterterrorism efforts. Second, the references to 9/11 reiterate 
counterterrorism efforts (especially as they pertain to al-Qaeda and the Taliban) as still being in 




Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 100%. 
Codes Holder Speech Brennan Speech Obama Speech Obama Statement 
Allies/Cooperation 1% 5% 3% 8% 
American Leadership 0% 1% 1% 0% 
Drone Strikes—Positive 
Language 
0% 3% 2% 0% 
Drone Strikes—
Precision  
2% 10% 3% 0% 
Drone Strikes—
Signature Strikes 
3% 1% 0% 15% 
Drone Strikes—
Terrorist Casualties  
4% 10% 4% 0% 
National Security 28% 17% 15% 15% 
Public Debate—United 
States 
1% 1% 0% 0% 
Response to Terrorism 39% 36% 39% 54% 
September 11, 2001 
Attacks 
4% 3% 9% 8% 
Soldier Casualty 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Soldier Safety/Casualty 
Avoidance 
1% 5% 7% 0% 
Warfare 15% 8% 14% 0% 
 
 Primarily present in President Obama’s 2013 drone and counterterrorism policy speech, 
references to soldier safety and casualties lend support to Hypothesis 3: Terminology used in the 
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selected speeches will seek to justify the tactical use of drones by prioritizing soldier safety and/or 
the avoidance of casualties.  Holder and Brennan’s speeches do reference soldier safety as well.  
John Brennan argues that the use of drones as a tactic is “a wise choice because they dramatically 
reduce the danger to US personnel, even eliminating the danger altogether.” It is important to note, 
however, that in many circumstances, the safety allotted to soldiers is coupled with a commitment 
to keeping civilians safe as well. Brennan continues: “Yet they are also a wise choice because they 
dramatically reduce the danger to innocent civilians, especially considered against massive 
ordinance that can cause injury and death far beyond their intended target.”348 The discourse’s 
argument that drones make civilians and noncombatants safer is a surprising finding, though for 
an Administration attempting to discredit allegations of mass civilian casualties, this is certainly 
an effective, strategic move.  
Dominant Discourse: Legality 
 The second theme composing the Obama Administration’s drone discourse includes 
terminology and language rooted in legal justification and explanation of drone strikes. References 
to legality make up 34% of Holder’s speech, 20% of Brennan’s speech, 20% of President Obama’s 
speech, and 36% of President Obama’s Weinstein statement. Likely a deficiency in the code terms, 
most of the speeches’ legal references are couched within the a priori, catch-all code “legal 
language.” This includes terminology and/or sections of text that highlight the legality (or 
illegality) of weaponized drone counterterrorism tactics and justification for that position. Eric 
Holder articulates the importance of legality to the Obama Administration’s counterterrorism 
efforts: 
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But just as surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of 
laws and values.  Even when under attack, our actions must always 
be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution – and must always 
be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law and our 
founding ideals. Not only is this the right thing to do—history has 
shown that it is also the most effective approach we can take in 




Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 100%. 
Codes Holder Speech Brennan Speech Obama Speech Obama Statement 
Civilian Casualties 4% 6% 15% 46% 
Civilian Safety 4% 19% 15% 15% 
Drone Strikes—Ethics  0% 26% 0% 0% 
Freedom 15% 6% 12% 0% 
Human Rights 0% 0% 3% 31% 
Justice 2% 1% 3% 8% 
Legal Language 72% 37% 39% 0% 
Militant/Civilian 
Distinction 
2% 6% 0% 0% 
 
This analysis does seem to support Hypothesis 2: Terminology used in the selected 
speeches will seek to justify the tactical use of drones through legal language. Each of the speeches 
devote space to the discussion of legality not only in terms of domestic law, but also in regard to 
international law. Interestingly, very little reference is made to human rights in the speeches, but 
about a third of the codes in President Obama’s statement regarding the death of Warren Weinstein 
cover human rights and a commitment to promoting human rights in the face of drone warfare.      
 In his 2013 drone policy speech, President Obama talked about the tragedy of civilian 
casualties resulting from drone strikes: 
As Commander-in-Chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking 
tragedies against the alternatives…It is false  to assert that putting 
boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths or less 
likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be 
more U.S. deaths, more Black Hawks down, more confrontations 
                                                 
349 Eric Holder, “Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law,” 5 
March 2012, Internet; http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-northwestern-
university-school-law; Accessed 20 January 2016. 
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with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of 
such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.350 
 
This quotation, taken in isolation, led me to believe that Hypothesis 4 would also be supported: 
terminology used in the selected speeches will concede civilian casualties as collateral damage or 
as a natural byproduct of conflict. President Obama’s reference to civilian casualties as “tragedies” 
suggested to me that I would see more of this terminology throughout the drone speeches. While 
each of the speeches do reference civilian casualties, they devote as much or more space to 
discussions of civilian safety. Never are the civilian casualties dismissed as permissible or a natural 
byproduct of war. The exception to this is President Obama’s 2015 statement, which is a lengthy 
eulogy to two al Qaeda hostages erroneously killed in a signature drone strike. Thus, I would feel 
comfortable considering this hypothesis as partially supported.     
 It is clear that the legality of counterterrorism policies are important to the Obama 
Administration, however, Micah Zenko cautions that while the Obama Administration has crafted 
policies forming a “legal basis for lethal counterterrorism,” but that “there is no evidence that most 
reforms were ever implemented.” Additionally, Zenko notes that these legal frameworks and 
justifications “[do] not apply to CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, where roughly 40 percent of all 
nonbattlefield drone strike have since occurred.”351 
Dominant Discourse: Hiddenness 
 The Obama Administration has been committed to waging drone warfare clandestinely 
under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency.352 Despite evidence under this thematic 
                                                 
350 Barack Obama, “Obama’s Speech on Drone Policy,” The New York Times.com, 23 May 2013, Internet;  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html; Accessed 24 
May 2013. 
351 Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Embrace of Drone Strikes Will Be a Lasting Legacy,” The New York Times, 12 
January, 2016, Internet; http://www.nytimes.com; Accessed 14 March 2016.  
352 Mayer, “The Predator War.”  
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code grouping that affirm arguments by the Brennan and Obama speeches that the Administration 
seeks out transparency, the analysis indicates overwhelming vagueness when discussing the dates 
and locations of drone strikes around the world. A number of geographic regions that include areas 
of alleged strikes (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen) are mentioned throughout 
the speeches, but few specifics are given. Even the details of the strike that killed Warren Weinstein 
are sanitized. Thus, the data lends support to Hypothesis 5: Terminology used in the selected 
speeches will not specify dates or locations of drone strikes. 
 The consequence of  this commitment to the clandestine has left what David Sanger refers 
to “a hole in the middle of the Obama Doctrine” that has caused the Obama Administration to lose 
“an opportunity to explain why America acts the way it does around the globe.”353 This provides 
a space for speculation that can trouble the policy initiatives of the Obama Administration and 
leaves room for a subversive discourse, such as those provided by the Amnesty International and 
NYU/Stanford NGO reports.   
Table 4 
Hiddenness 
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 100%. 
Codes Holder Speech Brennan 
Speech 




0% 0% 0% 0% 
Dates/Locations 
of Strikes—Vague  
0% 42% 17% 10% 
Drone Strikes—
CIA  
75% 10% 0% 0% 
Geography—
Afghanistan  
25% 4% 20% 10% 
Geography—Iraq  0% 2% 14% 0% 
Geography—
Pakistan 
0% 14% 9% 50% 
Geography—
Remote  
0% 8% 6% 0% 
Geography—
Somalia  
0% 2% 6% 0% 
Geography—
Yemen  
0% 2% 11% 0% 
                                                 
353 Sanger, 245.  
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Transparency 0% 10% 11% 20% 
Transparency—
Lack of 
0% 6% 6% 10% 
 
Subversive Discourse: Content Analysis and Hypothesis Testing 
In order to isolate the major components of the subversive discourses surrounding 
contemporary drone warfare, I have selected the two NGO reports (Living Under Drones and Will 
I be Next?) that utilize qualitative interviewing methodologies in order to gather information from 
those affected by drone warfare. Prior to conducting this content analysis, I formulated four 
hypotheses based in the above-cited literature that I chose to test through the content analysis.  
H1: Terminology used in the NGO reports will seek to delegitimize the United States’ tactical 
use of drones in counterterrorism efforts through legal language. 
H2: Terminology used in the NGO reports will prioritize human security.  
H3: Terminology used in the NGO reports that distinguishes civilian safety from that of 
combatants or members of terrorist organizations.  
H4: Terminology used in NGO reports will specify the dates or locations of drone strikes. 
 
Evaluation of these hypotheses after the content analysis provides us with the primary themes that 
construct a subversive discourse regarding the tactical use of weaponized drones in 
counterterrorism efforts established by the NGO reports.   
In the first round of coding I isolated nine a priori codes that are informed by the literature 
review. The codes are as follows: Civilian Casualties, Civilian Safety, Narrative—Family 
Member/Casualty, Narrative—Survivor, Dates/Locations of Strikes, Dates/Location of 
Strikes—Vague, Legal Language, National Security, and Solider Safety/Casualty 
Avoidance.354 Using these codes as a base, I open coded the texts by paragraph, allowing for 
                                                 
354 These a priori codes are slightly different from those established for the dominant discourse. The 
difference is informed by a theoretical emphasis observed in a prior knowledge of the reports’ content prior to 
coding and the story-telling literature explored in Chapter One. Please see Appendix A for the code book, which 
features Codes, Definitions, and a list of the A Priori and Emergent codes listed in alphabetical order.  
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emergent codes from the manifest content.355 Twenty-six codes (noted and defined in the below 
code book) were recorded. The second round of coding paid special attention to the presence of 
emergent codes in the texts to ensure that their presence (or lack thereof) in the other texts was 
observed and recorded.  
At the completion of the first two rounds of coding, three overarching themes emerged 
under which the a priori and emergent codes could be organized: Human Security, Legality, and 
Exposure. These three themes establish the key components of the reports’ subversive narrative 
regarding the tactical use of drones in counterterrorism efforts. Percentages of thematic codes 
within the speeches were calculated and will be discussed in turn below. The total percentage of 
the thematic areas are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 
Total Percentage of Codes by Theme 
Themes Living Under Drones Will I Be Next? 
Human Security 48% 28% 
Legality 26% 46% 
Exposure 26% 26% 
 
 There are two major takeaways from this global look at the content analysis. First, the 
Living Under Drones report prioritizes the codes associated with the human security theme. This 
report focuses on the everyday life experiences of noncombatants living in areas with frequent 
drone strikes and articulates these experiences through narratives given by survivors and the 
families of those who have been killed by drone strikes. Second, the Will I Be Next? report from 
Amnesty International focuses primarily on potential violations of international laws (indicated by 
the theme “legality”) and goes as far as to suggest that some of these violations may constitute war 
crimes on the part of the Obama Administration.356 These results seem to support Hypothesis One 
                                                 
355 Britton and Dean.  
356 Amnesty International, Will I Be Next?, 8. 
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(Terminology used in the NGO reports will seek to delegitimize the United States’ tactical use of 
drones in counterterrorism efforts through legal language) and Hypothesis Two (Terminology 
used in the NGO reports will prioritize human security) as the reports do seek to delegitimize the 
United States’ tactical use of drones in counterterrorism efforts through legal language and 
prioritize issues of human security. What is interesting about this finding is the clear thematic focus 
evident in each of the reports with 48% of the Living Under Drones report containing codes 
categorized under theme Human Security and 46% of the Will I Be Next? report containing codes 
categorized under the theme Legality.   
In order to investigate the components of the subversive discourse on drone warfare as 
presented through the NGO reports, each of the major themes, their inclusive codes, and their 
associated hypotheses will be discussed below. 
Subversive Discourse: Human Security 
Based on the seven categories of human security described in the United Nations’ 1994 
Development Report,357 the theme Human Security provides “an understanding of security that is 
focused explicitly on the well-being and welfare of individuals rather than on the protection of 
states exclusively.”358 This concern for human well-being and welfare is included in the codes 




                                                 
357 United Nations, “New Dimensions of Human Security,” United Nations Development Report (1994), 
24-25. The seven main categories pertinent to the achievement of human security include: economic security, food 
security, health security, environmental security, personal security, and political security. The relevant elements of 
human security to this analysis will be discussed in Chapter 5.  










By combining the “Narrative” codes, the data indicates, first, that the Living Under Drones 
report contains more narratives and tells the stories of more individuals (35% of the report) than 
the Amnesty International report does (29% of the report). This finding is consistent with the 
overarching numbers in Table 1 (above) that suggest a human security focus present in the Living 
Under Drones report. Another interesting finding that emerged is the importance attributed to 
relationships within the narratives. 12% of in the Living Under Drones report and 9% of the 
Amnesty International report provide narratives and analysis that intentionally distinguishes the 
relationship of the storyteller to the victim. 
Second, as was expected, both reports cover the physical and property damage caused by 
drone strikes, but an unexpected result was the percentage of the reports that discuss the 
Table 6 
Human Security 
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 
100%. 
Codes Living Under Drones Will I Be Next? 























Narrative—Relationship 12% 9% 
Narrative—Survivor 9% 10% 
National Security 3% 2% 
Response to Terrorism 7% 17% 






psychological trauma experienced by drone strikes in these reports (Living Under Drones—14% 
and Amnesty International—11%). Evident in these results is the implication that the lives of those 
impacted by drone-based warfare are often difficult and infiltrated with insecurity and fear that 
they might be the next victims of a drone strike. The Amnesty International report quotes a resident 
of a North Waziristan village that has been under threat not only by the Taliban and al Qaeda 
forces, but, consequently, also by American drone activity. “‘Everyone is scared and they can’t 
get out of their house without any tension and from the fear of drone attacks…We can’t sleep 
because of the planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the fear of attack in our 
mind.’”359     
Subversive Discourse: Legality 
 The results of this content analysis suggests that while the dominant narrative utilizes legal 
language in order to justify drone strikes, the subversive discourse utilizes legal language in order 
to delegitimize the use of drones in counterterrorism missions.  Both of the NGO reports are 
interested in the legal issues surrounding drone strikes, this is especially true with the Amnesty 
International report. As is described in Chapter Two, the drone legal literature is interested 
primarily in distinction (represented by the militant/civilian distinction and drone strikes—
signature strikes codes) and proportionality (represented by the civilian casualties code). The 
results presented in Table 7, below, suggest that the Living Under Drones report is more interested 
in legal issues of proportionality (at 41% of the report) than is the Will I Be Next? report (16%).  
The reports appear slightly less focused on issues of distinction: 20% of the Living Under Drones 
report and 12% of the Will I Be Next? report.360   
                                                 
359 Amnesty International, 31.  
360 These percentages are reached by combining the Table 7 values for the militant/civilian distinction and 
drone strikes—signature strikes codes.   
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Not surprisingly, both reports emphasize the importance of adherence to international law, 
but the Amnesty International report ups the proverbial ante by asserting in 7% of the codes that 
the Obama Administration may be committing war crimes through its drone-centric 
counterterrorism policies. Neither report actively discuss civilian safety, perhaps underpinned by 
the assumption that civilians are inherently not safe, as 41% of the Living Under Drones codes and 
16% of the Amnesty International report codes focus on reports of civilian casualties. This is an 
interesting finding because the dominant discourse is intentional to discuss civilian safety.361 This 
could be dismissed as rhetoric, but it could signify an authentic desire on the part of the Obama 
Administration to conduct drone strikes in ways that would be sensitive to civilian safety.  
Table 7 
Legality 
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 
100%. 
Codes Living Under Drones Will I Be Next? 
Civilian Casualties 41% 16% 




Human Rights 10% 24% 
Legal Language 26% 37% 
Militant/Civilian Distinction 10% 6% 
War Crimes 0% 7% 
  
 Importantly, the NGO reports are intentional to explain the difficulties they perceive for 
distinction between militants and civilians in the Obama Administration’s use of drones. This is 
especially true when considering the practice of signature strikes, which distinguish militants from 
civilians not based on international law standards, but on observed practices.362 These observations 
lend some support to Hypothesis 4 that the terminology used in the NGO reports that distinguishes 
                                                 
361 The percentages of the dominant discourse speeches coded as civilian safety are as follows: Holder—
4%; Brennan—19%; Obama-Speech—15%; Obama-Statement—15%.  
362 Dayna Greenfield defines signature strikes as “strikes conducted against individuals who ‘match a pre-
identified “signature” of behavior that the US links to militant activity,’ rather than targeting a specific person” 
(“The Case Against Drone Strikes on People Who Only ‘Act’ Like Terrorists.”)  
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civilian safety from that of combatants or members of terrorist organizations. However, the 
reports’ discussions of civilian safety are unexpectedly low (1% for the Living Under Drones 
report and 4% for the Will I Be Next? report) and references to terrorism and/or combatants is 
higher than expected. 363 
Subversive Discourse: Exposure 
 One of the key themes in the dominant narratives is the efforts of the Obama 
Administration to utilize drones clandestinely, primarily through classified missions carried out by 
the CIA.364 Thus, the analysis of the dominant narrative indicates a reluctance, if not outright 
refusal, to provide specifics on drone strikes, though countries are referenced.365 In contrast, the 
subversive narrative is interested in exposing the clandestine by reporting on specific strikes on 
specific dates in specific locations that have affected specific people. This lends solid support to 










                                                 
363 This code has been organized under “human security” and can be found in Table 6. Reponses to 
terrorism represent 7% of the Living Under Drones report and 17% of the Will I Be Next? report within the Human 
Security thematic code. 
364 See Mayer, “The Drone Wars” and Sanger, Confront and Conceal, 243-270.  
365 The dominant discourse’s commitment to the thematic code of hiddenness is as follows: Holder 
speech—2%; Brennan speech—19%; Obama speech—21%; Obama statement—28%. President Obama’s 
contributions to this content analysis accounts for 49% of the hiddenness codes. 
Table 8 
Exposure 
Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. Columns may not add up to 
100%. 
Codes Living Under Drones Will I Be Next? 
Dates/Locations of Strikes 13% 22% 
Dates/Locations of Strikes—Vague  0% 2% 
Drone Strikes—Anti US Sentiment 11% 0% 
Drone Strikes—CIA  12% 11% 
Geography—Afghanistan  1% 1% 
Geography—North Waziristan 21% 26% 
Geography—Pakistan 20% 6% 
Geography—Somalia 1% 0% 
Geography—South Waziristan  1% 1% 
Geography—Yemen  2% 1% 
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The NGO reports note that strikes are occurring, not merely in “Pakistan,” but in “North 
Waziristan,” often noting the village or specific region of the strike. Additionally, both reports 
condemn the Obama Administration for a lack of transparency regarding orchestrated drone strikes 
(Living Under Drones—8%; Will I Be Next?—17%) and both reports call upon the Administration 
to increase transparency (Living Under Drones—5%; Will I Be Next?—13%). Of additional 
interest, 5% of the Living Under Drones  (within the code of “exposure”) request that the United 
States engage in a public debate regarding the tactical use of drones, and the authors believe that 
their report may be a first step in instigating this debate.366 
Methodology: Visual Analysis 
 Discourses are not contained merely in texts and spoken words. “Images, photographs, 
diagrams, and graphics also work to create meaning.”367 Indeed, Clarke and Saldana each argue 
that the movement of Western culture into a “visually dependent culture”368 has endowed “us by 
default with visual literacy—heightened awareness of images and their presentation and 
representation.”369 The public availability of Noor Behram’s post-drone strike photography, taken 
in the FATA region of Pakistan, provides us with a unique opportunity to utilize the visual in order 
to better understand the assertions of the verbal. While scholars have generally discussed mixed 
methods as the combination of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in social science 
research, the utilization of both interpretative content analysis and visual analysis is also an 
example of a mixed methods approach. As is argued to be true with the employment of both 
                                                 
366 Stanford/NYU, Living Under Drones, viii. 
367 Machin and Mayr, 9. 
368 Clarke, 232.  
369 Saldana, 57.  
Public Debate—In the US 5% 0% 
Transparency 5% 13% 
Transparency—Lack of 8% 17% 
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quantitative and qualitative methodologies in a single study, the benefits of this methodological 
approach are also applicable in this case. The inclusion of another methodology (visual analysis) 
and mode of data (photography) creates a more robust data set, permitting triangulation of 
observations between the textual and the visual.370 
 The visual analysis of photography is a highly interpretative and subjective, thus hypothesis 
testing is not a fruitful endeavor, because it produces a sort of methodological tautology (“I predict 
that I will observe what I clearly see in front of me…”) Clarke, however, suggests a rigorous and 
thorough three-step methodology for transforming the visual into text, through the writing of 
interpretive memos, for further analysis. Clarke’s visual analysis methodology has three steps, 
each of which requires the writing of a memo to record ideas and interpretations of the 
photography.371 This requires quite a bit of intentionally devoted time (in my case about three 
hours) with each photograph, but it is through this process that the researcher is able “to open the 
visual data up for analysis.”372   
The visual analysis methodology consists of three deliberate steps. First, Clarke 
recommends viewing the whole photograph and recording “first impression,” which includes the 
analyst’s initial reaction to the photograph. The second step is to look at “the big picture.” This 
asks the analyst to describe what is seen in the photograph. Clarke notes that “the demands of 
actually writing a narrative description of the images will make you ‘see’ more clearly, elaborately, 
and precisely.”373 As I conducted my analysis, I found that my first impressions and big picture 
analysis naturally flowed together, so I collapsed these steps into one memo that addresses both 
                                                 
370 Julian Brannen, “Mixing Methods: The Entry of Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches into the 
Research Process,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology Vol. 8(3), 176 and Alan Bryman, 
“Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Research: How is it Done?” Qualitative Research Vol. 6(1), 105.  
371 Clarke quips that this is a “…fussy, obsessive, and tedious [task]” (248). I don’t disagree with her. 
372 Clarke, 248.  
373 Ibid., 251.  
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steps.374 Third, Clarke advises the researcher to print each photograph and to divide it into 
quadrants. Each quadrant of the photograph is then analyzed, allowing for a granular evaluation of 
the photograph. Clarke explains that the objective of this step “is to describe in lush and vivid 
detail…what you see.”375 
 At this point, Clarke recommends a complex process of concept mapping the memos in 
order to reach conclusions regarding the photographs. Marcus Banks, however recommends the 
utilization of interpretive content analysis when analyzing photographs. He believes that 
systematic content analysis takes into account the researcher’s subjectivity in approaching a 
photograph as well as the need for formal analysis to reach conclusions regarding the 
photography.376 Because this study used interpretative content analysis to establish the major 
themes present in the dominant and subversive narratives, I chose to use interpretative content 
analysis to analyze the memos of the pictures that I recorded as a result of the visual analysis 
process.  
Subversive Discourse: Visual Analysis 
 This section analyzes nine of Noor Behram’s thirteen photographs published by Wired.com 
in December of 2011.377 These photographs depict landscapes, survivors, casualties, and 
destruction. They lend the viewer a unique collection of images taken at the (reported) height of 
                                                 
374 Because this process is subjective and data analysis is dependent upon the researcher’s interpretation for 
results, I have included my memos in Appendix C to increase scholar transparency.   
375 Clarke, 251.  
376 Banks, 44-46.  
377 I selected photographs that clearly depicted post-drone strike damage. Three of the photographs 
published by Wired.com were of the remnants of a Hellfire missile Behram had collected and had photographed in a 
studio-setting. One of the photographs was of a drone flying high above Behram’s home in Western Pakistan. While 
it is interesting that Behram experiences the threat of drones in his immediate context, the photograph was not 
connected to the other photographs and its relevancy is unclear. 
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the Obama Administrations’ drone strikes in Western Pakistan in 2009 and 2010.378 The selected 
photographs for this analysis follow.379 
 
Photograph 1  Datta Khel, October 13, 2010 
 
 
Photograph 2 Mirin Shah, November 28, 2008 
                                                 
378 Note: Photograph 2 was taken in 2008, a product of the Bush Administration. The Long War Journal 
estimates that 170 drone strikes occurred in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010. To give this number some context, the site 
estimates that 173 drone strikes have been occurred in Pakistan between 2011 and 2016 (Bill Roggio, “Charting the 
Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2016,” The Long War Journal, Internet; 
http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes/; Accessed 8 July, 2016. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism 
reports similar a number of drone strikes in Pakistan in 2009 and 2010 (182) and 193 strikes between 2011 and 2016 
(“Get the Data: Drone Wars,” Internet; https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-
graphs/; Accessed 8 July 2016). Ultimately, I am suspicious of reported numbers as these strikes are often not 
officially confirmed. These statistics do, however, establish a baseline for the prominence of drone strikes in 
southern Asia and show that there were quite a few strikes during the time covered by Behram’s photographs.  
379 Dates and locations are as reported by Ackerman (“Rare Photographs Show Ground Zero of the Drone 




Photograph 3 Dande Darpa Khel, August 21, 2009 
 
 
Photograph 4 Dande Darpa Khel, August 21, 2009 
 
 

















Photograph 9 Datta Khel, October 18, 2010 
 
Each of the photographs was evaluated using Clarke and Banks’ recommendations for 
visual analysis. Each photograph was filtered through Clarke’s three step analysis protocol with 
memos written to record my interpretations of the photographs. The resulting memos were 
consequently analyzed using the ATLAS.ti version 7.5 software and were subjected to two rounds 
of coding. Clarke’s method is rooted in grounded theory, so all codes were emergent.380 In the first 
round of coding, emergent code were established. In the second round, these codes were again 
applied to the memos. This process produced fifteen codes that were organized into three 
categories: human, landscape, and aesthetics.381 
 
 
                                                 
380 Saldana, 101.  










Dirty Clothing 5% 
Emotion 5% 
Women 1% 
 Total: 30% 
Landscape 




 Total: 15% 
Aesthetics 
Destruction 3% 
Item Color 22% 
Item Detail 6% 
Metal Debris 5% 
Rubble 19% 
 Total: 55% 
   
Visual Analysis: Results 
The content analysis of the photographs’ interpretative memos yielded some interesting 
results. The most prominent category was Aesthetics with over half of the memos (55%) discussing 
the aesthetic content of the photographs. Within this category, as we might expect from drone 
strike photos, 19% of the memos referenced the presence of rubble. More unexpectedly, the memos 
revealed the dominance of color as the most frequently used code during the analysis (22%).382 
This result indicates the importance of the “small pictures” or quadrant analysis portion of the 
process. When looking at photograph, it is often difficult to observe the details of the pictures 
                                                 
382 It should be noted that this may not be a generalizable observation because I can see color. An 
individual, such as my uncle, Dr. Scott Hill, would not produce the same results because he is entirely color blind.    
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because we are taking in, observing, and interpreting the whole image at the same time. Breaking 
down the photographs into smaller units renders the often overlooked specifics of the photograph, 
such as the color of a displaced brick or a man’s tunic, into visibility.  
The “small pictures” step also allows for codes such as “item detail” (included in this were 
observations about patterns on bricks and printed fabric) to receive note. While the impact of this 
might not be immediately obvious, this engages the viewer more intentionally in the architecture 
of the region and provides hints about the types of brick that are present in the rubble and the socio-
economic class of the people in the photographs. For example, a detailed look at the children in 
Photograph 4 suggests that they come from a well-off family. Their clothes (aside from being 
covered in dirt, conceivably a result of the strike) are in good shape and have details such as 
embroidery and paisley-printed fabric. This also allows for comparison across pictures. Does the 
rubble in Photograph 2 looks differently from the rubble in Photograph 8? Why or why not. While 
answers to these questions might not produce demonstrably significant answers, they do provide 
an ethical or philosophical answer indicating that the subjects of these photographs have been seen 
and have been recognized.  
The content analysis of the visual analysis memos revealed some interesting revelations in 
the Human category. Making up 30% of the interpretation memos, it is interesting that the humans 
and human characteristic present in the photography was not more prominent. Especially 
considering that Noor Behram’s primary goal, as conveyed to journalist Steve Coll, is to create “a 
partial record of the dead, the wounded, and their detritus.”383 If Behram’s focus is on the humans 
affected by drone warfare, why did my memos not reflect that? It seems that composition might 
be a problem in Behram’s pictures. While 2/3 of the analyzed pictures contain human subjects, 
                                                 
383 Coll, “The Unblinking Stare.”  
 104 
 
less than 1/3 of the codes refer to the people in the pictures. That suggests that there is a lot of extra 
content in the picture. This indicates shortcomings in this methodology in two ways. First, it’s 
possible that this result indicates a shortcoming in the “small pictures” step in Clarke’s visual 
analysis methodology. Because the focus is to parse the photograph into as detailed of units as is 
possible, the main subject of the photogram can be obscured. Second, this may indicate a 
shortcoming in utilizing interpretive content analysis of the interpretive memos. Because more of 
the memo may unintentionally have been devoted to one aspect of the photograph over another, 
this would be reflected as “coder error” in the descriptive statistics after the content analysis has 
been conducted.384  
While Behram’s goal of focusing on people may not have been affirmed by this study’s 
visual and content analysis of his photography, the Human category does show a focus on children 
(8% of the codes) and on the facially expressed emotion (5% of the codes) conveyed through the 
images. Coll reports that Behram “learned from conversations with editors and other journalists 
that if a drone missile killed an innocent adult male civilian, such as a vegetable vender or a fruit 
seller, the victim’s long haired and beard would be enough to stereotype him as a militant. So he 
decided to focus on children.”385 Wired.com chose to publish two pictures of deceased children, 
both boys. While the shock of viewing dead children is difficult, it is likely that Wired.com 
published fairly sanitized photographs, limiting the true damage to one’s body of being killed in a 
drone strike. Additionally, in both pictures of deceased children, the boys’ wounds are covered by 
bandages, further obscuring the corporal damage. 
                                                 
384 A solution to this problem would be to have more than one coder to produce greater reliability in the 
coding process. Margaret Hermann suggests that a coder should have a high level of inter-coder reliability (.9 on a 1 
point scale) in order to judge the content analysis’ ability to be replicated by a third party. While I did not utilize this 
opportunity in this content analysis, it is a process that I should take advantage of in future iterations of this project.   
See: Margaret G. Hermann, “Content Analysis,” Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, 
eds. Audie Klotz and Deepa Prakash (London: Palgrave, 2009): 151-167.  
385 Coll, “The Unblinking Stare.”  
 105 
 
The final code category, Landscape, includes 15% of the coded interpretation memos. The 
codes contained in the Landscape category generally includes the background. As mentioned 
above, because Behram’s photographs are intended to show as much of a drone strike’s damage 
as is possible, the composition of the photos also show the topography of North Waziristan and its 
remoteness. The BBC report refers to this area as geographically “harsh” and that this isolation 
contributes to the disruption of the al-Qaeda forces believed to be operating in the area.386 This is 
reflected by my interpretation of the photographs as well. A category leading 6% of the codes 
reference the “barren landscape.” 
In Sum 
 This chapter presents an evaluation and explanation of the major themes and ideas that 
compose the dominant and subversive discourses surrounding drone warfare. The content analysis 
conducted on Obama Administration speeches and the NYU/Stanford and Amnesty International 
reports, reveals the presence of three pairs of conflicting themes: National Security vs. Human 
Security, Legality vs. Illegality, and Hiddenness vs. Exposure. Additionally, the visual analysis 
and consequent content analysis of interpretive memos of Noor Behram’s post-drone strike 
photography lends support to the subversive discourse theme of Exposure. The photography serves 
the role of visualizing the CIA’s clandestine drone program. Each of these themes and conflicts 








                                                 
386 “‘US Drone’ Kills Four in Pakistan,” BBC.com, 15 October, 2009, Internet; 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8308157.stm; Accessed 4 November 2015. 
 106 
 
Chapter Five: The Triumph of the Dominant Discourse: Framing and [lack] of  
Mobilization in Drone Discourse 
 
In a field outside of a village in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region in northwest Pakistan a 
90 by 60 foot portrait of a small child stares into the sky. The portrait is an edited version of Noor 
Behram’s photograph of three children, survivors of a drone strike that left them orphans. Created 
by a collective of Western and Pakistani artists who are interested in “[sharing] the untold stories 
and images of people in their communities,”387 the art installation, entitled #NotABugSplat, can 
be seen by American drones conducting surveillance and combat missions.388 The artists desire for 
this picture, of a child who lost her parents in a drone strike, is to “target predator drone operators 
sitting thousands of miles away who refer to kills as BugSplats. Now they’ll see a child’s face 
instead.”389 The artists behind #NotABugSplat do not intend to stop with one installation, but want 
“to continue to put up more posters of children to instigate further dialogue and awareness.”390  
 
Photograph 10 #NotABugSplat, Khyber Pakhtunkhawa, 2014 
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 Despite the poignancy of this art installation’s image and the compelling nature of its 
message, it is difficult to know if it evoked the sort of ethical considerations from drone pilots that 
it was intended to generate. What is clear, however, is that, despite the efforts of the subversive 
discourse, drone strikes still occur and that they continue to be a staple of the Obama 
Administration’s counterterrorism policies. Thus, this chapter considers the following key 
question: Why has the subversive discourse failed to mobilize the American public to oppose the 
drone warfare of the Obama Administration? 
 Recognizing the power that discourse framing possesses to prompt action, this chapter’s 
objective is to answer the above question. First, I look at how the six major themes established 
through the interpretive content analysis in Chapter Four  are utilized by the frames presented in 
Chapter 1 (Security, Insecurity, and Story) and are used by the dominant and subversive discourses 
to mobilize, or to restrict mobilization. Next, this chapter will explain why the dominant discourse 
is ultimately victorious, arguing that the dominant discourse is actually able to coopt and/or 
neutralize the subversive discourse’s Human Security and Exposure themes, and explains why the 
Illegality theme, especially as used by the Amnesty International report, utilizes rhetoric too 
extreme for resonance with the American public.    
Discourses and Frames 
 The interpretive content analysis, conducted in Chapter Four, produces six themes that 
compose the dominant discourse (National Security, Legality, Hiddenness) and subversive 
discourse (Human Security, Illegality, Exposure). The dominant discourse is framed with a staunch 
fidelity to Security, encapsulating each of the major themes within its auspices. The subversive 
discourse is divided into two frames. The first is Insecurity (Human Security, Illegality) and Story 
(Exposure). In the following section the dominant and subversive discourses will be filtered 
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through their respective frames with special attention paid to the discursive themes produced 
through the interpretative content analysis.  
Dominant Discourse: Security Frame 
 The security frame is utilized by the dominant discourse and is supported using the three 
themes that emerge from the interpretive discourse analysis articulated in Chapter Four: National 
Security, Legality, and Hiddenness. The dominant discourse has a distinct advantage over the 
subversive discourse because it is constructed and advocated for by political elites. Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams explain that this is because “certain actors and institutions are better at 
securitizing than others, because they are perceived as being more credible by the relevant 
audience, and certain issues and objects are easier to securitize than others.”391 This is assuredly 
the case with the use of drones in counter terrorism efforts. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the 
American public is comfortable with distance-based, casualty averse counterterrorism tactics, such 
as drone warfare because it preserves an illusion of homeland security and soldier safety. 
 Instead of working to generate social mobilization, as is the objective of the insecurity and 
story frames below the security frame seeks to maintain the status quo and reduce the attractiveness 
of the subversive narrative. It achieves this objective by amplifying beliefs that are central to 
Americans’ interests (i.e. national security) and by reminding the message recipients about the 
threat of terrorism that could return if support for the dominant discourse decreases.392     
 The first theme amplified through the dominant discourse is national security. The 
dominant discourse supports national security in three ways: first, by a general, persistent reminder 
that drone strikes promote national security, second, by linking the utilization of drone strikes to 
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counterterrorism efforts, and third by consistently linking current counterterrorism efforts within 
the context of 9/11.  
 First, the dominant discourse amplifies national security by consistently speaking of drone 
warfare as an important link to the preservation of national security. For example, Attorney 
General Eric Holder explains that despite counterterrorism successes, the threat to national security 
remains high and a consistent commitment to national security remains necessary. 
…Despite our recent national security successes, including the 
operation that brought to justice Osama bin Laden last year—there 
are people currently plotting to murder Americans, who reside in 
distant countries as well as within our own borders. Disrupting and 
preventing these plots—and using every available and appropriate 
tool to keep the American people safe—has been, and will remain, 
this Administration’s top priority.393   
 
Additionally, President Obama reminds his audience on May 23, 2013 that national security, 
protected through war, is vital for the maintenance of individual and corporate freedom.  
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together 
by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans, and 
served as our compass through every type of change. Matters of war 
and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about 
war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must 
be paid for freedom.394 
 
Thus, we see that security, articulated on a national level is an important strategy in maintaining 
support for endeavors that would preserve national security interests both at home and abroad. 
 The second way that national security is amplified through the dominant discourse is 
through the connection of drone warfare to sustained counterterrorism efforts. President Obama 
makes this link effectively in his May 23, 2013 speech. Following a historical review of the 
counterterrorism strategies employed after 9/11, President Obama reminds his audience, and the 
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American people that the most effective way to conduct counterterrorism tactics in remote places 
in the world (such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen) is to utilize drones. “So it is in this context 
that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al Qaeda and its associated forces, 
including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones.”395 
 The third strategy utilized within the national security theme to amplify belief is through 
the persistent linkage of current counterterrorism missions and tactics to the September 11th 
terrorist attacks. This is a worthwhile rhetorical strategy because 9/11 still resonates with the 
American people. Snow and Benford note that “stories, myths, and folks tales that are part and 
parcel of one’s culture heritage” are forceful mechanisms in “[informing] events and experiences 
in the immediate present.”396 For example, in his speech on April 30, 2012, John Brennan reminds 
his audience: “The United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and associated 
forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with our inherent right 
of national defense.”397 Additionally, when speaking about the accidental deaths of Warren 
Weinstein and Giovanni Lo Porto in a drone strike in Pakistan, President Obama reminds the 
United States: “Since 9/11, our counterterrorism efforts have prevented terrorist attacks and saved 
innocent lives both here in America, and around the world.”398  
 The second theme that is used to amplify the dominant discourse is Legality. The dominant 
discourse argues that its counterterrorism efforts are legal in two main ways. First, the Obama 
Administration points to its continued efforts to defeat the groups (and its affiliates) that has 
launched terrorist attacks against the United States and, unsuccessfully, planned many more. In his 
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May 23, 2013 speech, President Obama is clear to outline the legality of America’s continued war 
against terrorists both within domestic and international legal frameworks.  
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. 
Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of 
force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States 
is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We 
are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many 
Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So, this is a 
just war—a war waged proportionally, in last resort, and in self-
defense.399  
  
 Second, the dominant discourse is committed to presenting drone warfare as a legal, precise 
(thus discriminating), and proportionate military tactic. John Brennan lays out the dominant 
discourse’s case for legality in his April 30, 2012 speech. 
Targeted strikes conform to the principles of distinction, the idea 
that only military objectives may be intentionally targeted and that 
civilians are protected from being intentionally targeted. With the 
unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to precisely target 
a military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could 
argue that never before has there been a weapon that allows us to 
distinguish more effectively between an al-Qaida terrorist and 
innocent civilians. 
 
Targeted strikes conform to the principle of proportionality, the 
notion that the anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be 
excessive in relation to anticipated military advantage. By targeting 
an individual terrorist or small numbers of terrorists with ordnance 
that can be adapted to avoid harming others in the immediate 
vicinity, it is hard to imagine a tool that can better minimize the risk 
to civilians than remotely piloted aircraft.400 
 
 The third theme that amplifies the security frame is Hiddenness. This refers to a clear goal 
on the part of the dominant discourse to maintain the clandestine nature of the drone program. As 
is described in Chapter One, because part of the drone program is operated by the CIA, 
transparency is not expected or available to the American public. President Obama argues, 
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however, that while secrecy is necessary, he is committed to oversight measures that prevent 
potential overreach.  
The very precision of drone strikes and the necessary secrecy often 
involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from 
the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead 
a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for 
terrorism. And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of 
all lethal action.401 
 
 Despite mention of the Obama Administration’s “continuing commitment to greater 
transparency,”402 mention of specific strikes, locations, and casualties remain vague throughout 
the analyzed speeches. The most transparent speech, President Obama’s Weinstein statement 
contains the most specific details on a strike that killed an American and Italian hostage, 
imprisoned by al Qaeda. Even this revelation, however, remains vague, as if the details are not 
entirely known or able to be publicly released. 
Based on information and intelligence we have obtained, we believe 
that a US counterterrorism operation targeting an al Qaeda 
compound in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region accidently 
killed Warren and Giovanni this past January.403   
  
 The secrecy, or hiddenness, surrounding the United States drone program is the weakest 
part of the dominant discourse, signifying a clear place for questions and criticism from the 
subversive discourse and for the American people. 
Subversive Discourse: Insecurity Frame 
 In order to generate mobilization, the subversive discourse utilizes the frame of insecurity. 
Ole Waever notes that insecurity shares the same “security problematique” as security. Whereas 
issues of security are characterized by action to alleviate the challenge to security, instances of 
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insecurity are situations “with a security problem and no response.”404 The NGO reports frame the 
problem of insecurity in two ways: first, through a concentration on human security and second, 
through a concentration on illegality. The development of the insecurity frame in Chapter One 
presents the components of Axel Honneth’s practical spheres that measure human security. These 
include: “responsiveness to need, legal equity [and] justice to achievements.”405 This analysis will 
concentrate, first, on need and achievement and will address legal equity third. 
The Stanford/NYU and Amnesty International reports present the lives of those impacted 
by drone-based warfare to be difficult and infiltrated with insecurity and fear that they might be 
the next victims of a drone strike. The Amnesty International report quotes a resident of a North 
Waziristan village that has been under threat not only by the Taliban and al Qaeda forces, but, 
consequently, also by American drone activity. “‘Everyone is scared and they can’t get out of their 
house without any tension and from the fear of drone attacks…We can’t sleep because of the 
planes’ loud sound. Even if they don’t attack we still have the fear of attack in our mind.’”406 The 
psychological challenges associated with drone warfare indicates the continual existential 
insecurity experienced by noncombatants. This sense of insecurity, not surprisingly, affects all 
aspects of the victims’ lives.   
 The NGO drone reports elucidate an abridgement of human security expected by 
Honneth’s first sphere of recognition: basic human need. People possess an intrinsic need to feel 
safe so that they are able to go about their lives’ pursuits without fear of imminent death. The 
frequent tactical use of drones makes the experience of security difficult, if not impossible, for 
individuals living in areas heavily impacted by drone strikes. This is further complicated by the 
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violent, unexpected deaths of noncombatants in these locations. For example, the Amnesty 
International report details the death of a grandmother who was killed by a drone strike in October 
of 2012 while harvesting okra in a field with four of her grandchildren nearby. “Before her family’s 
eyes, Mamana Bibi was blown into pieces by at least two Hellfire missiles fired concurrently from 
a US drone aircraft.”407  
 This level of insecurity is compounded for women who, by social standards lack power in 
their communities and homes. They express an inability to control who comes into their homes 
and, thus, are unable to prevent terrorists from meeting or residing with family members. This 
increases their anxiety that drones will strike their homes, putting them and their children at risk, 
and they feel powerless to stop this progression of events.408  
 Additionally, drone strikes reportedly prevent their victims from pursuing economic and 
academic advancement, causing Honneth’s third sphere of recognition, achievement, to be 
unrecognized. A student who became disabled by a drone strike that hit his house, killing his 
father—the breadwinner for the family, tells the Living Under Drones researcher that he is no 
longer able to continue his studies because of his injuries. Additionally, he laments the fact that 
his disability (a lost leg) prevents him from working. Thus, his younger brothers are unable to 
attend school “because I can’t afford to support them, buying their books, and paying their fees.”409 
This is an especially difficult hardship as residents of the “FATA [suffer] from one of the highest 
poverty rates in the world. The per capita income in approximately US$250 per year.”410 
 There is a cultural component to drone warfare as well. Reports show how drone warfare 
has entrenched itself within the cultural discourse of drone-targeted cultures, signifying the 
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naturalization of insecurity. “The mothers used…to tell their kids: Go to sleep or I will call your 
father. Now, instead, they say: Go [to] sleep or I will call the plane.”411 Living Under Drones 
researcher Jennifer Gibson argues that drone warfare is systematically destroying communities in 
areas targeted by, especially, weaponized UAVs. “Parents are afraid to send their children to 
school. Women are afraid to meet in markets. Families are afraid to gather at funerals for people 
wrongly killed in earlier strikes. Drivers are afraid to deliver food from other parts of the country. 
The routines of daily life have been ripped to shreds.”412    
  The second theme discussed under the insecurity theme is illegality. Legal equity is also a 
key concern of Honneth’s. The analysis in Chapter Four indicates that the Amnesty International 
report is far more concerned about legal issues than the Stanford/NYU report is. The authors of 
the Amnesty International report pull no punches about their legal concerns with drone strikes: 
“Amnesty International is seriously concerned that these and other strikes have resulted in 
unlawful killings that may constitute extrajudicial executions or war crimes.”413 Amnesty 
International is also concerned with the legality of its “borderless” drone war. The authors are 
clear: 
Amnesty International does not accept the USA’s view that 
international law allows it to engage in a global and pervasive armed 
conflict against a diffuse network of non-state actors or that it is 
lawful to kill individual anywhere in the world at any time, 
whenever the USA deems appropriate.414 
 
 The insecurity frame articulates a significant critique against the dominant discourse. The 
NGO reports present the lives of impoverished people whose lives are made more psychologically 
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and economically difficult through their experiences with drone warfare. Additionally, the 
Amnesty International report presents strong language suggesting not only that the United States’ 
counterterrorism policies are illegal under the auspices of international law but also asserts that 
strikes may constitute war crimes.  
Subversive Discourse: Story Frame 
 The theoretical foundations of the story frame suggest that its primary goals are to provide 
voice to the silenced victims of drone warfare and to expose the realities of drone warfare both 
through the recounting of experiences and through the visualization of drone strikes’ aftermath as 
captured in photography. First, the frame of story in the NGO reports will be explored. Second, 
the impact of the aesthetic in war photography will be discussed. 
First, the goal subversive discourse when utilizing the story frame is to expose the 
dehumanizing narrative of the dominant discourse by providing a platform for the stories of drone 
victims to be articulated and distributed beyond the FATA region. Through the telling, recording, 
and reading of stories, others can recognize the experiences of victims. For those who experience 
the impact of drone surveillance and warfare on a daily basis, the act of storytelling is a process 
through which personal injustices might be identified and exposed.415 It might also be an 
opportunity for the victims of drone warfare to express the difficulties and achievements present 
in their life experiences.  
The telling and retelling of stories is a process that creates visibility for the voices of those 
who are underrepresented within the dominant discourse. The stories of noncombatants whose 
communities, families, and, sometimes, very livelihoods are threatened through drone-centric 
warfare have been largely untold both within both the public and academic arenas, but the NGO 
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reports analyzed in this project possess the ability not only to expose the “messiness” of the United 
States’ tactical use of drones, but also of telling the stories of those affected in order to bring clarity 
to an intentionally opaque practice. The power of these stories is important as the global and digital 
nature of this conflict has caused, as philosopher Nancy Fraser tell us, “the claims for recognition 
of once-distant others [to] acquire a new proximity, destabilizing horizons of cultural value that 
were previously taken for granted.”416  
 The stories told to the Amnesty International and Stanford/NYU researchers are poignant 
pieces of peoples’ experiences. Thus, in order to allow the victim and the story to speak for 
his/herself, two stories selected from the Stanford/NYU report are provided below.417 
“When the weather is clear, three or four [drones] can be seen . . . . 
They are in the air 24 [hours a day], seven [days a week], but not 
when it’s raining. Every time they are in the air, they can be heard. 
And because of the noise, we’re psychologically disturbed— women, 
men, and children. . . . When there were no drones, everything was 
all right. [There was] business, there was no psychological stress 
and the people did what they could do for a living.” “[The drone 
strikes have caused many problems:] [f]irst, it’s psychological. 
Diseases that people have—psychological, mental illnesses. And 
that’s a huge issue. Secondly, a lot of men have been killed, so 
they’re the wage earners for the house, and now the kids and the 
families don’t have a source of income because of that.” Hisham 
noted that “[others in the community help sometimes, but [i]n 
Waziristan, there are poor people, and [victims] usually rely on . . . 
daily wage earning. That’s only sufficient for themselves, so it’s 
hard to help others. But whenever they can, they do.” 
Hisham Abrar 
Interviewed in Islamabad, Pakistan on 26 February, 2012418 
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“[One day, [m]y brother was coming from college…dropping his 
friend to his house, which is located behind our house a few 
kilometers away…I was coming from Mir Ali Bazaar…going into 
my house. That’s when I heard a drone strike and I felt something 
in my heart. I thought something had happened, but we didn’t get to 
know until new day. That’s when all the villagers came and brought 
us news that [my brother] had been [killed]…I was drinking tea 
when I found out. [My] entire family was there. They were 
crying…[T]o lose such a young one; everybody is sad and it also 
affects the tribe, our community as well. My mother is really 
affected. She is sad all the time, and my father is also heavily 
affected. At times he used to go to Peshawar or Karachi, he was 
outgoing, but now he sits at home.” 
 
“I have been affected. The love I had for studies—that is finished. 
My determination to study—that is also gone…if, for instance, there 
is a drone strike and four or five of your villagers die and you feel 
sad for them and you feel like throwing everything away, because 
you feel death is near—[death is] so close, so why do you want to 
study?” 
Khairullah Jan 
Interviewed in Islamabad, Pakistan on 29 February, 2012419 
 
Second the visualization of the story frame and the exposure theme is captured by viewing 
and analyzing post drone strike photography. The visual analysis conducted in Chapter Four 
indicated key interpretive category of the aesthetic. The philosophical field of aesthetics is ancient, 
and provides insight into the power dynamics that are presented through artistic expression. 
Political theorist Diego Von Vacano defines the aesthetic within the political context as dealing 
with “the dimension of human experience that [allows] for purchase on the world through the 
senses, and how this relates to both political and moral evaluations.”420 In the case of war 
photography, there is a sense in which the beautiful, the aesthetic is considered sacrilegious. 
However, “the landscape of devastation is still a landscape. There is beauty in ruins.”421    
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 The aesthetic of war photography, especially in the current political milieu, is partially 
driven by an attraction to the sublime. Immanuel Kant distinguishes between that which is 
beautiful and the sublime. 
The sublime moves, the beautiful charms…The sublime is in turn of 
different kinds. Its feeling is sometimes accompanied with a certain 
dread, or melancholy; in some cases merely with quiet wonder; and 
in still others with a beauty completely pervading a sublime 
plan…The sublime must always be great; the beautiful can also be 
small. The sublime must be simple; the beautiful can be adorned and 
ornamented. A great height is just as sublime as a great depth, except 
that the latter is accompanied with the sensation of shuddering, the 
former with one of wonder.422 
 
While potentially terrifying, “what the sublime involves is…a ‘negative’ pleasure (as opposed to 
the ‘positive’ pleasure of the beautiful).”423 This sort of negative pleasure can be evoked when 
confronted with uncomfortable visualizations of warfare. Building upon the aesthetics of Kant, 
Debrix explains that “the spectator of the sublime image is placed in an expectative emotional state 
where by s/he must desperately wait for a subsequent explanation or justification in order to 
surmount the initial traumatic and unbearable scene.”424 Debrix goes on to argue that the 
dissonance felt by the viewer of the violent images of war is often resolved through the articulation 
of a narrative that affirms the violence as necessary and the viewers “come to accept and in fact 
demand abuses of power” so that political goals can be met.425 
 In order to prevent the potentially exploitative nature of sublime war photography, Debrix 
calls for an intellectual (and activist) “critical sublime” posture that is “on the lookout for and 
identify attempts at abusing the name of democracy in contemporary American military 
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operations…and in their visual…representations.”426 He concludes that a rupture of the “tabloid” 
understanding of the sublime would occur through “the open gift or unpredictable opportunity 
offered by this surprise of the event, by a sublime event that shocks and destabilizes but without 
providing answers and without bringing in new hopes.”427 This project does not achieve (or even 
broach) the most extreme goal of Debrix’s critical sublime. However, it is critical in the fact that 
it is an attempt, at least on a discursive level, to unsettle—if possible—the dominantly held 
discourses of the “war machine.” 
In the case of Noor Behram’s photography, the sublime takes center stage. The viewer of 
Behram’s photography cannot help but be drawn in by the simultaneous awe of technological 
achievement and destructive abilities of weaponized drones and the horror and destruction that 
drones and hellfire missiles level upon its targets. This is the power that the visual possesses to 
expose the realities of the United States’ clandestine drone wars and provides support for the 
stories of those who have been victims of drone warfare. 
The Victory of the Dominant Discourse 
 In public opinion polls conducted by the Pew Research Center in 2013 and 2015, 
Americans who were polled were asked about their approval or disapproval of the use of drones 
in counterterrorism efforts “in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.”428 In 2013, 56% 
of the Americans polled approved of the drone strikes, 26% disapproved, and 18% claimed to not 
know.429 This poll was conducted again in 2015. The results remained fairly consistent: 58% 
approved of drone strikes, 35% disapproved, and 7% didn’t know.430 In the same polls, 
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respondents were asked if they were concerned about whether or not drones “Endanger civilian 
lives.” In 2013, 53% of respondents were very concerned about the danger experienced by civilians 
in drone strikes.431 In 2015, this number was slightly down to 48% respondents. 432 From this 
polling data, it appears that an overwhelming number of Americans support drone strikes, but are 
concerned about whether or not the strikes affect civilian lives. 
If the subversive discourse had a discernable impact in mobilizing the American people 
against the Obama Administration’s drone policies, we would expect to see support for drone 
strikes drop, rather than rise, especially in the 2015 numbers. Thus, using this polling data, I 
conclude that the subversive discourse has been ineffective in mobilizing the American public 
against drone strikes.  
What this indicates is the intractable power of the dominant discourse in the case of 
American drone tactics. Richard Jackson explains the strength of the Obama Administration’s 
counterterrorism discourse as follows: 
It is a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, 
assumptions, metaphors, grammatical forms, myths and forms of 
knowledge—it is a carefully constructed discourse—that is 
designed to achieve a number of key political goals: to normalize 
and legitimize the current counterterrorism approach; to empower 
the authorities and shield them from criticism; to discipline domestic 
society by marginalizing dissent or protest; and to enforce national 
unity by reifying a narrow conception of national identity.433  
 
 The Obama Administration has been able to suppress the subversive discourse through 
public statements that strongly and consistently reiterate the positions of the Obama 
Administration outline above. Additionally, the dominant discourse is able to coopt two of the 
                                                 
431 Pew Research Center, “Continued Support for U.S. Drone Strikes, 2. 
432 Pew Research Center, “Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Strikes, 2.  
433Jackson, 2. Emphasis is in the original.  
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subversive discourse’s themes: human security and exposure. This diminishes the efficacy of the 
subversive discourse. 
 First, the dominant discourse is able to coopt issues of human security through the attention 
that it pays to civilians and civilian safety in the analyzed speeches. While the NGO reports 
condemn the insecurity that drones level against civilians in targets regions, the rhetoric of the 
dominant discourse is intentional to express acknowledgment and recognition of their plight. John 
Brennan argues that the number of civilian casualties is far less in drone strikes than in 
conventional warfare due to its precision and the standards held by the Obama Administration to 
avoid civilian deaths. 
I can tell you today that there have indeed been occasions when we 
decided against conducting a strike in order to avoid the injury or 
death of innocent civilians. This reflects our commitment to doing 
everything in our power to avoid civilian casualties, even if it means 
having to come back another day to take out that terrorist, as we 
have done previously. And I would note that these standards, for 
identifying a target and avoiding the loss of innocent—the loss of 
lives of innocent civilians, exceed what is required as a matter of 
international law on as typical battlefield. That’s another example of 
the high standards to which we hold ourselves.434 
 
President Obama also expresses deep concern for the protection of civilian lives and he actively 
discredits the casualty numbers reported by NGOs, including the reports analyzed in this project.  
Now, this last point is critical, because much of the criticism about 
drone strikes—both here at home and abroad—understandably 
centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between 
U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. 
Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in 
civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war. And for the 
families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify 
their loss. For me, and those in my chain of command, those deaths 
will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian 
casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.435  
                                                 
434 John Brennan, “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy.”  
435 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at the National Defense University.”  
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Second, the dominant discourse is able to coopt the subversive discourse’s exposure theme 
through “strategic transparency.” Above, I suggested that the dominant discourse’s hiddenness 
theme is the weakest of the three attributed to it. A way of mitigating that weakness is by 
strategically producing information that diffuses allegations of excessive opaqueness. Three such 
examples of this “strategic transparency” are the partial declassification of the Obama 
Administration’s “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,”436 President Obama’s public 
statement, admitting to his role in the death of Warren Weinstein,437 and the recent release of the 
number of deaths suffered by militants and noncombatants in the CIA’s drone strikes.438  In each 
of these cases, the Obama Administration lifted the curtain on its clandestine drone program just 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
But there was still the question of inner toughness: did Obama 
understand that as president he would be up against irredeemable 
people, for whom the only options would be to kill or capture them? 
[Richard] Clarke had spent a lifetime immersed in the dark corners 
of the terror wars; he had no illusions about what it would take to 
prevail against a nihilistic enemy like al-Qaeda. A president had to 
have a warrior instinct—an ability to be brutal at times. He made 
the point as directly as he knew how. Looking the senator in the eye, 
Clarke stated a simple fact. “As president, you kill people.” He 
wasn’t just talking about sending troops into battle—in the shadow 
wars, presidents know the names and addresses of people they have 
killed. Obama stared back at Clarke for several seconds. “I know 
that,” he said very quietly and calmly. “He didn’t flinch,” Clarke 
later recalled.439 
 
 Casualty averse warfare, isn’t entirely casualty averse. Regardless of the precision of 
military technology people, civilians, die as a result of war. As has been the case with prior 
American wars, this remains the case with the United States’ continued war on al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates throughout the world. The peril of precision and technologically-based warfare, such as 
weaponized drones, seems to create a trade-off between the human and the mechanized. This 
creates greater safety for some, while placing others at greater risk. Thus, the function of public 
discourses becomes a valuable platform through which critique and support of security policies 
can be articulated and debated.  
This project indicates that the power that political elites have in dictating and maintaining 
security policy discourses. Additionally, political elites, using strong discursive frames, such as 
the security frame, have the resources, platform, and public attention necessary to disseminate 
information and maintain focus on their message alone. While there are voices of dissent, as this 
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project has indicated, those voices must be strong, deliberate, and incessant in order to mobilize 
an opposition to the use of weaponized drones in warfare.  
Lest it appear that the subversive discourse has accomplished nothing in its efforts, it is 
important to note the importance of the voice given to the “other” through the telling of their stories 
beyond their own families and villages. These stories should be told and retold on their merit. As 
Honneth and Butler suggest, this establishes a level of recognition that provides the story-teller 
with a level of grievability not allotted to those silenced by distance and difference. 
In addition to the insightful interplay observed between the dominant and subversive 
discourses, this project elucidates a number of interesting avenues for future research. First, while 
this project does not access the feminist IR literature in an extensive way, there is space for 
discursive research on storytelling in a number of securitized areas that may yield interesting 
research. Second, while the international political sociology literature has loosely utilized 
“framing,” there seems to be room for a project like this one to address some of the literature gaps 
in formally utilizing Snow and Benford’s frame theory. Finally, I find great research potential in 
the employment of Adele Clarke’s visual analysis and, not having seen it utilized within the post-
structural IR literature, think that there is room for applying it to more expressions of security and 
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Appendix A: Content Analysis Code Books 
Dominant Narrative 
Code Code Definition  
Legality 
Civilian Casualties Terminology and/or sections of text that discuss the death of or injury 
to defined civilians or noncombatants in combat. References to 
“collateral damage” are included under this code. 
A Priori 
Civilian Safety Terminology and/or sections of text that discuss the provision of 
safety for civilians in combat scenarios 
A Priori 
Drone Strikes—Ethics Portions of the text/speech that discuss the ethical viability of drone 
strikes in counterterrorism efforts 
Emergent 
Freedom References to the creation and promotion of “American values” of 
liberty and freedom 
Emergent 
Human Rights Narrative and analysis that refers to the importance of maintaining 
and enhancing human rights amongst civilians, usually in a universal 
sense. Human rights also covers references to “humanitarian law.” 
Emergent 
Justice References to acts of justice through the legal courts and extrajudicial 
actions of retribution.  
Emergent 
Legal Language Terminology and/or sections of text that highlight the legality or 
illegality of weaponized drone counterterrorism tactics and 





Discussion in the text regarding the distinction made between 
militants and civilians in regard to drone strikes. A perceived lack of 
distinction between militants and civilians are also included within 
this code.  
Emergent 
National Security 
Allies/Cooperation Terminology and/or references to allies of the United States and 
cooperation with other states. 
Emergent 
American Leadership  Terminology and/or sections of text that discuss the leadership role 




A general code that includes language that promotes the utilization of 
drone strikes in counterterrorism efforts   
Emergent 
Drone Strikes—Precision Language and/or analysis that references the precise targeting 




Reference to drone strikes that are conducted using an observed 
pattern of activity that suggests terrorist activity and/or alliance with 




Reference to the efficacy of drone strikes as a method of causing 
terrorist casualties and/or reducing the effectiveness of terrorist 
activity. 
Emergent 
National Security Terminology and/or sections of text that prioritize and/or explain 




Discussion about and/or reference to the exchange of ideas or debate 
regarding counterterrorism in the United States especially regarding 
the use of drones. 
Emergent 
Response to Terrorism 
(relationship to “national 
security) 
Terminology that references acts of terrorism and/or terrorist groups 
in relationship to national security and/or drone strikes.   
Emergent 
September 11, 2001 
Attacks (relationship to 
“national security”) 
Reference to the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States that 
took place on September 11, 2001.  
Emergent 





Terminology and/or sections of texts that prioritize soldier safety 
and/or the utilization of tactics that are intended to reduce casualties 
and risk to soldiers in combat  
A Priori 
Warfare Terminology and/or sections of text that generally discuss “war” 
and/or specifically describe the on-going American conflict with al 
Qaeda and its affiliates  
Emergent 
Hiddenness 
Dates/Locations of Strikes Terminology and/or sections of text that mention dates and/or 




Terminology and/or sections of text that provide vague statements 
about strike locations/dates 
A Priori 
Drone Strikes—CIA  Reference to intelligence gathering, human intelligence, and CIA-
orchestrated drone activities 
Emergent 
Geography—Afghanistan References to Afghanistan Emergent 
Geography—Iraq References to Iraq Emergent 
Geography—Pakistan References to Pakistan Emergent 
Geography—Remote  Descriptive reference to rural and/or difficult locations to access. 
This code generally is used in reference to the Federally 
Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan. 
Emergent 
Geography--Somalia References to Somalia Emergent 
Geography—Yemen References to Yemen Emergent 
Transparency Analysis that requests or indicates transparency regarding drone 
strikes by the United States government 
Emergent 
Transparency—Lack Of Analysis that indicates and/or condemns a lack of transparency 
regarding drone strikes by the United States government. This 




Subversive Narrative: Content Analysis of Texts 
Code Code Definition  
Legality 
Civilian Casualties Terminology and/or sections of text that discuss the death of or injury 
to defined civilians or noncombatants in combat. References to 
“collateral damage” are included under this code. 
A Priori 
Civilian Safety Terminology and/or sections of text that discuss the provision of 




Reference to drone strikes that are conducted using an observed 
pattern of activity that suggests terrorist activity and/or alliance with 
a terrorist organization 
Emergent 
Human Rights Narrative and analysis that refers to the importance of maintaining 
and enhancing human rights amongst civilians, usually in a universal 
sense. Human rights also covers references to “humanitarian law.” 
Emergent 
Legal Language Terminology and/or sections of text that highlight the legality or 
illegality of weaponized drone counterterrorism tactics and 





Discussion in the text regarding the distinction made between 
militants and civilians in regard to drone strikes. A perceived lack of 
distinction between militants and civilians are also included within 
this code.  
Emergent 
War Crimes Pointed and subtle references to and analysis concerning American 






Allies/Cooperation Terminology and/or references to allies of the United States and 




Descriptions of community, religious, and/or cultural activities 




Reference to the economic challenges experienced by those affected 




A catch-all code that covers negative reference to drone strikes that 




Narratives and analysis that discuss physical damage to humans 
resulting from drone strikes 
Emergent 
Drone Strikes—Precision Language and/or analysis that references the precise targeting 




Narratives and analysis that discuss the destruction of property 




Narratives and analysis that discuss the disruption of life activities 





Section of narrative text that describes the loss or injury of a family 
member, neighbor, or friend resulting from a drone strike 
A Priori 
Narrative—Relationship  Narratives and analysis that specifically note the relationship of the 
story-teller to the victim 
Emergent 
Narrative—Survivor Section of narrative text that describes the experience of a drone 
strike and/or injury from the perspective of a survivor 
A Priori 
National Security Terminology and/or sections of text that prioritize and/or explain 
practices and policies of national security 
A Priori 
Response to Terrorism Terminology that references acts of terrorism and/or terrorist groups 
in relationship to national security and/or drone strikes.   
Emergent 
September 11, 2001 
Attacks  
Reference to the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States that 




Terminology and/or sections of texts that prioritize soldier safety 
and/or the utilization of tactics that are intended to reduce casualties 
and risk to soldiers in combat  
A Priori 
Exposure 
Dates/Locations of Strikes Terminology and/or sections of text that mention dates and/or 




Terminology and/or sections of text that provide vague statements 




Analytical remarks made in texts/reports that suggest that drone 
strikes result in increased anti-US Sentiment in areas targeted by 
drone strikes 
Emergent 
Drone Strikes—CIA  Reference to intelligence gathering, human intelligence, and CIA-
orchestrated drone activities 
Emergent 
Geography—Afghanistan References to Afghanistan Emergent 
Geography—North 
Waziristan 
References to the northern part of Waziristan, a mountainous region 
on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan   
Emergent 
Geography—Pakistan References to Pakistan Emergent 
Geography—Somalia References to Somalia Emergent 
Geography—South 
Waziristan 
References to the southern part of Waziristan, a mountainous region 
on the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
 
Geography—Yemen References to Yemen Emergent 
Public Debate—United 
States 
Discussion about and/or reference to the exchange of ideas or debate 
regarding counterterrorism in the United States especially regarding 
the use of drones 
 
Transparency Analysis that requests or indicates transparency regarding drone 




Transparency—Lack Of Analysis that indicates and/or condemns a lack of transparency 
regarding drone strikes by the United States government. This 





Subversive Narrative: Visual and Content Analysis of Photography 
Code Code Definition  
Adult Language referencing the presence 
of adult persons in the photographs 
Emergent 
Barren Landscape Language referring to the remote 
nature of the landscape in the 
photographs 
Emergent 
Casualty Discussion of injury and/or death  Emergent 
Children Language regarding the presence of 
children in photographs 
Emergent 
Destruction Language referring to the process 
of destruction 
Emergent 
Dirty Clothing Discussion of the soiled condition 
of clothing worn by individuals in 
the photographs 
Emergent 
Emotion Words describing the interpretation 
of emotions based on individuals’ 
facial expressions in the 
photographs 
Emergent 
Fire Language discussing the presence 
of fire and/or areas appearing to be 
burned/blackened in photographs 
Emergent 
Item Color Descriptions of the colors of 
particular items in the photographs 
Emergent 
Item Detail Descriptions of artistic imprinting 
on items, patterns on carpets, etc. in 
photographs  
Emergent 
Metal Debris Discussion of metal objects present 
in photographs. Description of 
remaining pieces of hell fire 
missiles are included under this 
code  
Emergent  
Mountains Description of mountainous terrain 
in the photograph 
Emergent 
Rubble Language describing building and 
infrastructure debris present in 
photographs  
Emergent 
Sun  Reference to sun and clear skies in 
the photographs 
Emergent 
Women Language regarding the presence of 










Appendix B: Visual Analysis Memos 
Noor Behram’s Drone Photography 
https://www.wired.com/2011/12/photos-pakistan-drone-war/ 
Initial thoughts: 
Of the 11 photographs posted in the “Wired” story, I selected nine to analyze. The nine selected 
included visual evidence (according to Behram and Wired.com) of the impact of drone strikes. 
To me, these revealed the impact that drone strikes have on individual people in homes and in 
communities. I chose the Wired photographs (instead of The Guardian and Der Spiegel’s 
published photography) because they were vetted by the author of the Wired.com article and 
seem to be triangulated with accounts of reported strikes by Western news sources. This 
triangulation also provided me with some context for the photographs.  
This analysis follows the “Big Picture Memo” approach developed by Robert E. Park and 
explained and developed by Clarke. The data creation comes not only from the photograph, but 
also from the composed memo, which is an account of the analyst’s interpretation of the 
photographs.  
As I embarked on the “first impressions” step, I naturally described the photograph. Thus, I 
collapsed steps one and two into one step. After this, I used printed versions of the photographs 
that were divided into quadrants in order to complete the “little pictures” step. Because I didn’t 
have access to a color printer, I used a black & white print out and looked at the colored photo on 
a computer screen in order to analyze the colors of the various quadrants.  
 
Photograph 1: 
First Impressions/Big Picture: 
 Seven children holding pieces of metal debris. These pieces of metal seem to be 
important as the children have collected the pieces and are holding them in an organized 
group to be photographed.  
 All of the children appear to be male. The three taller boys (in the back) appear to be 
teenagers, while the four near the front of the photograph appear to be grade school aged.  
 The children are wearing what I would expect to be “traditional” South Asian garb. With 
the exception of the boy second from the right who is wearing white and the tall boy in 
the back, who is wearing blue, the boys are wearing dark clothing. Some of the boys’ 
clothes (notably the boy in maroon in the center) are very dirty. One might assume that 
they became dirty when searching for and/or retrieving the metal objects they are 
holding. All of the boys are wearing head coverings (though we cannot see the top of the 
boy in blue’s head.)  Not all of the boys’ headwear appears similar. Some appear to have 
more turban-like or wrapped head coverings, while others have more structured caps.   
 It is clearly a sunny day. The picture is slightly over-exposed due to the sunlight. The 
green trees in the background pop out against the boys’ (generally) drab clothing.  
 The buildings in the background seem to be intact, as do the trees, so we might assume 
that the boys are standing a distance away from the drone strike location.  
 With the exception of the boy on the far right of the photograph, none of the boys are 
looking directly into the camera. The younger boys seem to be looking, with curiosity, 
directly at their metal debris. The older boys towards the left side of the picture appear 
disgusted or angry. The tall boy in blue does not have an interpretable facial expression. 
 The boy on the far right stands in a more aggressive pose than the other boys—as if he is 
shoving his piece of metal directly at the camera. “See? Look at what I have here.”  
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 On photo composition: This photograph seems hastily taken. It is not formally posed and 
neglects to include the entirely of the group. The subject of the photograph seems to be 
the metal debris that the boys are carrying. 
Little Pictures: 
 1-A 
o When pulled in this close, the expressions of the older, taller boys is clearer. Both 
appear very angry. The boy in the blue scarf also appears sad. 
o I am curious about the black strap across the scarf-wearing boy’s chest. It might 
be a bag, but that is unclear. 
o The boy on the far left looks quizzically at the missile piece in his hand. 
 1-B 
o The tall boy in the back, wearing the light blue, seems emotionless. He also 
doesn’t seem to have anything in his hands (unlike the other boys in the picture). 
Because his head is cut off in the photograph, it appears that he is not included in 
the group. He seems to be a bit of an outsider or perhaps was not involved in the 
missile-piece collection endeavor. 
o The facial expressions of the three younger boys are very interesting. The smallest 
boy (left) is carefully examining his missile piece, but seems sad—maybe afraid 
of it. The middle boy (in white) is gasping at his missile piece. Perhaps he’s about 
to drop it. The boy to the far right appears defiant and is aiming his missile piece 
at the photographer, towards the viewer. His eyes are squinting, almost as if he is 
aiming the missile piece (like a gun).  
o The boys are wearing similar hats that are dissimilar from the boys’ hats in 1-A. I 
wonder if they might be siblings. 
 1-C 
o The missile pieces in this quadrant are each spent. They are hollow inside. I’m 
surprised that they are in as large of fragments as they are post-strike. They must 
be fairly light as the boys can hold them with one hand.  
 1-D 
o Same comments re: missile pieces as in 1-C. Few dissimilarities are noticed.  
Photograph 2: 
First Impressions/Big Picture: 
 This photograph shows a pile of rubble/debris next to an intact wall. 
 Because the lower part of the wall is painted blue, it strikes me that this may be an 
interior wall or the exterior wall of a porch. Apparently it was an area of importance to 
the home owner since it was painted such a bright color.  
 Included in the pile of debris appear to be electrical wine, cement with exposed rebar, 
decorative stone or bricks, loose bricks (not decorative), bricks that are still held together 
with mortar. Long, thin pieces of wood are leaning against the wall. 
 The building in the background has doors and a window. The glass or screen on the 
window (left-center portion of the photo) seems to still be intact. 
 It doesn’t appear that there has been a fire here, just destruction—maybe an explosion.  
 The building appears to be sitting upon a concrete foundation with a step up (far right-
center of the photograph) 
 148 
 
 No household items (furniture, etc.) appear to be in the debris. 
 On photo composition: This photograph is composed with the pile of debris as the 
primary subject of the photograph.  
Little Pictures: 
 2-A 
o The diagonally situated pieces seem to be metal. Some have holes for screws, but 
they are no longer connected. 
o This appears to be the exterior of a building painted white with a bold, blue stripe. 
o The windows and doors are painted brown and have panes of glass. It appears that 
the glass in the windows and doors is not broken (though it’s difficult to tell) 
o This house has an electrical box attached to the wall between the window and 
door. Perhaps it is for an exterior light.  
 2-B 
o One of the window panes/shutters is open. It’s not clear if this is the way its 
supposed to be or not. 
o There are black marks on the back wall. This stands in stark contrast to the white 
walls. 
o The beam that is leaning has rebar coming out of the top. It appears to be plaster-
covered cement. It might be brick 
o Metal pieces—laid diagonally—cut through the center of this quadrant. 
 2-C 
o This quadrant shows a pile of displaced bricks. Towards the bottom, the bricks are 
still neatly laid—so the disparency between the two is clear. 
o A piece of electrical cord (conceivably) runs through the upper right portion of 
this quadrant. 
o Some of the bricks seems to have a stamp—maybe a date or location of 
manufacture. 
o In the top right, a chunk of mortared brick lays—it appears dislodged from the 
foundation. 
 2-D 
o In this quadrant we see more brick debris  
o In the far left corner of the quadrant is a delicately-carved brick/stone with a 
flower or star at the center and filigree on the edges as a border.  
Photograph 3: 
First Impressions/Big Picture:     
 This photograph shows a man wearing a purple shirt, holding a piece of metal (similar to 
those held by the boys in photograph 1). He is very direty. The sleeves of his shirt have 
become discolored and appear brown. His hands are also very dirty and appear to be 
covered with the dirt that surrounds him. He is showing the camera the piece of metal as 
if this is the important thing that he wants the photographer to see. In the background is 
an expansive pile of rubble. It fills most of the background of the photograph. In the 
background are at least three people. They are concentrated to the right side of the 
photograph. There are two figures in the background to the left of the man. These could 
be people, bodies, or piles of fabric (curtain material or rugs). The photograph does not 
make this clear. Further back in the photograph, we see that this is a mountainous region 
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and that there are trees and bushes in the background. While it’s difficult to tell for sure, 
it appears that the men to the right might be taking a water break (that looks like an 
orange water cooler to me—where would they have gotten that?!) The person to the 
right-center (in the blue) appears to be walking into the rubble. The people in the 
background appear interested in the photographer. They are also looking towards the 
camera, despite their distance from the photographer. They seem to be wondering: 
“What’s going on over there?”  
 The man in the picture: He seems to be well-dressed (my response to the photograph: 
“That’s a nice shirt!”) Despite his surroundings, his shirt appears well-pressed. His beard 
is well-maintained. He looks directly into camera, confidently, but he appears concerned. 
His eyebrows are furled and his eyes slightly squinted. Perhaps he is questioning the 
photographer.  
 On photo composition: This photograph is more aesthetically pleasing than the previous 
two and seems to deliberately tell a story of individuals who were doing clean up. The 
photographer seems to be making a connection between the piece of metal that the man 
in the foreground is holding and the destruction in the background. It’s interesting that 
this photograph, while showing a lot of debris in the background does not pull back far 
enough to see all of the destruction/debris/rubble. Nor is it clearly depicting the activities 
in the background of the photograph.  
Little Pictures: 
 3-A 
o This picture was taken on a bright, sunny day. 
o There is mountainous terrain in the background, though it is faint 
o There are two individuals standing in the background. It’s unclear what they are 
doing. 
o There is a bundle of blue fabric in the right center of the quadrant. It is laid out as 
if it could be a victim on the outskirts of the rubble, but that is not clear. 
o In the foreground, we see a landscape of various-sized stones and debris.  
 3-B: 
o In this quadrant, we first see the photograph’s main subject face. An adult man 
(30-40 years of age) is looking directly at the camera. His facial expression 
conveys concern, anger, sadness.  
o In the background, we see three individuals. All appear to be men. The two on the 
right appear to be to be taking a water break and are gathered around an orange 
cooler (similar to the kind that construction workers use in the US) that is sitting 
atop a pile of stones. They are dressed in dark clothing. 
o In the center, another man moves from right to left, towards the rubble. He is 
wearing white and blue, causing him to stand out against the darkly clothed 
individuals. 
o In the background, we can see some barren trees as well as some more lush 
greenery. Mountains and a tree line are visible in the far distance.    
 3-C: 
o In this quadrant, we see the piece of a missile that the subject (the man) is 
holding. It is metal and gray and appears to be empty. 
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o To the left, there are a few stones scattered. They appear to be distinct from the 
rubble pile depicted in 3A and 3B. They ground appears unlevel, but not affected 
by an explosion. 
o In the top center, there is a black area—perhaps the site of impact or a hole—with 
some brown/dried vegetation around the black hole.  
 3-D: 
o In this quadrant, we see primarily the man’s sleeve and left hand. His clothing is 
dirty, presumably from the efforts of extracting the missile piece that he is 
displaying in 3-C. 
o The ground in the right (vertical) third of the photograph also seems undisturbed.  
Photograph 4: 
First Impressions/Big Picture 
 This photograph depicts three children. They seem to know each other—I would guess 
that they are siblings. The smallest child (in green) looks to the middle child (a girl) for 
explanation. He might not understand why this photograph is being taken. Each child is 
holding some stones or pieces of brick and are showing them to the photographer. 
Despite being very dirty, the children’s attire seems well-cared for (it’s dirty, but doesn’t 
have holes in it). In contrast to the boys in photograph one, these children are wearing 
light/bright colored clothing (white, green, paisley-printed). The girl to the left is looking 
directly into the camera. She seems interested in what the photographer is doing. While 
the boy on the right appears to be looking at the camera, it seems that he is actually 
looking at the rocks in his hands. To the right, in the bottom corner, we see a fire burning. 
It appears to be wood burning, but the purpose of the fire and/or its origins are unclear.  
 In the background we see a flat, rocky area that leads up to a tree line and then to some 
larger hills/mountains. There are a lot of rocks. Everywhere. The tree in the upper right 
doesn’t seem to be especially vibrant. It appears to be leaning off of the small hill that it 
is growing out of.   
 On photo composition: The subject of this photograph is clearly the children. While their 
story is not clear from the photo, what is clear is their interest in the photographer, the 
rocks that they are holding onto, and each other. The photographer seems to have situated 
the children away from the village and from other people. They are placed against the 
background of what lies beyond their place of residence, free of buildings or other 
people. I’m not sure that the photographer intended the fire to be included in the 
photograph. At least, there is little clue from the photo’s composition concerning the 
purpose of the fire. More so than the other photographs, this one seems posed. 
Little Pictures: 
 4-A 
o While the little girl in this photograph is not (probably) the intended subject in 
this photograph, I think that the interaction between her and her (conceivably) 
younger sibling is precious.  
o The girl stares directly into the camera looking interested—not sad or afraid. Her 
hair is neatly cut and has a couple of curls flying away on top.  
o The girl’s dress is cute—looking almost Western in origin. It is white with a pink 
or purple paisley print.  
o She holds something—perhaps a rock—in her hands 
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o To the right, the girl’s younger sibling appears to be asking her a question 
(perhaps about the photographer). 
o The area directly behind the two children is rocky rough terrain. In the distance is 
a tree line and past that emerge mountains.  
 4-B 
o This quadrant shows only an older boy. In his hands, he holds two rocks or bricks. 
What they are for or what they for is not clear. 
o He smiles at the rocks, seemingly interested in them—perhaps he’s thinking of 
what he could do with them.  
o The boy wears white clothes that seem fairly clear except for a couple of smudges 
of dirt on the sleeves. 
o Over the boy’s shoulder, a tree grows on a hill or out of a rocky outcropping. 
There also appears to be some vegetative ground cover. 
 4-C 
o In this quadrant, it is clear that the small child is also holding a rock. He/she has 
decorative embroidery on his/her clothes 
o From this quadrant, the girl’s dress is clearly very dirty—with dirt and dust. It 
appears that she may have been covered in dust from an explosion. 
 4-D 
o In this quadrant we see that the older boy’s clothing is also quite dirty—similar to 
the girl’s clothing in 4-C. 
o The fire in the bottom right is a bit peculiar. It appears that wood is burning, but it 
is not clear what purpose the fire serves.  
o Behind the fire is rocky terrain, perhaps rubble.  
Photograph 5: 
First Impressions/Big Picture:  
 This picture is hard. That’s because I know at first glance that this is the death portrait of 
a child. 
 The child’s eyes are closed. He has some discoloration around his nostrils (dried blood?) 
and on his lip. Someone has placed a white bandage around his head. The child is 
wearing a blue jacket that is very dusty and dirty.  
 In the background we see a red, patterned rug. It’s quite beautiful and might be a special 
possession of the owner.  
 On photo composition: The child is the subject of this photo. His head is situated between 
two white columns, which provides an aesthetic frame for the child. 
 It is interesting to me that this is a picture of a child. There are not pictures of deceased 
adults included in this collection of photography. That indicates a very clear message 
to the viewer. While the deaths of others are important, it’s the death of children 
that are the most important.     
Little Pictures: 
 I evaluated this picture in its quadrants, but did not see anything additionally helpful. I 
think this is primarily because the quadrants were equally divided on the child’s face. 
Additionally, because the photograph was taken up close, much of the detail of the 





 This photograph shows a destroyed building in the midst of a desolate, rural landscape. 
The remaining wall (in the upper left) appears to be made out of mud. There are exposed 
beams on the building’s “floor.” Perhaps pieces of rebar (though that’s difficult to tell. 
There are blackened pieces of wood (conceivably from fire) in the bottom third of the 
photograph.  
 Towards the center of the photograph, in the midst of the rubble is a red patterned rug. 
That leads me to wonder if this had been someone’s home.  
 In the center back of the photograph there is a lone telephone pole, suggesting modern 
contact with the outside world. This is juxtaposed against the barren land in the 
background. The terrain contains some grass (now browned) and scattered bushes. In the 
far background we see some trees emerging. ?In the very back of the photograph there 
are large hills or mountains.  
 On photo composition: This photo is a landscape. The rug and the charred wood in the 
midst of the rubble seem to be the subject of this photograph, though it is taken at such an 
angle that it makes it difficult to see detail of either. The rug sees to emerge from the 
rubble. The white remaining wall stands in stark contrast to the rest of the color scheme, 
which leads us towards the telephone pole.  
Little Pictures: 
 6-A 
o This quadrant shows a crumbling wall that appears to be constructed from mud, 
wood, and stone. It could also be made from concrete that hasn’t been carefully 
smoothed (as it might be in American construction).  
o Some sticks protrude from the top of the mud wall and seem to be covered with 
straw (perhaps for the building’s roof).  
o Dislodged stones or bricks and wood are scattered on the ground. 
o In the distance, we see the horizon, lined with trees and with some brush in front 
of that.  
 6-B 
o There are two things that stick out to me in this quadrant: 
 The remnants of a wall that had been painted white. It appears to have had 
a substantial chunk removed from it. 
 A telephone pole dividing the quadrant. This technology is juxtaposed 
against a very remote backdrop. This scene actually reminds me of the 
landscape (dotted with telephone poles) at my family’s ranch in eastern 
Montana.  
o The foreground shows a number of stones, bricks, and sticks strewn on the 
ground. 
o The background shows a barren landscape: flat grass land transitions quickly into 
rolling hills, which transitions to a timber line, and then to mountains in the 
distance. One can see a very long distance in this area. 
 6-C 
o The quadrant shows a pile of rubble that appears to be composed of stones, 
lumber, sticks and bricks. 
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 Originally I thought that the sticks might be rebar, but from this vantage, 
they appear to be more wood-like than metal. I could still be wrong here. 
o Near the center of the frame, we see that some of the lumber has been charred, 
conceivably from a fire. 
o Near the dead center of the quadrant there appears to be a short cylinder. It looks 
different from the other materials in the rubble, leading me to wonder if it might 
be part of the missile that hit this building. 
o The upper right corner of this quadrant shows part of a red, white, and black 
patterned rug. 
 6-D 
o This quadrant shows more of the rubble.  
o The sticks in this area are positioned more evenly, almost laying perfectly 
horizontally. 
o There are some charred elements in the bottom left corner of the quadrant. 
o The upper-left corner shows the rest of the rug (mentioned in 6-C). In this 
quadrant, the color of the rug (red) and its pattern (white background with black 
circles) are clearer as a corner of the rug is flipped over and is displaying the 
color.  
Photograph 7: 
First Impressions/Big Picture 
 This photograph doesn’t strike me as very exciting, which makes me wonder why Wired 
chose to include it. It doesn’t seem to give any indication of being anything more than a 
garbage pile against a building wall. I suspect that there’s more in the article’s backstory.  
 This photograph shows a pile of whole and broken bricks in front of a white and brick 
building wall. There appear to be pipes intermixed in the pile at odd angles. Laying on 
top of the pile and slightly behind it are dried straw or grasses. Cutting through the 
photograph (tilted towards the upper right corner) is a blue metal piece that (probably 
because of the direction in which it’s pointed) reminds me of a ladder.  
 The longer I look at this photograph, I realize that the area behind the rubble is actually 
open. Initially, I thought that it was a white wall, but in the very far right corner, there is a 
tree. The picture is slightly overexposed, causing the daylight to appear white. Whatever 
was previously behind the pile of rubble is no longer present. The walls’ interiors (I’m 
guessing) are exposed to the outside and to the sun.  
Little Pictures: 
 7-A 
o This quadrant shows thick wooden poles leaning up against a brick and concrete 
wall. 
o Cutting through the frame is a blue metal piece that is sitting diagonally—lower 
left corner to upper right. There is a wooden pole laying cross-wise on it. 
o The concrete wall appears to be painted a brick red color on the lower half 
o In the background, we see an unknown arched structure and the white light of 
daylight 
 7-B 
o This quadrant doesn’t seem especially informative or interesting 
o On the far right we see a brick, mortared structure—perhaps a chimney. 
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o Throughout the center of the frame are dried grasses, straw, etc. 
o There is a concrete-covered brick structure (maybe a wall?) towards the back of 
the frame. It appears to be crumbling and has suffered damage, but is standing. 
 7-C 
o This quadrant shows the blue metal piece in the upper left coming out of the 
ground and extending into the 7-A quadrant. We can see the pole crossing it here. 
 It strikes me that perhaps the pole fell on the blue metal object, knocking it 
down 
o There are a number of stones and bricks strewn on the ground. Grasses and/or 
straw is interwoven throughout the rubble. 
o It appears that there might be a wooden or metal table within the rubble. It looks 
like a small side table or a night stand. 
 7-D 
o This quadrant shows dislodged and fallen bricks. 
o There are some metal pipes (maybe copper?) laying horizontally at the top and 
center of the quadrant and a pipe cutting the upper right corner.  
Photograph 8: 
First Impressions/Big Picture 
 This photograph depicts an area of strewn rock, stone, and brick. Approximately twelve 
individuals stand looking at the rubble from a firm rock or concrete street or building 
foundation. There is a mixture of adults and children. One person (likely a man) stands in 
the midst of the stones and appears to be searching for something.  
 I could be incorrect, but I think that this is the first depiction of women in the Wired.com 
Noor Behram photographs. I am assuming that some of the individuals standing in the 
upper right corner because they are waring fabric head coverings that appear to me to be 
hijabs.  
 The spectators are wearing a variety of colors. While some are wearing dark colors 
(black, brown), the individuals at the center are wearing light colors (white, yellow, blue) 
that cause them to stand out against the monotone tan foreground of the photograph.  
 In the background of the photograph, a stone/brick wall remains intact with a red-
curtained window pops out in the upper left. The photograph is framed in the upper left, 
as well, with some tree or bush branches. 
 Some of the stones/bricks in the pile seem unremarkable, but there are several that 
contain decorative stamping. That indicates to me that this building/wall was/.is special to 
the people who are gathered. 
 In the lower third of the photograph, in the center, is a heap of brown fabric. While I am 
hopeful that it is some strewn clothing, it’s possible that it marks the location of a victim 
beneath the rubble.  
Little Pictures: 
 8-A 
o In this quadrant, we see a man bending over in a pile of rubble, looking for 
something or someone. Despite the fact that he is wearing a rather drab color 
(brown), he stands out against the light-colored stone/brick that he is standing on. 
o A man in black (on the far right) watches the man in brown’s search. 
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o On the left side of the frame is a tree with green leaves. 
o Behind the pile of rubble is a tall stone wall with a red-curtained door or window. 
 It’s possible that this rubble was caused by the destruction of a similar 
wall. Perhaps this used to be a courtyard of sorts. 
 8-B 
o This quadrant includes a crowd of spectators. All seem to be watching the man in 
brown’s search through the rubble (quadrant 8-A). 
 I believe that I count 13 onlookers in this quadrant 
o The three men on the right seem to be talking to each other 
o It appears that there are two children standing near the center of the group and 2-3 
women (who are identified from their head scarves). 
 As a side note, this is the first presence of women in the Wired.com 
photographs 
o There appears to be a red vehicle in the background and some still-standing 
buildings in the distance. 
 8-C 
o This quadrant shows a pile of stone and brick rubble. 
o Most of the bricks appear plain, but some have decorative markings—perhaps a 
flower 
o Towards the lower right corner is a brown bit of fabric. It’s difficult to tell if it 
might be covering a victim. If so, this might be the individual that the man in 
brown is searching for. If not, it appears to be some clothing in the midst of the 
rubble. 
 8-D 
o The quadrant shows more stone and brick debris 
o Here we can see more clearly some of the decorative markings on the brick. It 
might be crest or a decorative emblem.  
 It seems that this place was valued—as is clear by the care in including 
decorative bricks in its construction. 
Photograph 9:  
 First Impressions/Big Picture 
 Again, this photograph of an injured, perhaps dead, child is difficult. 
 Different from the other photographs posted by Wired.com, this is the only photograph 
that is displayed vertically. This may be because the photographer is interested in 
showing only the child, not the background.  
 The child appears to be elementary school aged (maybe 8-10 years old) and is shirtless 
and is covered in bandages on his torso, but his face appears fairly free of damage. He 
rests his head either on his white shirt or the shirt of a rescuer. The lower half of his body 
is covered in a brown and black plaid blanket or sheet.   
 His right hand and arm appear to be burned. He has an IV in his left hand, indicating to 
me that this picture has been taken at the hospital or doctor’s clinic.  




 Similar to the situation with Photograph 5. Because this is a close-up photograph of an 
injured or deceased child, the quadrant approach does not seem to add anything of help to 
the analysis that isn’t already present in the First Impressions/Big Picture step.  
 
 
